"a zero-knowledge proof for nuclear-weapons verification"

October 2, 2016 2:00 PM

The Virtues Of Nuclear Ignorance, Alex Wellerstein, whose blog RESTRICTED DATA covers Secrecy, verification, and purposeful ignorance
posted by the man of twists and turns (4 comments total)

Earlier this summer was the 70^th anniversary of the Operation Crossroads, the "world's first nuclear disaster."
posted by the man of twists and turns at 2:03 PM on October 2, 2016

Yet more proof that everyone should have a liberal-arts knowledge of computer science. Nice piece.

That said, I'm not sure what the utility of this particular zero-knowledge procedure is supposed to be. I guess in principle it could replace the traditional method of announcing that you are a nuclear power (i.e., detonating a warhead), but that seems rather unlikely to me. Maybe it would be useful for people who were trying to buy and sell nuclear weapons or expertise.

The supposed application to “the next round of arms-control agreements” I don't understand at all. Maybe: to prove that objects being destroyed are actual warheads instead of fakes? But in that application the zero-knowledge guarantee seems like a fault, not a virtue. In arms control, you want to verify the absence or destruction of weapons. But the proposed zero-knowledge procedures both aim to verify only the presence of a weapon. What zero-knowledge procedure could establish "I don't have any weapons in this network of caves"? Aren't I pretty much going to have to let you into my network of caves?

LATER: oh I see this is answered in the first part of the piece, which I skipped over to see what the proof was:

[A] good treaty would require rigorous inspections, to insure that neither side was dragging its feet or, worse, disposing of decoy bombs, rather than real ones. But how should the process of verification work? If a U.S. scientist were allowed to dismantle a Russian warhead personally, he or she could identify it as legitimate fairly easily, even if it differed in design from American models. But, in doing so, the scientist would necessarily learn many classified details about the weapon, something that the Russians would never consent to. (Nor would the Americans, if their roles were swapped.)

So that's the scenario: a proof that a given weapon is real that doesn't require exposing its internal design to non-trusted parties.
posted by grobstein at 2:55 PM on October 2, 2016

I'm dubious about attempts share flawed designs, which this guys seemingly supports. In fact, the CIA accelerated Iran's nuclear bomb program by giving them plans which covered details they did not know. And so far they've only prosecuted Jeffrey Sterling for exposing their stupidity to congress.
posted by jeffburdges at 6:57 PM on October 2, 2016

This sounds like a really cool technical solution to a problem that we'd only have if our politics didn't suck.
posted by RobotVoodooPower at 9:25 AM on October 3, 2016