Test your morality.
April 5, 2007 1:57 AM Subscribe
Taboo: A thought provoking scored quiz on morality from TPM Online - The Philosopher's Magazine. (Possibly NSFW due to sexual themes.)
This post was deleted for the following reason: Still moral after all these months. -- cortex
I think this has been posted before, but maybe just in a comment. I've certainly taken the test before.
This time around, I scored 0.04, 0.00, and 0.00. They think I'm confused because of that 0.04, which is the moralizing quotient, given that my other two scores are 0. But their claim that no one is hurt in their scenarios seems problematic in the case of the first scenario I was given, the promise to the mother.
I think there's a utilitarian good in keeping promises in general, and some harm in not keeping them, in general. Even if you can say that the specific people involved weren't harmed. So that's why I answered "a little" on that. But when they asked about two countries, one where keeping such problems is the custom and one where it is not, I judged that both were okay because in the country where it is the custom to not keep such a promise, there couldn't be a real expectation to keep such a promise.
The other problem I had, which I had the other time I took this test, was answering the God question. The question presupposes the existence of a God and it seems to me that if I'm apparently being asked to assume the existence of a God, and it doesn't tell me about such a God, then I have to guess the question is referring to the monotheistic God of our culture. And that God arbitrarily defines morality. So I don't see how I can answer the question reasonably any other way than going along with that arbitrary judgment. It's not clear to me if that's what they were aiming for.
Anyway, my score seems a bit odd to me because I feel like I'm notably moralistic. Of course, I don't believe in an absolute morality and the closest I can come is that I think that a human-wide (or, more unlikely but still perhaps possible, consciousness-wide) utilitarian morality is possible. At any rate, my morality is utilitarian with my intuition trying to cast the net as widely as possible. But because there's so much uncertainty, and because I'm not an absolutist, I'm also in a practical sense often culturally relativist and my answers reflected this. But I'm not in principle culturally relativist and I don't accept that all morality is culturally determined. I'm perfectly willing to, and do, violate my tendency toward cultural relativism when I think the cultural value is wrong in the larger context. An example of this is female genital mutilation.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 2:28 AM on April 5, 2007
This time around, I scored 0.04, 0.00, and 0.00. They think I'm confused because of that 0.04, which is the moralizing quotient, given that my other two scores are 0. But their claim that no one is hurt in their scenarios seems problematic in the case of the first scenario I was given, the promise to the mother.
I think there's a utilitarian good in keeping promises in general, and some harm in not keeping them, in general. Even if you can say that the specific people involved weren't harmed. So that's why I answered "a little" on that. But when they asked about two countries, one where keeping such problems is the custom and one where it is not, I judged that both were okay because in the country where it is the custom to not keep such a promise, there couldn't be a real expectation to keep such a promise.
The other problem I had, which I had the other time I took this test, was answering the God question. The question presupposes the existence of a God and it seems to me that if I'm apparently being asked to assume the existence of a God, and it doesn't tell me about such a God, then I have to guess the question is referring to the monotheistic God of our culture. And that God arbitrarily defines morality. So I don't see how I can answer the question reasonably any other way than going along with that arbitrary judgment. It's not clear to me if that's what they were aiming for.
Anyway, my score seems a bit odd to me because I feel like I'm notably moralistic. Of course, I don't believe in an absolute morality and the closest I can come is that I think that a human-wide (or, more unlikely but still perhaps possible, consciousness-wide) utilitarian morality is possible. At any rate, my morality is utilitarian with my intuition trying to cast the net as widely as possible. But because there's so much uncertainty, and because I'm not an absolutist, I'm also in a practical sense often culturally relativist and my answers reflected this. But I'm not in principle culturally relativist and I don't accept that all morality is culturally determined. I'm perfectly willing to, and do, violate my tendency toward cultural relativism when I think the cultural value is wrong in the larger context. An example of this is female genital mutilation.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 2:28 AM on April 5, 2007
I got 0, 0, -1. I differ from EB in that I think some lies (ie promise not kept) can increase general benefit. The question is careful to point out the recipient of the promise is not harmed as a result of the lie. It's certainly possible to come up with scenarios where I would have judged keeping a promise was of more general benefit.
I also thought the God question was poorly conceived.
posted by biffa at 2:38 AM on April 5, 2007
I also thought the God question was poorly conceived.
posted by biffa at 2:38 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Moralising Quotient is: 0.00.
Your Interference Factor is: 0.00.
Your Universalising Factor is: -1.
Perverted universal Chicken Lovers of the World unite!
posted by homodigitalis at 2:39 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Interference Factor is: 0.00.
Your Universalising Factor is: -1.
Perverted universal Chicken Lovers of the World unite!
posted by homodigitalis at 2:39 AM on April 5, 2007
I knew what was coming.
posted by fire&wings at 2:39 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by fire&wings at 2:39 AM on April 5, 2007
Note to self: instead of doing a test to find out I am open to perversion - I should rather do something naughty next time ...
posted by homodigitalis at 2:41 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by homodigitalis at 2:41 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Moralising Quotient is: 0.04.
Your Interference Factor is: 0.00.
Your Universalising Factor is: 0.00
I was hesitant on the cat-meal question. To be able to think of culinary pleasures when your own [i]pet[/i] cat has just been killed outside your own home, and to then act upon it, most certainly triggers the 'yuk' reaction. Such a morality in action, IMHO, translates to unpleasant overall outcomes elsewhere. But I went with a 'little wrong'.
posted by Gyan at 2:50 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Interference Factor is: 0.00.
Your Universalising Factor is: 0.00
I was hesitant on the cat-meal question. To be able to think of culinary pleasures when your own [i]pet[/i] cat has just been killed outside your own home, and to then act upon it, most certainly triggers the 'yuk' reaction. Such a morality in action, IMHO, translates to unpleasant overall outcomes elsewhere. But I went with a 'little wrong'.
posted by Gyan at 2:50 AM on April 5, 2007
Note to self: instead of doing a test to find out I am open to perversion - I should rather do something naughty next time ...
I suspect the true test is whether you can keep an erection whilst your penis is inserted into a frozen chicken.
posted by vbfg at 2:50 AM on April 5, 2007
I suspect the true test is whether you can keep an erection whilst your penis is inserted into a frozen chicken.
posted by vbfg at 2:50 AM on April 5, 2007
I suspect the true test is whether you can keep an erection whilst your penis is inserted into a frozen chicken.
... but it's not a moral issue, is it?
posted by homodigitalis at 2:54 AM on April 5, 2007
... but it's not a moral issue, is it?
posted by homodigitalis at 2:54 AM on April 5, 2007
I guess I had more of a problem dealing with absolutes; when they state that no further harm will ever come to these people should they repeat their decision. Once, okay. Twice? Thrice? Serially? What if later, as variables come into play and complications arise, you go from "experimental" to "obsessive?" Basically, they want me to believe that these humans, in these situations, are able to isolate themselves from their own emotions and are making completely rational choices. Deathbed promises, talking with God, and two-person sex are totally irrational situations. One of the only rational people in the quiz was the chickenfucker.
But chickenfucking is totally a gateway paraphilia. Dude, once you go fowl, can't go back now.
posted by krippledkonscious at 3:00 AM on April 5, 2007
But chickenfucking is totally a gateway paraphilia. Dude, once you go fowl, can't go back now.
posted by krippledkonscious at 3:00 AM on April 5, 2007
Looks like my 0.04, 0, 0 is not that unusual in the context of Mefi.
posted by handee at 3:07 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by handee at 3:07 AM on April 5, 2007
Seriously though, every time I'm grossed out by the fact that Koreans still eat dog meat, I consider the Hindus, and how truly delicious I think steak and hamburgers are.
posted by Brittanie at 3:20 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by Brittanie at 3:20 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Moralising Quotient of 0.38 compares to an average Moralising Quotient of 0.22. This means that as far as the events depicted in the scenarios featured in this activity are concerned you are less permissive than average.
Now wait a minute. Knocking the kid off the swing, the chicken fucking, the pet eating was all OK in my book, but I answer negative to incest and I am "less permissive" than average.
You average people are sick.
posted by three blind mice at 3:20 AM on April 5, 2007 [1 favorite]
Now wait a minute. Knocking the kid off the swing, the chicken fucking, the pet eating was all OK in my book, but I answer negative to incest and I am "less permissive" than average.
You average people are sick.
posted by three blind mice at 3:20 AM on April 5, 2007 [1 favorite]
the irony of getting a score that means "you don't force your morals on other people" is that that is a moral code I would love to force on other people.
posted by nihlton at 3:27 AM on April 5, 2007 [2 favorites]
posted by nihlton at 3:27 AM on April 5, 2007 [2 favorites]
Your Moralising Quotient is: 0.21.
Your Interference Factor is: 0.00.
Your Universalising Factor is: 0.00
Am I the only one bothered by "universalising?"
posted by maxwelton at 3:28 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Interference Factor is: 0.00.
Your Universalising Factor is: 0.00
Am I the only one bothered by "universalising?"
posted by maxwelton at 3:28 AM on April 5, 2007
Yeah, I got the same result as you three blind mice. I said wrong in the incest scenario on the basis that it's detrimental to the species in general, and as a policy should be avoided. Although this one particular instance didn't result in a child, the act is morally wrong in all cases.
But, it seems that just makes me some kind of incest nazi. I'm pro man-chicken love, though, totally.
posted by tracert at 3:37 AM on April 5, 2007
But, it seems that just makes me some kind of incest nazi. I'm pro man-chicken love, though, totally.
posted by tracert at 3:37 AM on April 5, 2007
"I got 0, 0, -1. I differ from EB in that I think some lies (ie promise not kept) can increase general benefit. The question is careful to point out the recipient of the promise is not harmed as a result of the lie. It's certainly possible to come up with scenarios where I would have judged keeping a promise was of more general benefit."
Those are good points. It's interesting that even though we're instructed not to mentally elaborate on the question, it's perfectly natural and perhaps necessary that we do so. What's more interesting is how different people assume different degrees of elaboration are more natural and necessary than others.
For me, in evaluating that question, I first had to ask myself "what is this question trying to get at?" That seemed to me to be the morality of breaking a promise. And the scenario was carefully worked so that we could see that there was no direct harm to either person for breaking a promise—they wanted to get at what people think of the inherent morality of promises.
It seems to me that there's great social utility in keeping promises. Or, as you say, not lying. That's not to say that in particular circumstances it's not better to break or promise or to lie. Sometimes it is.
You read the question in such a way that you saw this as one of those exceptions. I'm guessing that this is because you see the man visiting the grave as needless and the wasted effort of it as a greater harm than the general social harm that comes from breaking promises. It didn't occur to me to see it that way as I didn't think the grave visiting was onerous. Or, alternatively, if it is onerous I don't think he should have made the promise in the first place.
Ultimately, though, my cultural utilitarianism is revealed by this question as it seems to clumsily trying to divide between absolutists and those who will evaluate the situation solely in the context of those two people involved. Because they think that the phrasing of the question managed this, they think I'm inconsistent with my other scores. But I think they just didn't do enough of a job of making the context explicitly only between those two people. If they had, I would have answered differently. (Like, they are the only two people in the world.)
But that brings up where Gyan and I disagree. I can't see anything wrong with the pet eating because the "yuk" thing seems to me to be entirely an arbitrary cultural custom. I can't easily come up with a utilitarian basis for it being judged wrong in the way that in the promise-breaking question I can. I'm surprised that Gyan answered the question the way he answered it.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 3:47 AM on April 5, 2007
Those are good points. It's interesting that even though we're instructed not to mentally elaborate on the question, it's perfectly natural and perhaps necessary that we do so. What's more interesting is how different people assume different degrees of elaboration are more natural and necessary than others.
For me, in evaluating that question, I first had to ask myself "what is this question trying to get at?" That seemed to me to be the morality of breaking a promise. And the scenario was carefully worked so that we could see that there was no direct harm to either person for breaking a promise—they wanted to get at what people think of the inherent morality of promises.
It seems to me that there's great social utility in keeping promises. Or, as you say, not lying. That's not to say that in particular circumstances it's not better to break or promise or to lie. Sometimes it is.
You read the question in such a way that you saw this as one of those exceptions. I'm guessing that this is because you see the man visiting the grave as needless and the wasted effort of it as a greater harm than the general social harm that comes from breaking promises. It didn't occur to me to see it that way as I didn't think the grave visiting was onerous. Or, alternatively, if it is onerous I don't think he should have made the promise in the first place.
Ultimately, though, my cultural utilitarianism is revealed by this question as it seems to clumsily trying to divide between absolutists and those who will evaluate the situation solely in the context of those two people involved. Because they think that the phrasing of the question managed this, they think I'm inconsistent with my other scores. But I think they just didn't do enough of a job of making the context explicitly only between those two people. If they had, I would have answered differently. (Like, they are the only two people in the world.)
But that brings up where Gyan and I disagree. I can't see anything wrong with the pet eating because the "yuk" thing seems to me to be entirely an arbitrary cultural custom. I can't easily come up with a utilitarian basis for it being judged wrong in the way that in the promise-breaking question I can. I'm surprised that Gyan answered the question the way he answered it.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 3:47 AM on April 5, 2007
"There was no inconsistency in the way that you responded"
I presume the questions were too narrowly defined from which they made leaping generalizations.
Hmmmm, chicken.
posted by fluffycreature at 3:53 AM on April 5, 2007
Tracert: But, it seems that just makes me some kind of incest nazi. I'm pro man-chicken love, though, totally.
When I picture your future employers googling your name and finding this comment, I can't help but giggle.
posted by jaded at 3:54 AM on April 5, 2007
When I picture your future employers googling your name and finding this comment, I can't help but giggle.
posted by jaded at 3:54 AM on April 5, 2007
I'd save them the trouble and just put it on my resumé.
posted by Mr.Encyclopedia at 4:04 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by Mr.Encyclopedia at 4:04 AM on April 5, 2007
I got 0,0,-1 as far as moral taboos go. However, pretty much all the activities described except the broken promise are pretty damn sick, and I would have trouble accepting some of them as morally permissible in the real world, and only rated them all as morally permissible because "were not harmed" was stated in the question.
Interestingly, after I took the quiz I went back and changed my answer on the swing question to say that it was ok to puch someone for your own amusement, and it didn't change the results.
I previously took the test morality play, and after retaking it scored 96% on moral parsimony. I'm actually a little bothered that I still rate acts as slightly more morally significant than omissions.
posted by BrotherCaine at 4:04 AM on April 5, 2007
Interestingly, after I took the quiz I went back and changed my answer on the swing question to say that it was ok to puch someone for your own amusement, and it didn't change the results.
I previously took the test morality play, and after retaking it scored 96% on moral parsimony. I'm actually a little bothered that I still rate acts as slightly more morally significant than omissions.
posted by BrotherCaine at 4:04 AM on April 5, 2007
The argument for the pet eating being morally wrong (I didn't think it was in this question), is that someone might feel coerced into eating a pet to go along with everyone else in the family even though it was traumatic for them.
posted by BrotherCaine at 4:06 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by BrotherCaine at 4:06 AM on April 5, 2007
EB: I can't see anything wrong with the pet eating because the "yuk" thing seems to me to be entirely an arbitrary cultural custom.
Heck, no. If it's your pet cat, then presumably you have some emotional attachment to it. Viewing it as flesh in the very short time horizon after its demise i.e. when you're still in shock & grief, is an abnormal scenario. It's the quick switch from treating the cat's body as that of a sentient entity to treating it as flesh, which is disconcerting. Ultimately, I chose 'a little wrong' since given the cat's dead, no one's directly harmed in the process.
posted by Gyan at 4:07 AM on April 5, 2007
Heck, no. If it's your pet cat, then presumably you have some emotional attachment to it. Viewing it as flesh in the very short time horizon after its demise i.e. when you're still in shock & grief, is an abnormal scenario. It's the quick switch from treating the cat's body as that of a sentient entity to treating it as flesh, which is disconcerting. Ultimately, I chose 'a little wrong' since given the cat's dead, no one's directly harmed in the process.
posted by Gyan at 4:07 AM on April 5, 2007
I got 0, 0, -1 also. Go ahead and fuck your dead chickens, baby.
I have to admit I'm surprised how many people think that sex between two consenting adults is morally wrong if they happen to share genes. I mean, I have the same ICK reaction as anyone else, but that doesn't make it immoral.
posted by Justinian at 4:13 AM on April 5, 2007
I have to admit I'm surprised how many people think that sex between two consenting adults is morally wrong if they happen to share genes. I mean, I have the same ICK reaction as anyone else, but that doesn't make it immoral.
posted by Justinian at 4:13 AM on April 5, 2007
"Heck, no. If it's your pet cat, then presumably you have some emotional attachment to it. Viewing it as flesh in the very short time horizon after its demise i.e. when you're still in shock & grief, is an abnormal scenario. It's the quick switch from treating the cat's body as that of a sentient entity to treating it as flesh, which is disconcerting. Ultimately, I chose 'a little wrong' since given the cat's dead, no one's directly harmed in the process."
Why is "abnormal" a little wrong? Why is eating something you are attached to a little wrong? These both seem to me to be the normalizing of your personal morality. I can easily imagine eating something you're attached to as an act of honoring or love. I can't see this as something that's not a morally neutral act without more context (which there specifically is not).
BTW, I think that most people would answer that pushing the girl off the swing is wrong and they include that question not as part of the regular questions but rather to detect those who don't even include obvious harm as relevant to morality.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 4:14 AM on April 5, 2007
Why is "abnormal" a little wrong? Why is eating something you are attached to a little wrong? These both seem to me to be the normalizing of your personal morality. I can easily imagine eating something you're attached to as an act of honoring or love. I can't see this as something that's not a morally neutral act without more context (which there specifically is not).
BTW, I think that most people would answer that pushing the girl off the swing is wrong and they include that question not as part of the regular questions but rather to detect those who don't even include obvious harm as relevant to morality.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 4:14 AM on April 5, 2007
EB - with regard to easily imagining eating something as an act of honoring or love, you don't have to imagine it. Roman Catholics do it every single week. Remember, to a Roman Catholic the Eucharist is not a symbol of Christ's body, it is Christ's body itself no less than if it was the taste and texture of human flesh.
But you probably realized that already.
posted by Justinian at 4:16 AM on April 5, 2007
But you probably realized that already.
posted by Justinian at 4:16 AM on April 5, 2007
Heh, no, that didn't occur to me. But it's a great example.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 4:17 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 4:17 AM on April 5, 2007
A mefite, in the excitement of discovery, duplicates an earlier post. Is this morally wrong?
posted by Wolfdog at 4:17 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by Wolfdog at 4:17 AM on April 5, 2007
What really bugged me about the quiz is how all the responses are embedded in human-parseable text in a progressively longer URL. If I was as amoral and inconsiderate as the quiz claims, I would have edited the fields to make me appear more thoughtful and logical.
posted by ardgedee at 4:18 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by ardgedee at 4:18 AM on April 5, 2007
If a culture says that it is OK to lie to your dying mother, the dying mothers must know that that is the norm, and therefore know that any promises given to them are outright lies. This would cause emotional harm to the dying mothers, which is why I said it's not OK. It's actually worse than individual cases of lying to dying mothers.
Also, regarding the cat. I agree with Gyan, in our culture, if no harm (emotionally) results from eating your pet, there's something wrong with you and your moral compass is already skewed. Other cultures, yuck, and I don't believe that it really can be harmless, but I tried to be open minded.
It's different from eating some random dog, it's like eating your sibling.
posted by miss tea at 4:27 AM on April 5, 2007
Also, regarding the cat. I agree with Gyan, in our culture, if no harm (emotionally) results from eating your pet, there's something wrong with you and your moral compass is already skewed. Other cultures, yuck, and I don't believe that it really can be harmless, but I tried to be open minded.
It's different from eating some random dog, it's like eating your sibling.
posted by miss tea at 4:27 AM on April 5, 2007
I must say that I prefer "Battleground God" to the Taboo game. It's quite interesting and thought provoking. Of course the people who really need to take that one probably won't.
posted by Justinian at 4:28 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by Justinian at 4:28 AM on April 5, 2007
Miss Tea - it may well be like eating your sibling. That you find eating your (dead) sibling abhorrent is cultural, not inherently immoral.
posted by Justinian at 4:29 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by Justinian at 4:29 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Moralising Quotient is: 0.00.
Your Interference Factor is: 0.00.
Your Universalising Factor is: -1.
What's with the chicken fucking, is all I want to know.
Anyway, I've talked at length before about how I think it's possible and important to make a significant distinction between 'ethical' and 'moral', despite the fact that 'moral' is used as a blanket term by most. I'd rather drink more beer this evening than repeat myself on that topic, but given that I place little to no stock in morality and a great deal in ethics, my result ain't suprising at all.
Interesting link, loq. Thanks!
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 4:36 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Interference Factor is: 0.00.
Your Universalising Factor is: -1.
What's with the chicken fucking, is all I want to know.
Anyway, I've talked at length before about how I think it's possible and important to make a significant distinction between 'ethical' and 'moral', despite the fact that 'moral' is used as a blanket term by most. I'd rather drink more beer this evening than repeat myself on that topic, but given that I place little to no stock in morality and a great deal in ethics, my result ain't suprising at all.
Interesting link, loq. Thanks!
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 4:36 AM on April 5, 2007
Justinian & EB - the highland people of Papua New Guinea have one up on the catholics. They used to literally eat dead loved ones (as i recall, as a means of preserving them internally) (see: Kuru)
posted by nihlton at 4:37 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by nihlton at 4:37 AM on April 5, 2007
I've been bugged about this test for the last little while because I don't think it gets at the areas that I think are most interesting. It seems to really just separate out the moral absolutists (usually the theists) and people who create an absolutist morality from normalizing their own (cultural or no) beliefs, from the rest of us. But that's trivial, really.
Where it gets problematic and interesting is the stuff they eliminated from the get-go: where there's "harm". But what is "harm"? That's what we end up arguing about the most, particularly with a great many cross-cultural debates. Those of us who object to FGM do so because we see obvious harm. But those who defend it deny there is harm. And the same goes for MGM.
So it seems to me that the elision of harm in this test gives a false impression of how discussions and conflicts about morality in the real world really work. For example, where people tend to see harm, they tend to universalism and not cultural relativism. They may be nuanced about this, evaluating relative levels of harm and weighing that against the harm of cultural moral imperialism. But they are universalist about the morality involving harm, nevertheless.
So it would be very interesting to look at how different people evaluate where there is harm, and how much.
And then we can look at how, um, "imperialist" they are. Even when they believe there is harm, many people weigh the vice of cultural imperialism so heavily that only where there is great harm will they endorse it. Others are much more quick to endorse intervention. So, again, it seems to me to be more interesting to look at how different people differently evaluate these things. Why are they different? What factors correlate to those differences?
I think of myself as a moralist because, unlike other relativists, where I'm pretty sure my moral judgment applies, I endorse its enforcement. Unlike nihlton, I don't see forcing your morals on other people as a bad thing. I think it's a good thing, as long as your morals are correct. But I'm moderately skeptical about how well we are able to approach that correctness and so as the context widens or becomes more unusual, I'm more careful and reluctant. I endorse actions to fight FGM in other cultures, but that's pretty close to my limit of willingness to interfere.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 4:41 AM on April 5, 2007
Where it gets problematic and interesting is the stuff they eliminated from the get-go: where there's "harm". But what is "harm"? That's what we end up arguing about the most, particularly with a great many cross-cultural debates. Those of us who object to FGM do so because we see obvious harm. But those who defend it deny there is harm. And the same goes for MGM.
So it seems to me that the elision of harm in this test gives a false impression of how discussions and conflicts about morality in the real world really work. For example, where people tend to see harm, they tend to universalism and not cultural relativism. They may be nuanced about this, evaluating relative levels of harm and weighing that against the harm of cultural moral imperialism. But they are universalist about the morality involving harm, nevertheless.
So it would be very interesting to look at how different people evaluate where there is harm, and how much.
And then we can look at how, um, "imperialist" they are. Even when they believe there is harm, many people weigh the vice of cultural imperialism so heavily that only where there is great harm will they endorse it. Others are much more quick to endorse intervention. So, again, it seems to me to be more interesting to look at how different people differently evaluate these things. Why are they different? What factors correlate to those differences?
I think of myself as a moralist because, unlike other relativists, where I'm pretty sure my moral judgment applies, I endorse its enforcement. Unlike nihlton, I don't see forcing your morals on other people as a bad thing. I think it's a good thing, as long as your morals are correct. But I'm moderately skeptical about how well we are able to approach that correctness and so as the context widens or becomes more unusual, I'm more careful and reluctant. I endorse actions to fight FGM in other cultures, but that's pretty close to my limit of willingness to interfere.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 4:41 AM on April 5, 2007
I mean, come on! Philosopher(.net) chicken porn. [Note: not porn.]
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 4:42 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 4:42 AM on April 5, 2007
Unlike nihlton, I don't see forcing your morals on other people as a bad thing.
Shit, I'm getting sucked in, here, but: EB, I'd say that the phrase 'forcing your morals on other people' is essentially meaningless, which is to say that (I reckon) morality is an artifact of community, and only sometimes in consonance with ethical behaviour, which may be suggested to be universal (or baked-in to human experience, or however you want to look at it). That is, that 'your morals' are the morals of whatever intersection of communities you are part of or identify with or have been indoctrinated to, and so are not 'yours', and so that clashes of morality are actually clashes of tribes.
Shorthand, of course.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 4:49 AM on April 5, 2007
Shit, I'm getting sucked in, here, but: EB, I'd say that the phrase 'forcing your morals on other people' is essentially meaningless, which is to say that (I reckon) morality is an artifact of community, and only sometimes in consonance with ethical behaviour, which may be suggested to be universal (or baked-in to human experience, or however you want to look at it). That is, that 'your morals' are the morals of whatever intersection of communities you are part of or identify with or have been indoctrinated to, and so are not 'yours', and so that clashes of morality are actually clashes of tribes.
Shorthand, of course.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 4:49 AM on April 5, 2007
Justinian- well, yeah, that's what I said. In other cultures, yuck. But I didn't say it was morally wrong. In our culture, morally wrong.
posted by miss tea at 4:51 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by miss tea at 4:51 AM on April 5, 2007
miss tea writes "If a culture says that it is OK to lie to your dying mother, the dying mothers must know that that is the norm, and therefore know that any promises given to them are outright lies. This would cause emotional harm to the dying mothers, which is why I said it's not OK. It's actually worse than individual cases of lying to dying mothers.
Yeah, what I'd have written if miss tea hadn't.
posted by orthogonality at 4:55 AM on April 5, 2007
Yeah, what I'd have written if miss tea hadn't.
posted by orthogonality at 4:55 AM on April 5, 2007
"If a culture says that it is OK to lie to your dying mother, the dying mothers must know that that is the norm, and therefore know that any promises given to them are outright lies. This would cause emotional harm to the dying mothers, which is why I said it's not OK. It's actually worse than individual cases of lying to dying mothers."
I don't see that at all. That is exactly the opposite of my evaluation. It seems to me that if the cultural norm is that it's okay to lie to your dying mother, then the mother, being a part of that culture, will necessarily also think it's okay. It wouldn't cause her harm to know that the promise is a lie, quite the reverse. In fact in our culture there's lots of examples where it's acceptable to lie and because of that we typically don't think the person lied to is harmed by it.
For a humorous example, there's "no, honey, you don't look fat in those pants". Put aside the question of whether there's some utility in the partner hearing the truth in this example. Just concentrate on the social norm that one doesn't tell one's partner they look fat and that the partner knows this is the social norm. Your argument is that, knowing this, the partner is harmed by knowing she (or he) has been lied to. But isn't that obviously false in actual fact? If the partner wasn't aware of the social convention and absolutely expects the truth, then one could argue she's hurt by the lie because it's a betrayal of trust. However, knowing it's the social norm, then there isn't the issue of trust and the utility of the lie (which is the reason for its social acceptance) becomes foremost. The possibility of it being a lie doesn't represent betrayal while, simultaneously, he/she can assume its truth and feel secure in being attractive to the partner. This is the weird logic of socially acceptable lies, and it makes sense and is useful. Knowing that it's socially acceptable doesn't make it worse, it's essential to what makes it okay.
"Also, regarding the cat. I agree with Gyan, in our culture, if no harm (emotionally) results from eating your pet, there's something wrong with you and your moral compass is already skewed. Other cultures, yuck, and I don't believe that it really can be harmless, but I tried to be open minded."
Your argument is the combination of two things. First, it's a strong endorsement of cultural norms being equivalent to morality. Second, you just barely are able to restrain your instinctive reaction from universalizing your judgment. I think that the latter thing is affecting the former.
Because this idea that violating the cultural norm means that you're emotionally maladjusted and thus your moral compass is skewed has all sorts of implications I think you wouldn't want to endorse. For example, homosexuality.
This is the dark side of cultural relativism with regard to morality. It can be used to equate morality with conformity. That's oppressive.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 4:58 AM on April 5, 2007
I don't see that at all. That is exactly the opposite of my evaluation. It seems to me that if the cultural norm is that it's okay to lie to your dying mother, then the mother, being a part of that culture, will necessarily also think it's okay. It wouldn't cause her harm to know that the promise is a lie, quite the reverse. In fact in our culture there's lots of examples where it's acceptable to lie and because of that we typically don't think the person lied to is harmed by it.
For a humorous example, there's "no, honey, you don't look fat in those pants". Put aside the question of whether there's some utility in the partner hearing the truth in this example. Just concentrate on the social norm that one doesn't tell one's partner they look fat and that the partner knows this is the social norm. Your argument is that, knowing this, the partner is harmed by knowing she (or he) has been lied to. But isn't that obviously false in actual fact? If the partner wasn't aware of the social convention and absolutely expects the truth, then one could argue she's hurt by the lie because it's a betrayal of trust. However, knowing it's the social norm, then there isn't the issue of trust and the utility of the lie (which is the reason for its social acceptance) becomes foremost. The possibility of it being a lie doesn't represent betrayal while, simultaneously, he/she can assume its truth and feel secure in being attractive to the partner. This is the weird logic of socially acceptable lies, and it makes sense and is useful. Knowing that it's socially acceptable doesn't make it worse, it's essential to what makes it okay.
"Also, regarding the cat. I agree with Gyan, in our culture, if no harm (emotionally) results from eating your pet, there's something wrong with you and your moral compass is already skewed. Other cultures, yuck, and I don't believe that it really can be harmless, but I tried to be open minded."
Your argument is the combination of two things. First, it's a strong endorsement of cultural norms being equivalent to morality. Second, you just barely are able to restrain your instinctive reaction from universalizing your judgment. I think that the latter thing is affecting the former.
Because this idea that violating the cultural norm means that you're emotionally maladjusted and thus your moral compass is skewed has all sorts of implications I think you wouldn't want to endorse. For example, homosexuality.
This is the dark side of cultural relativism with regard to morality. It can be used to equate morality with conformity. That's oppressive.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 4:58 AM on April 5, 2007
If a culture says that it is OK to lie to your dying mother, the dying mothers must know that that is the norm, and therefore know that any promises given to them are outright lies. This would cause emotional harm to the dying mothers, which is why I said it's not OK. It's actually worse than individual cases of lying to dying mothers.
That's not necessarily true, though. Imagine that the custom is for the dying mother to ask all sorts of crazy promises to be made - progressively more and more wild and demanding, and the son is obligated to play along by replying with the most lavish, florid promises and oaths he can invent, along with fantastic improvised tales about how he's going to achieve these impossible promised deeds. There's no reason this process couldn't stand as a symbol of honest care and devotion, even though it's clear to both sides that the "promises" are never going to be carried out.
posted by Wolfdog at 5:01 AM on April 5, 2007
That's not necessarily true, though. Imagine that the custom is for the dying mother to ask all sorts of crazy promises to be made - progressively more and more wild and demanding, and the son is obligated to play along by replying with the most lavish, florid promises and oaths he can invent, along with fantastic improvised tales about how he's going to achieve these impossible promised deeds. There's no reason this process couldn't stand as a symbol of honest care and devotion, even though it's clear to both sides that the "promises" are never going to be carried out.
posted by Wolfdog at 5:01 AM on April 5, 2007
It can be used to equate morality with conformity. That's oppressive.
Precisely. Which is what it is, and does. By my lights, at least.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 5:03 AM on April 5, 2007
Precisely. Which is what it is, and does. By my lights, at least.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 5:03 AM on April 5, 2007
Dunno about the frozen-chicken thing -- I imagine that the extreme cold would be a show-stopper -- but I'm grateful to Smedleyman for turning me on to salami.
(Not.)
posted by pax digita at 5:04 AM on April 5, 2007
(Not.)
posted by pax digita at 5:04 AM on April 5, 2007
"Shit, I'm getting sucked in, here, but: EB, I'd say that the phrase 'forcing your morals on other people' is essentially meaningless, which is to say that (I reckon) morality is an artifact of community, and only sometimes in consonance with ethical behaviour, which may be suggested to be universal (or baked-in to human experience, or however you want to look at it). That is, that 'your morals' are the morals of whatever intersection of communities you are part of or identify with or have been indoctrinated to, and so are not 'yours', and so that clashes of morality are actually clashes of tribes."
Well, firstly, I use the word morality when, strictly speaking, ethics is the correct term. But this is a concession to everyday language because ethics is too weak of a term (in everyday language) to use in this context.
Secondly, my response to your argument is, "and so...?" I don't get what you're aiming at. You're a moral relativist and specifically a cultural relativist with regard to morality. Okay.
As I said, I may be a cultural relativist in practice, but I'm not one in principle. I'm guessing from what you wrote that you are.
Where I think an ethical principle applies cross-culturally, I don't have any compunctions about enforcing it cross-culturally. I think it should be enforced. Basically, I don't recognize any sort of cultural moral sovereignty. Something like that may exist in practice as an accident of circumstance, but it's not something real that exists in principle. And it seems to me that most people feel this way, it's just a matter of what limits they are willing to place on that practical sovereignty. For example, most people would prohibit slavery regardless of cultural norms.
I'm more of a moralist than other non-absolutists because a) I'm generally more sure of my own moral judgments (because I think I'm very careful about them), and b) I'm see avoiding cross-cultural interference/imperialism as something more like a good idea than The Most Important Principle There Is (which is how many others see things).
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 5:09 AM on April 5, 2007
Well, firstly, I use the word morality when, strictly speaking, ethics is the correct term. But this is a concession to everyday language because ethics is too weak of a term (in everyday language) to use in this context.
Secondly, my response to your argument is, "and so...?" I don't get what you're aiming at. You're a moral relativist and specifically a cultural relativist with regard to morality. Okay.
As I said, I may be a cultural relativist in practice, but I'm not one in principle. I'm guessing from what you wrote that you are.
Where I think an ethical principle applies cross-culturally, I don't have any compunctions about enforcing it cross-culturally. I think it should be enforced. Basically, I don't recognize any sort of cultural moral sovereignty. Something like that may exist in practice as an accident of circumstance, but it's not something real that exists in principle. And it seems to me that most people feel this way, it's just a matter of what limits they are willing to place on that practical sovereignty. For example, most people would prohibit slavery regardless of cultural norms.
I'm more of a moralist than other non-absolutists because a) I'm generally more sure of my own moral judgments (because I think I'm very careful about them), and b) I'm see avoiding cross-cultural interference/imperialism as something more like a good idea than The Most Important Principle There Is (which is how many others see things).
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 5:09 AM on April 5, 2007
I would like to say that I am apparently quite parsimonious morally, have very little tension in my philosophical framework, am a psychological reductionist, and my views on god(s) are apparently completely consistent.
Thank you, that is all.
posted by Justinian at 5:11 AM on April 5, 2007
Thank you, that is all.
posted by Justinian at 5:11 AM on April 5, 2007
Oh, on my fourth or fifth reading of what I quoted of you, stav, I see that the only thing relevant was the ethics/morality distinction.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 5:14 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 5:14 AM on April 5, 2007
my response to your argument is, "and so...?" I don't get what you're aiming at. You're a moral relativist and specifically a cultural relativist with regard to morality. Okay.
Oh, I'm not arguing, just talking. This is a topic that interests me a great deal, and always has.
I'm not a moral relativist as that label is generally used and understood (and as I think you're using it here, pejoratively).
I don't believe morality as I understand and use the word (which is non-standard, I admit) to have any worth beyond the desire for orderly behaviour in a given society. I see it on a similar level to laws -- which serve the same purpose but are prescriptive (like churchy 'morality' in that sense) rather than organically agreed upon -- and spit on 'em both, while understanding that they are necessary and living my life in such a way that my behaviour in most areas tends to line up with them fairly well.
You're a [...] cultural relativist
No, I'm not. There are elements of cultures all over the damn world that I revile and reject. Including (which follows from what I've said already), my own.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 5:19 AM on April 5, 2007
Oh, I'm not arguing, just talking. This is a topic that interests me a great deal, and always has.
I'm not a moral relativist as that label is generally used and understood (and as I think you're using it here, pejoratively).
I don't believe morality as I understand and use the word (which is non-standard, I admit) to have any worth beyond the desire for orderly behaviour in a given society. I see it on a similar level to laws -- which serve the same purpose but are prescriptive (like churchy 'morality' in that sense) rather than organically agreed upon -- and spit on 'em both, while understanding that they are necessary and living my life in such a way that my behaviour in most areas tends to line up with them fairly well.
You're a [...] cultural relativist
No, I'm not. There are elements of cultures all over the damn world that I revile and reject. Including (which follows from what I've said already), my own.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 5:19 AM on April 5, 2007
Oh, on my fourth or fifth reading of what I quoted of you, stav, I see that the only thing relevant was the ethics/morality distinction.
Whoops, didn't see that. Anyway, clarification.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 5:20 AM on April 5, 2007
Whoops, didn't see that. Anyway, clarification.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 5:20 AM on April 5, 2007
assuming you're planning on eating meat that night anyway, let the loved carcass rot or spare another animals life if only for another night? which is, logically, more sound?
also, eating meat doesn't always have to be the completely disconnected experience that it is in America and maybe it shouldn't be. Perhaps eating deceased pets could be a proper ritualistic perspective, and proper silent thanks to the critters, on carnivorous diets.
posted by trinarian at 5:36 AM on April 5, 2007
also, eating meat doesn't always have to be the completely disconnected experience that it is in America and maybe it shouldn't be. Perhaps eating deceased pets could be a proper ritualistic perspective, and proper silent thanks to the critters, on carnivorous diets.
posted by trinarian at 5:36 AM on April 5, 2007
Another 0,0,-1 here (and I'm actually surprised there aren't more of us—I would have thought MeFi would be a bastion of poultry-lovin', sibling-bangin', grave-neglectin' bastards).
It's interesting that even though we're instructed not to mentally elaborate on the question, it's perfectly natural and perhaps necessary that we do so.
Come on, EB, that's ridiculous. I wasn't even tempted to "mentally elaborate"; I answered the questions as posed. Your milage may, of course, vary, but your milage is not "perfectly natural and perhaps necessary."
I think they just didn't do enough of a job of making the context explicitly only between those two people.
What, their explicit statement that they wanted "your judgements about the events precisely as they are described in these scenarios" wasn't enough?
If nobody's harmed, morality doesn't come into play, end of story.
Incidentally, I was baffled and a tad insulted by the final page. First they tell me:
posted by languagehat at 5:48 AM on April 5, 2007
It's interesting that even though we're instructed not to mentally elaborate on the question, it's perfectly natural and perhaps necessary that we do so.
Come on, EB, that's ridiculous. I wasn't even tempted to "mentally elaborate"; I answered the questions as posed. Your milage may, of course, vary, but your milage is not "perfectly natural and perhaps necessary."
I think they just didn't do enough of a job of making the context explicitly only between those two people.
What, their explicit statement that they wanted "your judgements about the events precisely as they are described in these scenarios" wasn't enough?
If nobody's harmed, morality doesn't come into play, end of story.
Incidentally, I was baffled and a tad insulted by the final page. First they tell me:
You see nothing wrong in the actions depicted in these scenarios. Consequently, there is no inconsistency in the way that you responded to the questions in this activity.Well and good. But then they go on "However, it is interesting to note that had you judged any of these acts to be morally problematic, it is hard to see how this might have been justified..." and yammer on for a whole long paragraph about how I would have been inconsistent if I had answered differently! Fuck you, yammering philosophers, this is why normal people hate you!
posted by languagehat at 5:48 AM on April 5, 2007
"...and as I think you're using it here, pejoratively"
I didn't think I was. Yes, I resist and dislike it when people elevate non-interference into the principle that trumps all other considerations and/or when they deny any possibility of cross-cultural ethics and won't condemn almost anything cross-culturally. But other than that, in many ways I'm a cultural relativist. Maybe your sense that I'm using the term pejoratively comes from my ambivalence.
Part of what's going on with this with me is that both in the case of philosophical relativism and cultural (ethical) relativism, I've long been very frustrated with the simpleminded and extreme pop-cultural versions of these things. And yet, in the rigorous intellectual context, I hold to both. On the other hand, in many practical contexts, I appear to hold to neither. But that's because I'm not simpleminded about these things.
My objection to the way that I see pop-cultural moral relativism manifest itself is that it is usually, upon examination, just a pernicious variety of a normative moral imperialism. Almost no one is a consistent relativist and would allow murder and slavery and the like in other cultures. Most people pick and choose what values they would impose on other cultures. For example, in the eighties, the same people that objected to the cultural imperialism of political interference in Central America (on relativistic grounds, not on the grounds that they disagreed with the aim of the intervention) often were the same people who supported intervention in South Africa. Today, many people object on relativistic grounds to the cross-cultural imposition of some values and yet support the cross-cultural imposition of other (for example, environmentalist).
This picking and choosing is fine, and necessary, and it's what I do. That's not my problem. My problem is that when they argue against people who differ from them on values they won't impose on other cultures, they argue from relativism as a principle. Even though they violate that principle in other cases. That's what's long bugged me.
And here we get back to the "don't impose your morals on other people" thing. This bugs me. This is a statement of principle. But no one holds to that principle—there's always some examples of moral views a person holds to that they are willing to enforce on other people. The only time people assert this as if it's the most important (or only) moral principle there is, is when they're criticizing someone else's attempt at imposition. It's a rhetorical club. It's a holier-than-thou accusation that dishonestly ends the discussion. And because no one who asserts this as a principle holds to this principle consistently, then what they're really doing is implicitly asserting their own real-world ethical give-and-take and particular judgments as normative for everyone else! It seems very hypocritical to me.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 5:55 AM on April 5, 2007
I didn't think I was. Yes, I resist and dislike it when people elevate non-interference into the principle that trumps all other considerations and/or when they deny any possibility of cross-cultural ethics and won't condemn almost anything cross-culturally. But other than that, in many ways I'm a cultural relativist. Maybe your sense that I'm using the term pejoratively comes from my ambivalence.
Part of what's going on with this with me is that both in the case of philosophical relativism and cultural (ethical) relativism, I've long been very frustrated with the simpleminded and extreme pop-cultural versions of these things. And yet, in the rigorous intellectual context, I hold to both. On the other hand, in many practical contexts, I appear to hold to neither. But that's because I'm not simpleminded about these things.
My objection to the way that I see pop-cultural moral relativism manifest itself is that it is usually, upon examination, just a pernicious variety of a normative moral imperialism. Almost no one is a consistent relativist and would allow murder and slavery and the like in other cultures. Most people pick and choose what values they would impose on other cultures. For example, in the eighties, the same people that objected to the cultural imperialism of political interference in Central America (on relativistic grounds, not on the grounds that they disagreed with the aim of the intervention) often were the same people who supported intervention in South Africa. Today, many people object on relativistic grounds to the cross-cultural imposition of some values and yet support the cross-cultural imposition of other (for example, environmentalist).
This picking and choosing is fine, and necessary, and it's what I do. That's not my problem. My problem is that when they argue against people who differ from them on values they won't impose on other cultures, they argue from relativism as a principle. Even though they violate that principle in other cases. That's what's long bugged me.
And here we get back to the "don't impose your morals on other people" thing. This bugs me. This is a statement of principle. But no one holds to that principle—there's always some examples of moral views a person holds to that they are willing to enforce on other people. The only time people assert this as if it's the most important (or only) moral principle there is, is when they're criticizing someone else's attempt at imposition. It's a rhetorical club. It's a holier-than-thou accusation that dishonestly ends the discussion. And because no one who asserts this as a principle holds to this principle consistently, then what they're really doing is implicitly asserting their own real-world ethical give-and-take and particular judgments as normative for everyone else! It seems very hypocritical to me.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 5:55 AM on April 5, 2007
Where this test gets a little weird for me is the assumption that none of these activities cause any harm to anyone, because that's specified in the questions. I think the results had me looking a lot more permissive than I actually am!
We can say, "If shooting someone in the chest causes no pain or injury, is it wrong to shoot them in the chest?"-- but that's completely divorced from what happens in the real world. Sometimes "harm" exists in subtle ways that aren't immediately visible. The small things you do can have a profound effect on shaping your attitudes and the way you look at things-- and I think that's one of the reasons taboos are not such a horrible thing.
posted by Jeanne at 5:57 AM on April 5, 2007
We can say, "If shooting someone in the chest causes no pain or injury, is it wrong to shoot them in the chest?"-- but that's completely divorced from what happens in the real world. Sometimes "harm" exists in subtle ways that aren't immediately visible. The small things you do can have a profound effect on shaping your attitudes and the way you look at things-- and I think that's one of the reasons taboos are not such a horrible thing.
posted by Jeanne at 5:57 AM on April 5, 2007
A mefite, in the excitement of discovery, duplicates an earlier post. Is this morally wrong?
No. However, a society in which this was normal and encouraged would be bad.
posted by moss at 5:58 AM on April 5, 2007
No. However, a society in which this was normal and encouraged would be bad.
posted by moss at 5:58 AM on April 5, 2007
I'm surprised by how many of you are offended by the consumption of dead pets. Even here in America, we've got loads of examples of domesticated animals being slaughtered by their human caretakers for food. In many cases, those caretakers are attached to those animals. Try the first five minutes of this This American Life episode. As Ira Glass says, "In Kamiko's world, an animal's transition from 'buddy' to 'dinner' is a great deal less problematic than it is for us city folks."
posted by grrarrgh00 at 5:59 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by grrarrgh00 at 5:59 AM on April 5, 2007
I have to disagree with the people saying that you must be sick in the head if you're prepared to eat your pet. I don't think it's necassarily unhealthy to see a pet's body as merely meat: after all, it is. When a pet cat is dead, then the living being, the thing to which you were emotionally attached, is gone. All that's left is meat. Kind of stringy meat, but with the right marinade... okay, just kidding. I've never eaten a pet and probably wouldn't actually do it myself. But I think my point stands, and if a friend made the decision to dine on her dog, I would respect that. Is it morally wrong to not feel an emotional attachment to a [cat] corpse? I don't think so. In fact, I think one can argue that it demonstrates a healthy, sane, realistic attitude to death.
Of course, that argument does extend to human bodies as well. So, if a friend demanded in his will that his body be curried, cooked, and served at his wake, would I tuck in? Let's say he had no family/SO, or that they didn't mind. You know, I'd be tempted.
posted by Drexen at 5:59 AM on April 5, 2007
Of course, that argument does extend to human bodies as well. So, if a friend demanded in his will that his body be curried, cooked, and served at his wake, would I tuck in? Let's say he had no family/SO, or that they didn't mind. You know, I'd be tempted.
posted by Drexen at 5:59 AM on April 5, 2007
Your argument is the combination of two things. First, it's a strong endorsement of cultural norms being equivalent to morality. Second, you just barely are able to restrain your instinctive reaction from universalizing your judgment. I think that the latter thing is affecting the former.
Because this idea that violating the cultural norm means that you're emotionally maladjusted and thus your moral compass is skewed has all sorts of implications I think you wouldn't want to endorse. For example, homosexuality.
Yes, good point, EB.
It certainly wasn't my intention to reinforce the cultural norm/morality thing. This is why I am not a philosopher.
That said, I think I agree with Jeanne, though. It's very difficult to take these hypotheticals at face value in some sort of abstract way, since the question itself sort of begs the question. I think that's where I lost it with the dying mom thing too.
posted by miss tea at 6:08 AM on April 5, 2007
Because this idea that violating the cultural norm means that you're emotionally maladjusted and thus your moral compass is skewed has all sorts of implications I think you wouldn't want to endorse. For example, homosexuality.
Yes, good point, EB.
It certainly wasn't my intention to reinforce the cultural norm/morality thing. This is why I am not a philosopher.
That said, I think I agree with Jeanne, though. It's very difficult to take these hypotheticals at face value in some sort of abstract way, since the question itself sort of begs the question. I think that's where I lost it with the dying mom thing too.
posted by miss tea at 6:08 AM on April 5, 2007
"Come on, EB, that's ridiculous. I wasn't even tempted to 'mentally elaborate'; I answered the questions as posed. Your milage may, of course, vary, but your milage is not 'perfectly natural and perhaps necessary.'"
I didn't consciously elaborate. But the question aimed at the ethics of keeping promises. It didn't occur to me to evaluate the ethics of keeping promises outside the context of a society that these two people are a part of. These two people living isolated from a society is so unnatural that I didn't consider it.
"What, their explicit statement that they wanted 'your judgements about the events precisely as they are described in these scenarios' wasn't enough?"
No, because removing the scenario from any kind of social context is extraordinary and not implicit in a question that only mentions two people.
"If nobody's harmed, morality doesn't come into play, end of story."
In the social context, I'm not sure that no one is harmed. As a matter of fact, I'm not sure that no one is harmed even in the scenario of the two people in complete isolation. This gets to my previous comment about how this quiz rather conveniently ignores how ambiguous the idea of "harm" really is, and, furthermore, how most of our real-world clashes of morality occur because different people evaluate "harm" differently. The quiz's attempt to elide harm and to look at only absolutists versus relativists makes it something of an exercise of the obvious.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 6:08 AM on April 5, 2007
I didn't consciously elaborate. But the question aimed at the ethics of keeping promises. It didn't occur to me to evaluate the ethics of keeping promises outside the context of a society that these two people are a part of. These two people living isolated from a society is so unnatural that I didn't consider it.
"What, their explicit statement that they wanted 'your judgements about the events precisely as they are described in these scenarios' wasn't enough?"
No, because removing the scenario from any kind of social context is extraordinary and not implicit in a question that only mentions two people.
"If nobody's harmed, morality doesn't come into play, end of story."
In the social context, I'm not sure that no one is harmed. As a matter of fact, I'm not sure that no one is harmed even in the scenario of the two people in complete isolation. This gets to my previous comment about how this quiz rather conveniently ignores how ambiguous the idea of "harm" really is, and, furthermore, how most of our real-world clashes of morality occur because different people evaluate "harm" differently. The quiz's attempt to elide harm and to look at only absolutists versus relativists makes it something of an exercise of the obvious.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 6:08 AM on April 5, 2007
My only hiccup came when they didn't specify whether the cat eaters were going to take in future pets with the sole purpose of killing and eating them or whether they would wait until they died before eating them. Then I realized how inconsistent a viewpoint this was and I botched the test instructions.
Pets or Meat, I guess, no matter what my first instinct is. That's why you don't name the cows.
posted by unsupervised at 6:08 AM on April 5, 2007
Pets or Meat, I guess, no matter what my first instinct is. That's why you don't name the cows.
posted by unsupervised at 6:08 AM on April 5, 2007
I have an idea. Lets create scenarios and apply unreal restrictions on how people think and then try to say that we know something about how people think.
What a waste.
Why not do empirical studies of actual court cases that went to juries instead?
posted by BeerGrin at 6:10 AM on April 5, 2007
What a waste.
Why not do empirical studies of actual court cases that went to juries instead?
posted by BeerGrin at 6:10 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Moralising Quotient is: 0.00.
Your Interference Factor is: 0.00.
Your Universalising Factor is: -1.
posted by Gnostic Novelist at 6:12 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Interference Factor is: 0.00.
Your Universalising Factor is: -1.
posted by Gnostic Novelist at 6:12 AM on April 5, 2007
To clarify:
1)I have no problems with eating cat meat
2)In all, I don't even have a problem with the 'eating one's pet' part
3)What I found disconcerting in the scenario was the time frame suggested. Such emotional plasticity is very unusual. Morality, like many other social phenomena, is both cause and effect. Hence, a morality which allows the scenario as described, condones a very plastic emotional psyche. The overall ramifications of such a morality don't seem pleasant to me.
posted by Gyan at 6:13 AM on April 5, 2007
1)I have no problems with eating cat meat
2)In all, I don't even have a problem with the 'eating one's pet' part
3)What I found disconcerting in the scenario was the time frame suggested. Such emotional plasticity is very unusual. Morality, like many other social phenomena, is both cause and effect. Hence, a morality which allows the scenario as described, condones a very plastic emotional psyche. The overall ramifications of such a morality don't seem pleasant to me.
posted by Gyan at 6:13 AM on April 5, 2007
"Sometimes 'harm' exists in subtle ways that aren't immediately visible."—Jeanne
and
"It's very difficult to take these hypotheticals at face value in some sort of abstract way, since the question itself sort of begs the question."—miss tea
Yeah, I completely agree. I said something like this earlier and in my previous comment. The attempt to remove harm from the equation is both a bit unnatural and a bit clumsy.
Like all tests, this one was normed for a particular audience. I don't think we're (mefites) are that audience. (Though I certainly don't think anyone with more than a little philosophy would be that audience, either.) Where the test results have meaningful granularity is when you have more regular folks who are inclined to absolutism and some universal enforcement and who haven't thought much about their morality and its consistency. For those people, the results will be both interesting and revealing of distinctions within that group.
For most of us, though, our many differences are collapsed into that far lower right-hand quadrant.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 6:21 AM on April 5, 2007
and
"It's very difficult to take these hypotheticals at face value in some sort of abstract way, since the question itself sort of begs the question."—miss tea
Yeah, I completely agree. I said something like this earlier and in my previous comment. The attempt to remove harm from the equation is both a bit unnatural and a bit clumsy.
Like all tests, this one was normed for a particular audience. I don't think we're (mefites) are that audience. (Though I certainly don't think anyone with more than a little philosophy would be that audience, either.) Where the test results have meaningful granularity is when you have more regular folks who are inclined to absolutism and some universal enforcement and who haven't thought much about their morality and its consistency. For those people, the results will be both interesting and revealing of distinctions within that group.
For most of us, though, our many differences are collapsed into that far lower right-hand quadrant.
posted by Ethereal Bligh at 6:21 AM on April 5, 2007
Huh. I always identified as chaotic good, but it turns out I'm nearly true neutral. Next up, my armor class!
posted by kimota at 6:23 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by kimota at 6:23 AM on April 5, 2007
Like all tests, this one was normed for a particular audience. I don't think we're (mefites) are that audience.
Yup, exactly.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 6:29 AM on April 5, 2007
Yup, exactly.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 6:29 AM on April 5, 2007
I thought the cat question was odd. Do I think it's morally wrong to eat your recently deceased housepet? No, not morally wrong. That doesn't mean I don't find it gross though. The same way I wouldn't eat a racoon that got run over in the street, I wouldn't eat a cat. Pet or not, it was ON THE STREET. Yuck.
posted by antifuse at 6:30 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by antifuse at 6:30 AM on April 5, 2007
Blessed are the Sister Chicken fuckers - I don't give a fuck what you do as long as no one (other than you possibly) is getting hurt.
posted by MikeMc at 6:31 AM on April 5, 2007
posted by MikeMc at 6:31 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Moralising Quotient is: 0.50.
Your Interference Factor is: 0.25.
Your Universalising Factor is: 0.67.
Hmm.
posted by Aloysius Bear at 6:32 AM on April 5, 2007
Your Interference Factor is: 0.25.
Your Universalising Factor is: 0.67.
Hmm.
posted by Aloysius Bear at 6:32 AM on April 5, 2007
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posted by donkeymon at 2:26 AM on April 5, 2007