Human Zoos and Don'ts
December 9, 2002 6:29 AM Subscribe
In the late 19th and early 20th century, at a time that might be considered the height of colonial exploitation, the regrettable spectacle of human zoos swept through America and Europe. Two of the most popular victims of these ethnological exhibits were Ota Benga, a four-foot-eleven African pygmy with filed teeth, who was successfully (and fraudulently) billed as a wild cannibal, and Saartjie Baartman, a Khoisan slave woman who was exhibited naked in the streets of Paris and London for the public to examine her so-called 'Hottentot apron'.
The anthropologists then measured not only the live humans, but in one case a "primitive's" head was ... severed from the body and boiled down to the skull. Believing skull size to be an index of intelligence, scientists were amazed that this skull was larger than that which had belonged to the statesman Daniel Webster"
Don't you just hate it when your theories don't pan out.
posted by Secret Life of Gravy at 6:39 AM on December 9, 2002
Don't you just hate it when your theories don't pan out.
posted by Secret Life of Gravy at 6:39 AM on December 9, 2002
Believing skull size to be an index of intelligence. . .
Actually Gravy, some modern studies (MRI scans etc.) are starting to vindicate that there is, in fact, a slight correlation between measured intelligence, within gender, and skull size.
posted by dgaicun at 6:54 AM on December 9, 2002
Actually Gravy, some modern studies (MRI scans etc.) are starting to vindicate that there is, in fact, a slight correlation between measured intelligence, within gender, and skull size.
posted by dgaicun at 6:54 AM on December 9, 2002
You mean racial subjugation wasn't the exclusive province of the American South?
posted by MrMoonPie at 7:41 AM on December 9, 2002
posted by MrMoonPie at 7:41 AM on December 9, 2002
That "heretical" site, BTW, appears to be the sort of place where people can trot out their nasty little racist gibes and whatnot under the guise of being daring freethinkers.
It rather reminded me of Adam Parfrey's Amok Press from the early 90's, the American fringe's premier apologists for child-rape fandom and Mansonite crypto-Nazism. Ecch.
posted by adamgreenfield at 7:48 AM on December 9, 2002
It rather reminded me of Adam Parfrey's Amok Press from the early 90's, the American fringe's premier apologists for child-rape fandom and Mansonite crypto-Nazism. Ecch.
posted by adamgreenfield at 7:48 AM on December 9, 2002
Several of those sites seem to have some strange, yet wildly differing ideologies. Sorry. I expect people can separate the wheat from the chaff. The Heretical came from a Google search on 'Hottentot apron', and was the only one that had a picture. And in all honesty, like the London and Parisian crowds people. . .I was curious.
posted by dgaicun at 7:56 AM on December 9, 2002
posted by dgaicun at 7:56 AM on December 9, 2002
The book, "Give Me My Father's Body: The Life of Minik, the New York Eskimo" is a true story about a young Inuit boy, taken with his family from Greenland by the explorer, Robert E. Peary, and displayed at the American Museum of Natural History. His family died of illness, his father's skeleton was displayed in the museum, and little Minik was abandoned by Peary. Although he watched the museum officials bury his father's body (it was a log wrapped in blankets, buried at dusk), he found out that his father's body was being displayed after he learned how to read. It wasn't until 1993 that the Museum repatriated the skeletons back to Greenland. The story of Minik has been picked up by Americans and may lead to a movie.
posted by KathyK at 8:00 AM on December 9, 2002
posted by KathyK at 8:00 AM on December 9, 2002
Dgaicun - Nice post.How about a post on the trail from eugenics, phrenelogy, and related (pseudo?)sciences of the 19th century to the birth of IQ tests in the US during WW1, and the culmination of the eugenics movement in the US - state laws on the sterilization of "defectives", and in the rise of the german Nazi party? (big post, that! maybe chopped up into installments?)
Dgaicun, Secret Life of Gravy - the head-boiling phrenologists were assuming from the "git go" that the "primitive" (whose head they boiled down to the bone to measure the skull) was, of course, dumb: he wasn't European! Perhaps he really was smarter. How would they be able to tell? I doubt they could even speak his language beyond a very rudimentary level. IQ tests? A bit dubious, and in any case they didn't yet exst.
However, parrots have much smaller brains than dogs, and yet have been shown to have complex problem solving skills and can learn to talk (in human speech, that is). Crows have been observed fashioning fashioning hooks out of wire to use to get at food.
For that matter, hypocephalia (I think that's what it's called) results in individuals with only 5-10% of the normal amount of grey matter. It's often never detected in many individuals who, despite the lack of most of the normal brain mass, develop as normal or even exceptionally intelligent individuals. Weird, huh? Try typing "Is the[or "your"] brain really necessary" into google - this should pull up a case history
But there sure is a threshold: I haven't heard anyone arguing for the superior intelligence of flatworms!
KathyK - Alas, poor minik! Poor bastard....
posted by troutfishing at 8:35 AM on December 9, 2002
Dgaicun, Secret Life of Gravy - the head-boiling phrenologists were assuming from the "git go" that the "primitive" (whose head they boiled down to the bone to measure the skull) was, of course, dumb: he wasn't European! Perhaps he really was smarter. How would they be able to tell? I doubt they could even speak his language beyond a very rudimentary level. IQ tests? A bit dubious, and in any case they didn't yet exst.
However, parrots have much smaller brains than dogs, and yet have been shown to have complex problem solving skills and can learn to talk (in human speech, that is). Crows have been observed fashioning fashioning hooks out of wire to use to get at food.
For that matter, hypocephalia (I think that's what it's called) results in individuals with only 5-10% of the normal amount of grey matter. It's often never detected in many individuals who, despite the lack of most of the normal brain mass, develop as normal or even exceptionally intelligent individuals. Weird, huh? Try typing "Is the[or "your"] brain really necessary" into google - this should pull up a case history
But there sure is a threshold: I haven't heard anyone arguing for the superior intelligence of flatworms!
KathyK - Alas, poor minik! Poor bastard....
posted by troutfishing at 8:35 AM on December 9, 2002
For those that are interested in this sort of thing, I'd recommend Nature's Body by Londa Schiebinger. It's a shockingly readable (considering) book about early scientific approaches to gender and race.
On has to wonder what sort of delusions we, as a pretty darn scientific society, are working under presently that will seem twisted and perverse in a couple of hundred years.
posted by stet at 9:47 AM on December 9, 2002
On has to wonder what sort of delusions we, as a pretty darn scientific society, are working under presently that will seem twisted and perverse in a couple of hundred years.
posted by stet at 9:47 AM on December 9, 2002
I was just struck by the mental picture of the scientists chopping off a head, boiling it, and then taking measurements....followed by their crestfallen looks as they realize that uh, oh...gotta come-up with a new theory. Otherwise, following the theory of skull size = intelligence, they would be stuck with the idea that the "savage" was smarter than Daniel Webster.
Personally, I wash my hands of any search for race/ intelligence ratios. Both the journey and the end result would be abhorrent to me.
posted by Secret Life of Gravy at 9:53 AM on December 9, 2002
Personally, I wash my hands of any search for race/ intelligence ratios. Both the journey and the end result would be abhorrent to me.
posted by Secret Life of Gravy at 9:53 AM on December 9, 2002
It strikes me that looking back at the odd or offensive notions and behaviors of people in the past in order to condemn them from a "modern" perspective and feel superior to them is exactly the same behavior, with exactly the same motivation, of those who sought out freak shows or adopted racist theories about different human populations, only across a temporal dimension rather than a spatial one.
Funny how human nature remains constant in so many ways.
posted by rushmc at 10:04 AM on December 9, 2002
Funny how human nature remains constant in so many ways.
posted by rushmc at 10:04 AM on December 9, 2002
rushmc , you have expressed my feelings with utter brilliance.
posted by dgaicun at 10:14 AM on December 9, 2002
posted by dgaicun at 10:14 AM on December 9, 2002
It strikes me that looking back at the odd or offensive notions and behaviors of people in the past in order to condemn them from a "modern" perspective and feel superior to them is exactly the same behavior, with exactly the same motivation, of those who sought out freak shows or adopted racist theories about different human populations, only across a temporal dimension rather than a spatial one.
Yeah, but with the important proviso that a racist or cultural supremacist in the same temporal dimension as those s/he feels superior to is in a position to put those beliefs into practice against actual people, whereas historical subjects are already dead.
Subjecting a historical subject to a smug, defamatory, presentist history that valorizes the present by condemning the past is certainly offensive, but it's not 'exactly the same behavior' as putting a living, breathing person in a 'human zoo'.
The history=anthropology analogy leaves me cold.
posted by Sonny Jim at 12:55 PM on December 9, 2002
Yeah, but with the important proviso that a racist or cultural supremacist in the same temporal dimension as those s/he feels superior to is in a position to put those beliefs into practice against actual people, whereas historical subjects are already dead.
Subjecting a historical subject to a smug, defamatory, presentist history that valorizes the present by condemning the past is certainly offensive, but it's not 'exactly the same behavior' as putting a living, breathing person in a 'human zoo'.
The history=anthropology analogy leaves me cold.
posted by Sonny Jim at 12:55 PM on December 9, 2002
Sonny,
Rushmc may feel that it is low to judge people of the past by modern standards, if so that's not something I agree with, though I do like his analogy of judgement in general. My personal feeling is that judging others is a healthy affirmation of ones moral sense. Part of the way we distinguish and learn right behavior from wrong behavior is through comparing and contrasting. For instance racial hatred and anti-Semitism took a sharp nose-dive after WWII, partly in response to the Holocaust and the behavior of Nazi Germany. In other words our paradigm shift was a result of recognizing the flaws of and responding to another culture's moral deficit.
We had similar discussion of the logic of moral relativism in my last thread. Seemingly the only alternative to rational moral judgements consistently applied both spatially and temporally, is the belief that all moral systems are arbitrary and co-equal. Such a belief just can't sustain itself without contradiction.
Moral relativism's own transparent philosophical reason for existing is in response to human zoos and other such imperialistic barbarism of the colonial era. The belief goes that cultural judgement is the casual antecedent of cultural oppression. Personally I think this is a false and unnecessary correlation. We can recognize and understand the causes of a culture's general inferiority (be it temporal, as the given topic, or spatial, as in the last) without also seeing them as less co-equally human than ourselves.
No one is inherently "better" or more "moral" than the next person, everyone in every era is simply trying their best, based on their own historical vantage points (yes, even the Nazi's). So maybe it can be said that there is no superior morality per se, but simply superior knowledge, which results in superior morality*. In that way morality is like any technology, it accumulates as the canon expands. In this view, the only difference between us and the "evil" 19th century Imperialists, is that they didn't have 19th century imperialists and two huge disgraceful wars (among a thousand other things) to inform their behavior against.
*For instance Germans of today have a pacifistic, largely liberal culture precisely because they have the knowledge gained from the the first half of the 20th century directly informing their actions of today. Germans of the first half of the century didn't have the example of their defeat, or the ugly revelations of that defeat to see their own flaws with.
posted by dgaicun at 2:22 PM on December 9, 2002
Rushmc may feel that it is low to judge people of the past by modern standards, if so that's not something I agree with, though I do like his analogy of judgement in general. My personal feeling is that judging others is a healthy affirmation of ones moral sense. Part of the way we distinguish and learn right behavior from wrong behavior is through comparing and contrasting. For instance racial hatred and anti-Semitism took a sharp nose-dive after WWII, partly in response to the Holocaust and the behavior of Nazi Germany. In other words our paradigm shift was a result of recognizing the flaws of and responding to another culture's moral deficit.
We had similar discussion of the logic of moral relativism in my last thread. Seemingly the only alternative to rational moral judgements consistently applied both spatially and temporally, is the belief that all moral systems are arbitrary and co-equal. Such a belief just can't sustain itself without contradiction.
Moral relativism's own transparent philosophical reason for existing is in response to human zoos and other such imperialistic barbarism of the colonial era. The belief goes that cultural judgement is the casual antecedent of cultural oppression. Personally I think this is a false and unnecessary correlation. We can recognize and understand the causes of a culture's general inferiority (be it temporal, as the given topic, or spatial, as in the last) without also seeing them as less co-equally human than ourselves.
No one is inherently "better" or more "moral" than the next person, everyone in every era is simply trying their best, based on their own historical vantage points (yes, even the Nazi's). So maybe it can be said that there is no superior morality per se, but simply superior knowledge, which results in superior morality*. In that way morality is like any technology, it accumulates as the canon expands. In this view, the only difference between us and the "evil" 19th century Imperialists, is that they didn't have 19th century imperialists and two huge disgraceful wars (among a thousand other things) to inform their behavior against.
*For instance Germans of today have a pacifistic, largely liberal culture precisely because they have the knowledge gained from the the first half of the 20th century directly informing their actions of today. Germans of the first half of the century didn't have the example of their defeat, or the ugly revelations of that defeat to see their own flaws with.
posted by dgaicun at 2:22 PM on December 9, 2002
I would argue that it is the same behavior, only that the effect upon others is, as you point out, different, given the presence and therefore the vulnerability of those against whom it is directed. I guess it depends whether you judge the behavior by a utilitarian or a moral compass--or perhaps a social or a personal one.
It is not clear to me that the outcome for the person holding this attitude is significantly different in either case, however.
posted by rushmc at 2:28 PM on December 9, 2002
It is not clear to me that the outcome for the person holding this attitude is significantly different in either case, however.
posted by rushmc at 2:28 PM on December 9, 2002
So maybe it can be said that there is no superior morality per se, but simply superior knowledge, which results in superior morality
The problem with this conceptualization, which is appealing at first glance, is that not all people or cultures will choose to make the same use of the same knowledge; therefore, there must be some factor beyond the knowledge itself that determines how one will fit it into one's moral worldview. I think that the analogy which you cite with technology is an apt one: not all societies use technology in the same ways. One group may use a particular technological advance to provide better housing and services to its people, while another may use it to wage war more successfully on its neighbors. A third may choose to do both.
I think it can be quite useful to judge past peoples and societies by "modern standards;" I simply don't think it is sufficient to do so. It is too easy to fall into the fallacy of not taking the previous subject's environment into account when making one's judgment (e.g., to condemn a remote tribe for allowing a high percentage of its population to die from disease, forgetting that they did not have the same vaccine and treatment options that we do).
posted by rushmc at 2:40 PM on December 9, 2002
The problem with this conceptualization, which is appealing at first glance, is that not all people or cultures will choose to make the same use of the same knowledge; therefore, there must be some factor beyond the knowledge itself that determines how one will fit it into one's moral worldview. I think that the analogy which you cite with technology is an apt one: not all societies use technology in the same ways. One group may use a particular technological advance to provide better housing and services to its people, while another may use it to wage war more successfully on its neighbors. A third may choose to do both.
I think it can be quite useful to judge past peoples and societies by "modern standards;" I simply don't think it is sufficient to do so. It is too easy to fall into the fallacy of not taking the previous subject's environment into account when making one's judgment (e.g., to condemn a remote tribe for allowing a high percentage of its population to die from disease, forgetting that they did not have the same vaccine and treatment options that we do).
posted by rushmc at 2:40 PM on December 9, 2002
I would argue that it is the same behavior
Sorry, what exactly?
I guess it depends whether you judge the behavior by a utilitarian or a moral compass
Which I maintain is the same thing. Morality is an instrument of utility. Its only purpose is for individual humans to cooperate as a society.
or perhaps a social or a personal one.
In other words 'hate the sin not the sinner'. Which is absolutely possible.
It is not clear to me that the outcome for the person holding this attitude is significantly different in either case, however.
So do you hate Republicans, or Religionists, or whoever it is you disagree with, or do simply recognize the basic inferiority of their positions while simultaneously maintaining an independent respect for the rights and humanity of the other? If the latter, then why do you believe this can't be applied consistently to others you may disagree with; Islamists for example? Why do you feel it is necessary to view people as less essentially human or worthy of human dignity, just because you disagree with them?
posted by dgaicun at 2:51 PM on December 9, 2002
Sorry, what exactly?
I guess it depends whether you judge the behavior by a utilitarian or a moral compass
Which I maintain is the same thing. Morality is an instrument of utility. Its only purpose is for individual humans to cooperate as a society.
or perhaps a social or a personal one.
In other words 'hate the sin not the sinner'. Which is absolutely possible.
It is not clear to me that the outcome for the person holding this attitude is significantly different in either case, however.
So do you hate Republicans, or Religionists, or whoever it is you disagree with, or do simply recognize the basic inferiority of their positions while simultaneously maintaining an independent respect for the rights and humanity of the other? If the latter, then why do you believe this can't be applied consistently to others you may disagree with; Islamists for example? Why do you feel it is necessary to view people as less essentially human or worthy of human dignity, just because you disagree with them?
posted by dgaicun at 2:51 PM on December 9, 2002
The problem with this conceptualization, which is appealing at first glance, is that not all people or cultures will choose to make the same use of the same knowledge
rushmc, your falling into a Cartesian trap here. Obviously if they had exactly the same knowledge they would act exactly the same. Its an issue of causality. Basically what I am saying is obvious: people act the way they do because they are conditioned by the world and their biology and nothing else. Just like every other human on the planet. In other words put 'me' in Mrs. Hitler's womb, and nothing will change- history will play out accordingly. It is this humble realization of the world and the nature of the universe that makes hatred a moot point. The only imperative is the perfectibility of man (as far as that is possible) and that's not going to be possible until we admit that some ways of behaving are indeed "better" than others. Its nothing to be ashamed or frightened of.
posted by dgaicun at 3:01 PM on December 9, 2002
rushmc, your falling into a Cartesian trap here. Obviously if they had exactly the same knowledge they would act exactly the same. Its an issue of causality. Basically what I am saying is obvious: people act the way they do because they are conditioned by the world and their biology and nothing else. Just like every other human on the planet. In other words put 'me' in Mrs. Hitler's womb, and nothing will change- history will play out accordingly. It is this humble realization of the world and the nature of the universe that makes hatred a moot point. The only imperative is the perfectibility of man (as far as that is possible) and that's not going to be possible until we admit that some ways of behaving are indeed "better" than others. Its nothing to be ashamed or frightened of.
posted by dgaicun at 3:01 PM on December 9, 2002
No one is inherently "better" or more "moral" than the next person, everyone in every era is simply trying their best, based on their own historical vantage points (yes, even the Nazi's). So maybe it can be said that there is no superior morality per se, but simply superior knowledge, which results in superior morality*. In that way morality is like any technology, it accumulates as the canon expands.
dgaicun,
Your argument kind of reminds me Gadamer's defence of presentism in history, whereby history exists in a dialogic relationship with the present, to be called upon to provide 'answers' to contemporary 'questions' (in this case, moral answers). I think this is an attractive idea, but there are a few drawbacks.
For one, reducing the past to a series of episodes to be called upon for moral guidance in the present is going to inevitably distort history. This is the Renaissance (and I guess classical) version of history, where the past is fashioned into readily applicable moral exempla or tropes, and only the events that might provide examples (positive or negative) for virtuous conduct are chronicled. I'm a confirmed historicist, so this kind of thing strikes me as bad history.
Secondly, any agent attempting to draw upon the past for morality is going to be impeded -- or at least guided in a particular direction -- by the institutions that dispense and mediate the past (school systems, churches, the academy, universities, newspapers, whatever) who will inevitably have their own agendas and ideologies. Of course, the 'traditional' histories these institutions produce can be morally enabling (the post-war castigation of Nazism you cite is a good example) but it's equally easy to see the past being put to less morally-uplifting ideological purposes.
It's all about context. The moral beliefs and conduct of any given individual in time are going to be to some degree constrained and mediated by ideologies and power structures. To suggest that morality necessarily improves as more knowledge is gained about the past is insufficient, as it doesn't take into account the content of that knowledge, the ways in which that content is mediated by the institutions that dispense it, and the interests that that mediation serves.
posted by Sonny Jim at 3:32 PM on December 9, 2002
dgaicun,
Your argument kind of reminds me Gadamer's defence of presentism in history, whereby history exists in a dialogic relationship with the present, to be called upon to provide 'answers' to contemporary 'questions' (in this case, moral answers). I think this is an attractive idea, but there are a few drawbacks.
For one, reducing the past to a series of episodes to be called upon for moral guidance in the present is going to inevitably distort history. This is the Renaissance (and I guess classical) version of history, where the past is fashioned into readily applicable moral exempla or tropes, and only the events that might provide examples (positive or negative) for virtuous conduct are chronicled. I'm a confirmed historicist, so this kind of thing strikes me as bad history.
Secondly, any agent attempting to draw upon the past for morality is going to be impeded -- or at least guided in a particular direction -- by the institutions that dispense and mediate the past (school systems, churches, the academy, universities, newspapers, whatever) who will inevitably have their own agendas and ideologies. Of course, the 'traditional' histories these institutions produce can be morally enabling (the post-war castigation of Nazism you cite is a good example) but it's equally easy to see the past being put to less morally-uplifting ideological purposes.
It's all about context. The moral beliefs and conduct of any given individual in time are going to be to some degree constrained and mediated by ideologies and power structures. To suggest that morality necessarily improves as more knowledge is gained about the past is insufficient, as it doesn't take into account the content of that knowledge, the ways in which that content is mediated by the institutions that dispense it, and the interests that that mediation serves.
posted by Sonny Jim at 3:32 PM on December 9, 2002
Why do you feel it is necessary to view people as less essentially human or worthy of human dignity, just because you disagree with them?
Either you are misreading my statements entirely or that is the wildest out-of-left-field ad hominem attack I've yet seen.
Obviously if they had exactly the same knowledge they would act exactly the same.
That's not obvious at all. There are many factors in decision-making beyond the knowledge utilized. Many people may know that eating frequently at McDonald's is unhealthy, but some will choose to do so anyway while others will not. Predispositions, drives, desires, strategies, long-term goals, differences in past experiences and success/fail rates are just some of the other types of criteria that can affect people's choices.
Basically what I am saying is obvious: people act the way they do because they are conditioned by the world and their biology and nothing else.
Again, I don't think that's at all obvious. Certainly such conditioning is a very powerful influence upon a person's "development," but I don't think things are quite so absolutely predetermined as you make out. There is some wiggle room there.
posted by rushmc at 4:10 PM on December 9, 2002
Either you are misreading my statements entirely or that is the wildest out-of-left-field ad hominem attack I've yet seen.
Obviously if they had exactly the same knowledge they would act exactly the same.
That's not obvious at all. There are many factors in decision-making beyond the knowledge utilized. Many people may know that eating frequently at McDonald's is unhealthy, but some will choose to do so anyway while others will not. Predispositions, drives, desires, strategies, long-term goals, differences in past experiences and success/fail rates are just some of the other types of criteria that can affect people's choices.
Basically what I am saying is obvious: people act the way they do because they are conditioned by the world and their biology and nothing else.
Again, I don't think that's at all obvious. Certainly such conditioning is a very powerful influence upon a person's "development," but I don't think things are quite so absolutely predetermined as you make out. There is some wiggle room there.
posted by rushmc at 4:10 PM on December 9, 2002
Sonny,
My argument really shouldn't be as controversial as you're making it.
For one, reducing the past to a series of episodes to be called upon for moral guidance in the present is going to inevitably distort history.
I'm not sure that's exactly what I was saying. What I am saying is that the past was the logical, in fact only possible, path to the present. If you believe in a mechanical universe of cause and effect, that should be fairly non-controversial. Therefore human's who have had wicked cultures, and done wicked deeds are in a sense, exempt from what should be personal hatred for their actions. Still, if we are to have a coherent philosophy of moral behavior, (i.e. correct and incorrect ways to interact with our fellow man) we should realize what's wrong and what's right in all examples of human behavior.
Certainly I think knowledge of the past helps inform the present, but my argument wasn't that we act better because we have more historical moral factoids. I was arguing A) that societies are different because they took unique historical paths. B) Some of those paths resulted in more liberal outcomes (better moral/cooperative behavior). C) that the outcomes are objectively better for the individuals living in those societies. and D) we should recognize it as objectively better. which involves E) recognizing what is objectively worse.
Secondly, any agent attempting to draw upon the past for morality is going to be impeded
Its not so much that we have pre-packaged moral histories that allow us to act better, but that we have a grand preserved intellectual tradition. Its precisely because we have Locke and Hume and a documented Democratic history that these moral ideas aren't lost. Our intellectual canon, is our moral canon.
To suggest that morality necessarily improves as more knowledge is gained about the past is insufficient
Presumably, if all our accumulated written and mental knowledge of the past was erased tomorrow, we would be as we we're 50,000 years ago. We would act with what, I'm assuming, would be a much more instinctual, and therefore, less moral behavior. Obviously accumulated history,knowledge, lessons, be it mental, or written, etc. is the only reason for improvement. Otherwise we'd be starting fresh each day.
posted by dgaicun at 5:05 PM on December 9, 2002
My argument really shouldn't be as controversial as you're making it.
For one, reducing the past to a series of episodes to be called upon for moral guidance in the present is going to inevitably distort history.
I'm not sure that's exactly what I was saying. What I am saying is that the past was the logical, in fact only possible, path to the present. If you believe in a mechanical universe of cause and effect, that should be fairly non-controversial. Therefore human's who have had wicked cultures, and done wicked deeds are in a sense, exempt from what should be personal hatred for their actions. Still, if we are to have a coherent philosophy of moral behavior, (i.e. correct and incorrect ways to interact with our fellow man) we should realize what's wrong and what's right in all examples of human behavior.
Certainly I think knowledge of the past helps inform the present, but my argument wasn't that we act better because we have more historical moral factoids. I was arguing A) that societies are different because they took unique historical paths. B) Some of those paths resulted in more liberal outcomes (better moral/cooperative behavior). C) that the outcomes are objectively better for the individuals living in those societies. and D) we should recognize it as objectively better. which involves E) recognizing what is objectively worse.
Secondly, any agent attempting to draw upon the past for morality is going to be impeded
Its not so much that we have pre-packaged moral histories that allow us to act better, but that we have a grand preserved intellectual tradition. Its precisely because we have Locke and Hume and a documented Democratic history that these moral ideas aren't lost. Our intellectual canon, is our moral canon.
To suggest that morality necessarily improves as more knowledge is gained about the past is insufficient
Presumably, if all our accumulated written and mental knowledge of the past was erased tomorrow, we would be as we we're 50,000 years ago. We would act with what, I'm assuming, would be a much more instinctual, and therefore, less moral behavior. Obviously accumulated history,knowledge, lessons, be it mental, or written, etc. is the only reason for improvement. Otherwise we'd be starting fresh each day.
posted by dgaicun at 5:05 PM on December 9, 2002
Why do you feel it is necessary to view people as less essentially human or worthy of human dignity, just because you disagree with them?
Either you are misreading my statements entirely or that is the wildest out-of-left-field ad hominem attack I've yet seen.
I certainly did not mean it as a personal attack. As I understood it, you were arguing that it was not possible to judge a society (in this case ours temporally) as inferior without also judging the people as inferior. In other words that a person's worth is contingent instead of presupposed.
Basically what I am saying is obvious: people act the way they do because they are conditioned by the world and their biology and nothing else.
Again, I don't think that's at all obvious. Certainly such conditioning is a very powerful influence upon a person's "development," but I don't think things are quite so absolutely predetermined as you make out. There is some wiggle room there.
Pardon? So what is this mysterious force that is neither nurture or nature that is deciding your actions rushmc? Do you have a soul, that allows you to act outside of causation?
If we rewind history is it possible that Nazi Germany will take a different historical path, or do a single thing differently when all historical variables remain constant, resulting in the same cause and effect present? Where's the wiggle room? You've been a living domino effect since the day of your birth. Free-will just doesn't exist.
posted by dgaicun at 5:27 PM on December 9, 2002
Either you are misreading my statements entirely or that is the wildest out-of-left-field ad hominem attack I've yet seen.
I certainly did not mean it as a personal attack. As I understood it, you were arguing that it was not possible to judge a society (in this case ours temporally) as inferior without also judging the people as inferior. In other words that a person's worth is contingent instead of presupposed.
Basically what I am saying is obvious: people act the way they do because they are conditioned by the world and their biology and nothing else.
Again, I don't think that's at all obvious. Certainly such conditioning is a very powerful influence upon a person's "development," but I don't think things are quite so absolutely predetermined as you make out. There is some wiggle room there.
Pardon? So what is this mysterious force that is neither nurture or nature that is deciding your actions rushmc? Do you have a soul, that allows you to act outside of causation?
If we rewind history is it possible that Nazi Germany will take a different historical path, or do a single thing differently when all historical variables remain constant, resulting in the same cause and effect present? Where's the wiggle room? You've been a living domino effect since the day of your birth. Free-will just doesn't exist.
posted by dgaicun at 5:27 PM on December 9, 2002
You've been a living domino effect since the day of your birth. Free-will just doesn't exist.
That is quite the statement to leave hanging there, unsupported. I am more than willing to admit that people are products of biology and environment and nothing else, but it seems tenuous (at best) to use this as proof of a completely deterministic human history. We are not even close to being able to define all the influences that nature and nurture are used as catch-all terms to refer to, let alone the complex ways in which they interact. And the statement that the same initial variables always lead to the same result is plainly false, as any programmer can demonstrate readily.
It seems to me that you are arguing for predestination, albeit a modernized version. I think the last hundred years of science should make people a little less sure of the old mechanized universe idea, seeing as how god does, in fact, play dice.
posted by Nothing at 6:03 PM on December 9, 2002
That is quite the statement to leave hanging there, unsupported. I am more than willing to admit that people are products of biology and environment and nothing else, but it seems tenuous (at best) to use this as proof of a completely deterministic human history. We are not even close to being able to define all the influences that nature and nurture are used as catch-all terms to refer to, let alone the complex ways in which they interact. And the statement that the same initial variables always lead to the same result is plainly false, as any programmer can demonstrate readily.
It seems to me that you are arguing for predestination, albeit a modernized version. I think the last hundred years of science should make people a little less sure of the old mechanized universe idea, seeing as how god does, in fact, play dice.
posted by Nothing at 6:03 PM on December 9, 2002
On the subject of history influencing morality, I agree with Dgaicun, but with two caveats: firstly, you don't know what you don't know. Things that don't make it into history, which is normally a summary deduced long after the fact, don't get learned from. People who don't learn history, at their mother's knee or in school, don't know what they're missing. Secondly, historical knowledge restricts solutions; perhaps something that we think doesn't work might have actually worked, if something integral to it but not obvious hadn't failed. So our learning from history isn't perfectly correct (though it's pretty good). As another consequence of this we tend to follow the thought processes of our ancestors, being reluctant to try something completely new.
As for altering history, there have been many views proposed, by authors in the alternate history/time travel genre of fiction, of what exactly might happen if you rewind time. One view is that almost everything changes, because a person's life history is a series of essentially random events. For example, your parents had sex at such and such a time and place, making a particular egg/sperm pair which led to you (consequence of this: disrupt a person's conception in any way, however subtle, and you pretty much remove that person from history's tapestry). You sat next to somebody in school and became friends with them; it was through that person that you met another friend and another friend and developed your interests and met your spouse, etc etc. You missed a bus and had to wait for the next, to keep yourself amused you bought a paper and read an article that motivated you to change your job, and so on. Alter anything and you unpredictably alter everything after that event.
That's the view I personally favor, but there have been many other views, usually presented for narrative reasons: the elastic of history (prevent Hitler and someone else will unite a European nation in fascism and provoke war; prevent Jesus, and the Christian religion will derive in more or less the same way from St John or St Paul; etc). The view of the elastic of history is that you can alter the look of history, but not its substance. This is a purely mystical viewpoint, in my opinion, and pretty much pre-supposes a guiding force behind it all. But it makes for the most interesting stories.
Another view is the simple "you can't alter history because you can't go back in time", and that one is probably strictly correct, but least interesting. :)
Paradoxing, which is making it impossible for you to go back in time because whatever alterations you made to the past removed time travel or yourself or both (and hence you couldn't have made the alterations) is a whole other issue.
posted by aeschenkarnos at 6:04 PM on December 9, 2002
As for altering history, there have been many views proposed, by authors in the alternate history/time travel genre of fiction, of what exactly might happen if you rewind time. One view is that almost everything changes, because a person's life history is a series of essentially random events. For example, your parents had sex at such and such a time and place, making a particular egg/sperm pair which led to you (consequence of this: disrupt a person's conception in any way, however subtle, and you pretty much remove that person from history's tapestry). You sat next to somebody in school and became friends with them; it was through that person that you met another friend and another friend and developed your interests and met your spouse, etc etc. You missed a bus and had to wait for the next, to keep yourself amused you bought a paper and read an article that motivated you to change your job, and so on. Alter anything and you unpredictably alter everything after that event.
That's the view I personally favor, but there have been many other views, usually presented for narrative reasons: the elastic of history (prevent Hitler and someone else will unite a European nation in fascism and provoke war; prevent Jesus, and the Christian religion will derive in more or less the same way from St John or St Paul; etc). The view of the elastic of history is that you can alter the look of history, but not its substance. This is a purely mystical viewpoint, in my opinion, and pretty much pre-supposes a guiding force behind it all. But it makes for the most interesting stories.
Another view is the simple "you can't alter history because you can't go back in time", and that one is probably strictly correct, but least interesting. :)
Paradoxing, which is making it impossible for you to go back in time because whatever alterations you made to the past removed time travel or yourself or both (and hence you couldn't have made the alterations) is a whole other issue.
posted by aeschenkarnos at 6:04 PM on December 9, 2002
That is quite the statement to leave hanging there, unsupported.
Unsupported? Nothing, this is so utterly bogus. How did causality all of sudden become unsupported; it's the fundamental principle behind scientific naturalism. Even the physics that challenge its supremacy have to still assume it true, or they inevitably encounter paradox.
I am more than willing to admit that people are products of biology and environment and nothing else, but it seems tenuous (at best) to use this as proof of a completely deterministic human history.
so. . .each human is the product of nothing else but nurture and nature, but three humans in historical sequence are influenced by something else? You just contradicted your own premise.
We are not even close to being able to define all the influences that nature and nurture are used as catch-all terms to refer to, let alone the complex ways in which they interact.
It shouldn't matter, if together they are the only things shaping a human being, as you have conceded, then they are definitionally catch-all.
The universe operates by the rules of cause and effect. No coherent or usefull alternative exists. There simply is no "randomness" (however that works), just complex causes.
Even if the universe plays dice, a slot machine brain is no more free than a mechanized one. Either way, free-will in the Cartesian sense, remains ill-defined and warrants no serious consideration.
posted by dgaicun at 6:56 PM on December 9, 2002
Unsupported? Nothing, this is so utterly bogus. How did causality all of sudden become unsupported; it's the fundamental principle behind scientific naturalism. Even the physics that challenge its supremacy have to still assume it true, or they inevitably encounter paradox.
I am more than willing to admit that people are products of biology and environment and nothing else, but it seems tenuous (at best) to use this as proof of a completely deterministic human history.
so. . .each human is the product of nothing else but nurture and nature, but three humans in historical sequence are influenced by something else? You just contradicted your own premise.
We are not even close to being able to define all the influences that nature and nurture are used as catch-all terms to refer to, let alone the complex ways in which they interact.
It shouldn't matter, if together they are the only things shaping a human being, as you have conceded, then they are definitionally catch-all.
The universe operates by the rules of cause and effect. No coherent or usefull alternative exists. There simply is no "randomness" (however that works), just complex causes.
Even if the universe plays dice, a slot machine brain is no more free than a mechanized one. Either way, free-will in the Cartesian sense, remains ill-defined and warrants no serious consideration.
posted by dgaicun at 6:56 PM on December 9, 2002
Maybe it's the way you're stating things, dgaicun, I dunno. I feel I disagree with you strongly, yet when you sum up your contention thusly, I agree with you:
I was arguing A) that societies are different because they took unique historical paths. B) Some of those paths resulted in more liberal outcomes (better moral/cooperative behavior). C) that the outcomes are objectively better for the individuals living in those societies. and D) we should recognize it as objectively better. which involves E) recognizing what is objectively worse.
...always assuming that we would both define "better" and "worse" the same way (which I suspect that we might not) (also, I would not agree that "more cooperative" necessarily equals "more moral" in all cases).
As I understood it, you were arguing that it was not possible to judge a society (in this case ours temporally) as inferior without also judging the people as inferior. In other words that a person's worth is contingent instead of presupposed.
I'm not sure where you got that, but I intended to say nothing of the sort. My point was that seeking to judge vastly disparate societies as though they existed on an equal playing field was ridiculous, and that doing so in order to feel better about oneself was comparable to what people of the past did in displaying "freaks" in order to feel better about themselves.
If we rewind history is it possible that Nazi Germany will take a different historical path, or do a single thing differently when all historical variables remain constant
Yes, because all historical variables do not remain the same, given the influence of random, pseudo-random, and highly-chaotic factors and the complexity of the countless interactions between all things. If Hitler's mother prepared him X for supper instead of Y one night, which gave him indigestion and nightmares, which caused him to get up and go outside in the cold, which resulted in his catching cold, then pneumonia, and dying at the age of 17, how do you attribute this alternate course of events to either nature or nurture? There is only one past, but there is an infinite number of possible futures (and probably an infinite number of non-possible futures, too, but that's another matter).
posted by rushmc at 7:14 PM on December 9, 2002
I was arguing A) that societies are different because they took unique historical paths. B) Some of those paths resulted in more liberal outcomes (better moral/cooperative behavior). C) that the outcomes are objectively better for the individuals living in those societies. and D) we should recognize it as objectively better. which involves E) recognizing what is objectively worse.
...always assuming that we would both define "better" and "worse" the same way (which I suspect that we might not) (also, I would not agree that "more cooperative" necessarily equals "more moral" in all cases).
As I understood it, you were arguing that it was not possible to judge a society (in this case ours temporally) as inferior without also judging the people as inferior. In other words that a person's worth is contingent instead of presupposed.
I'm not sure where you got that, but I intended to say nothing of the sort. My point was that seeking to judge vastly disparate societies as though they existed on an equal playing field was ridiculous, and that doing so in order to feel better about oneself was comparable to what people of the past did in displaying "freaks" in order to feel better about themselves.
If we rewind history is it possible that Nazi Germany will take a different historical path, or do a single thing differently when all historical variables remain constant
Yes, because all historical variables do not remain the same, given the influence of random, pseudo-random, and highly-chaotic factors and the complexity of the countless interactions between all things. If Hitler's mother prepared him X for supper instead of Y one night, which gave him indigestion and nightmares, which caused him to get up and go outside in the cold, which resulted in his catching cold, then pneumonia, and dying at the age of 17, how do you attribute this alternate course of events to either nature or nurture? There is only one past, but there is an infinite number of possible futures (and probably an infinite number of non-possible futures, too, but that's another matter).
posted by rushmc at 7:14 PM on December 9, 2002
The universe operates by the rules of cause and effect. No coherent or usefull alternative exists. There simply is no "randomness" (however that works), just complex causes.
how on earth do you know that? Philosophically you're taking quite a risk, too, as you have to explain some kind of "first" cause. How do you explain intrinsic qualities (like the four primary forces) - what causes things that just "are"? Randomness seems to be one of the few qualities of the universe we can count on, actually. It's not completely random, but like a computer program that can choose one of a few directions at each stage, matter seems capable of a certain degree of flexibility in its action, and as it becomes more and more highly organized, it (we) becomes more capable of taking alternate routes. Yes, it's possible our ability to decide what to eat for dinner is an illusion and the moment standing in the supermarket aisle holding two different products is indelibly etched on Existence, as is our choice... it's a comforting thought, but by no means a given.
Either way, free-will in the Cartesian sense, remains ill-defined and warrants no serious consideration.
if it hasn't yet been well defined, how do you know whether it will warrant any serious consideration?
posted by mdn at 7:38 PM on December 9, 2002
how on earth do you know that? Philosophically you're taking quite a risk, too, as you have to explain some kind of "first" cause. How do you explain intrinsic qualities (like the four primary forces) - what causes things that just "are"? Randomness seems to be one of the few qualities of the universe we can count on, actually. It's not completely random, but like a computer program that can choose one of a few directions at each stage, matter seems capable of a certain degree of flexibility in its action, and as it becomes more and more highly organized, it (we) becomes more capable of taking alternate routes. Yes, it's possible our ability to decide what to eat for dinner is an illusion and the moment standing in the supermarket aisle holding two different products is indelibly etched on Existence, as is our choice... it's a comforting thought, but by no means a given.
Either way, free-will in the Cartesian sense, remains ill-defined and warrants no serious consideration.
if it hasn't yet been well defined, how do you know whether it will warrant any serious consideration?
posted by mdn at 7:38 PM on December 9, 2002
Its not so much that we have pre-packaged moral histories that allow us to act better, but that we have a grand preserved intellectual tradition. Its precisely because we have Locke and Hume and a documented Democratic history that these moral ideas aren't lost. Our intellectual canon, is our moral canon.
dgaicun,
I don't know; I just can't agree with this. Firstly, I don't think there is a singular, grand historical tradition that stays constant from generation to generation. There are traditions, but they're in flux and prone to change according to intellectual fashion, prevailing ideologies, changes in language and discourse etc.
To take the case of Locke's Two Treatises on Government, for instance, it's really a little unclear what its intellectual (let alone its moral) content is, due to the profound shift in political language and ideology since the 1680s. There are traditions of interpretation -- Locke the father of bourgeois liberalism; Locke the ideologist of government by consent (Tucker); Locke the apologist for capitalist appropriation (Marx); Locke the underground sympathiser for radical, grass roots revolution (Ashcraft); Locke the puritan intellectual (Dunn), and so on and so on -- but it's clear that none of these entirely encompass or explain the work, and some of them are wildly off the mark. There's no one single interpretation that tells us what the hell the thing means, or meant when it was written in 1680-3, or what it meant when it was published in 1690.
Secondly, the 'Western intellectual tradition' can't be conflated with morality. Everyone agrees that Locke (again)was a 'great thinker', but you can't extract a coherent theory of moral conduct from his works that wouldn't be repugnant today. Locke advocated that the poor be whipped, for God's sake. He took for granted that criminals be destroyed 'as lyons and tygers'. He assumed that most of the workless poor were hopelessly irrational and should be confined in workhouses and deprived of all rights. Political ideology isn't morality, and shouldn't be treated that way. They're totally different things.
posted by Sonny Jim at 11:11 PM on December 9, 2002
dgaicun,
I don't know; I just can't agree with this. Firstly, I don't think there is a singular, grand historical tradition that stays constant from generation to generation. There are traditions, but they're in flux and prone to change according to intellectual fashion, prevailing ideologies, changes in language and discourse etc.
To take the case of Locke's Two Treatises on Government, for instance, it's really a little unclear what its intellectual (let alone its moral) content is, due to the profound shift in political language and ideology since the 1680s. There are traditions of interpretation -- Locke the father of bourgeois liberalism; Locke the ideologist of government by consent (Tucker); Locke the apologist for capitalist appropriation (Marx); Locke the underground sympathiser for radical, grass roots revolution (Ashcraft); Locke the puritan intellectual (Dunn), and so on and so on -- but it's clear that none of these entirely encompass or explain the work, and some of them are wildly off the mark. There's no one single interpretation that tells us what the hell the thing means, or meant when it was written in 1680-3, or what it meant when it was published in 1690.
Secondly, the 'Western intellectual tradition' can't be conflated with morality. Everyone agrees that Locke (again)was a 'great thinker', but you can't extract a coherent theory of moral conduct from his works that wouldn't be repugnant today. Locke advocated that the poor be whipped, for God's sake. He took for granted that criminals be destroyed 'as lyons and tygers'. He assumed that most of the workless poor were hopelessly irrational and should be confined in workhouses and deprived of all rights. Political ideology isn't morality, and shouldn't be treated that way. They're totally different things.
posted by Sonny Jim at 11:11 PM on December 9, 2002
Please, I was not questioning causality; I was questioning your assumption of determinism. Probabilistic causality allows for rational cause and effect in a nondeterministic universe, and it's not exactly a radical concept. I still see no evidence to support your claim that human interaction is deterministic. Anyway, this is rather off the topic at this point, which puts me in the strange position of disagreeing with your argument on my way to agreeing with one of your conclusions. I completely agree that the value of a person is intrinsic and not based on any outside assessment of their morality.
Also, since I forgot to mention it last time: Rushmc, I loved your comparison at the beginning of this thread. Excellent.
posted by Nothing at 12:07 AM on December 10, 2002
Also, since I forgot to mention it last time: Rushmc, I loved your comparison at the beginning of this thread. Excellent.
posted by Nothing at 12:07 AM on December 10, 2002
Free-will just doesn't exist.
Of course, you had to say that. And now I shall have to forgive you.
posted by walrus at 4:25 AM on December 10, 2002
Of course, you had to say that. And now I shall have to forgive you.
posted by walrus at 4:25 AM on December 10, 2002
Everybody,
It looks like we've all established common ground in our own ways, but it seems the content of the disagreement is different with each person.
I'd like to point out that the free-will/cause-and-effect universe, is actually two different problems. While it may be argued that the universe operates mechanically, probabilistically, or even chaotically, none of these scenarios gives room to anything resembling free-will. In the first scenario, human action would be utterly predictable, if all universal variables were prior known. It would follow that if you could predict a persons every action, that they would be predetermined, not free agents. In the third scenario, you couldn't predict anything about a persons actions, but not because the person was 'utterly free', but because the universe itself would be in chaotic flux. A human couldn't even exist in such a universe. The second scenario is nothing but a point somewhere between the first and the third, much closer to the first, I imagine most would argue. But as the first and the third left no room for free-will the second doesn't do any better. A person's actions would be as mostly as predictable as the universe itself would be. Where that predictability leaves off isn't at the point of some intangible will, but at the quantum randomness of the universe's operation. As noted in the chaotic universe scenario, how does random chance facilitate freedom anymore so than mechanistic operation? Is randomness freedom? If I choose a red sweater to wear instead of a blue one, because of some sort of irregularity in the mechanical operation of my brain, how was that freedom? Did I decide the nature of that quantum irregularity? Did I decide what it would result in? If not, than it wasn't free choice, it was just as out of my hands as it would be in any rigidly mechanistic system.
Now for the individual answers-
Rushmc: My point was that seeking to judge vastly disparate societies as though they existed on an equal playing field was ridiculous
True. My point was that regardless of how a society comes to a wrong conclusion, the conclusion is wrong, and we should have no trouble evaluating it as such. To claim we can't, I believe, is to undermine our own ability to make knowledge claims, something that is common both in Mysticism, a religious concept I disagree with (ex. who are we to judge the actions of God), and in Post-Modernism, a philosophical equivocation that I disagree with also, mainly because it makes the same infalliblist fallacy* that mystics defend faith with (ex. How do we "know" that the "primitive" (insert tribal people here) aren't actually more "advanced" than "us").
If Hitler's mother prepared him X for supper instead of Y one night, which gave him indigestion and nightmares. . .etc., etc.
The problem here is what made Hitler's mother prepare X instead of Y in the first place (i say this fully agreeing that the tiniest thing could change history dramatically). Maybe you think it was random. I think all the variables were set to ensure she prepare Y since the beginning of time. Of course even if this wasn't true, it still wouldn't help your argument:
ME:Basically what I am saying is obvious: people act the way they do because they are conditioned by the world and their biology and nothing else.
YOU:Again, I don't think that's at all obvious. . . There is some wiggle room there.
Randomness does not equal freedom. If the unpredictable quantum fluctuation of the universe resulted in Mrs. Hitler preparing X instead of Y, then her actions, and thus history, were still rigidly determined by the universe. You have demonstrated nothing resembling 'wiggle room'.
I'll have to respond to other people later, I'm at work.
*the infallibilist fallacy is to say that knowledge claims can't be made when all knowledge is not available to us. A proposition that is contradictory, because it itself is a knowledge claim.
posted by dgaicun at 7:42 AM on December 10, 2002
It looks like we've all established common ground in our own ways, but it seems the content of the disagreement is different with each person.
I'd like to point out that the free-will/cause-and-effect universe, is actually two different problems. While it may be argued that the universe operates mechanically, probabilistically, or even chaotically, none of these scenarios gives room to anything resembling free-will. In the first scenario, human action would be utterly predictable, if all universal variables were prior known. It would follow that if you could predict a persons every action, that they would be predetermined, not free agents. In the third scenario, you couldn't predict anything about a persons actions, but not because the person was 'utterly free', but because the universe itself would be in chaotic flux. A human couldn't even exist in such a universe. The second scenario is nothing but a point somewhere between the first and the third, much closer to the first, I imagine most would argue. But as the first and the third left no room for free-will the second doesn't do any better. A person's actions would be as mostly as predictable as the universe itself would be. Where that predictability leaves off isn't at the point of some intangible will, but at the quantum randomness of the universe's operation. As noted in the chaotic universe scenario, how does random chance facilitate freedom anymore so than mechanistic operation? Is randomness freedom? If I choose a red sweater to wear instead of a blue one, because of some sort of irregularity in the mechanical operation of my brain, how was that freedom? Did I decide the nature of that quantum irregularity? Did I decide what it would result in? If not, than it wasn't free choice, it was just as out of my hands as it would be in any rigidly mechanistic system.
Now for the individual answers-
Rushmc: My point was that seeking to judge vastly disparate societies as though they existed on an equal playing field was ridiculous
True. My point was that regardless of how a society comes to a wrong conclusion, the conclusion is wrong, and we should have no trouble evaluating it as such. To claim we can't, I believe, is to undermine our own ability to make knowledge claims, something that is common both in Mysticism, a religious concept I disagree with (ex. who are we to judge the actions of God), and in Post-Modernism, a philosophical equivocation that I disagree with also, mainly because it makes the same infalliblist fallacy* that mystics defend faith with (ex. How do we "know" that the "primitive" (insert tribal people here) aren't actually more "advanced" than "us").
If Hitler's mother prepared him X for supper instead of Y one night, which gave him indigestion and nightmares. . .etc., etc.
The problem here is what made Hitler's mother prepare X instead of Y in the first place (i say this fully agreeing that the tiniest thing could change history dramatically). Maybe you think it was random. I think all the variables were set to ensure she prepare Y since the beginning of time. Of course even if this wasn't true, it still wouldn't help your argument:
ME:Basically what I am saying is obvious: people act the way they do because they are conditioned by the world and their biology and nothing else.
YOU:Again, I don't think that's at all obvious. . . There is some wiggle room there.
Randomness does not equal freedom. If the unpredictable quantum fluctuation of the universe resulted in Mrs. Hitler preparing X instead of Y, then her actions, and thus history, were still rigidly determined by the universe. You have demonstrated nothing resembling 'wiggle room'.
I'll have to respond to other people later, I'm at work.
*the infallibilist fallacy is to say that knowledge claims can't be made when all knowledge is not available to us. A proposition that is contradictory, because it itself is a knowledge claim.
posted by dgaicun at 7:42 AM on December 10, 2002
The problem here is what made Hitler's mother prepare X instead of Y in the first place (i say this fully agreeing that the tiniest thing could change history dramatically). Maybe you think it was random. I think all the variables were set to ensure she prepare Y since the beginning of time.
No, I don't think it was random, I think it was choice. If you are going to claim that "the variables were set to ensure she prepare Y since the beginning of time," it seems to me that the burden of proof is on you, since that's a rather remarkable and counterintuitive claim to make. Some variables were no doubt set that constrained her choice--what supplies she was able to have on hand, given crop performance and purchasing decisions by shop owners and other buyers--but in that moment when she went to her pantry and chose to make X over the equally viable Y (with no bias against Y, since she frequently made it), I don't see anything in that moment that would constrain me from calling it a true "choice." She might make use of certain knowledge and information--how hungry she was, which meal she had prepared most recently, which required more work to prepare, etc.--but we all utilize information in our choice-making, by definition. To claim that this translates into a compulsion to choose a certain way seems quite a leap to me.
Perhaps our difference lies in how we define "choice." I certainly wouldn't argue that all of our choices are not constrained in numerous ways. I just don't see that they are constrained in ALL ways.
posted by rushmc at 10:02 AM on December 10, 2002
No, I don't think it was random, I think it was choice. If you are going to claim that "the variables were set to ensure she prepare Y since the beginning of time," it seems to me that the burden of proof is on you, since that's a rather remarkable and counterintuitive claim to make. Some variables were no doubt set that constrained her choice--what supplies she was able to have on hand, given crop performance and purchasing decisions by shop owners and other buyers--but in that moment when she went to her pantry and chose to make X over the equally viable Y (with no bias against Y, since she frequently made it), I don't see anything in that moment that would constrain me from calling it a true "choice." She might make use of certain knowledge and information--how hungry she was, which meal she had prepared most recently, which required more work to prepare, etc.--but we all utilize information in our choice-making, by definition. To claim that this translates into a compulsion to choose a certain way seems quite a leap to me.
Perhaps our difference lies in how we define "choice." I certainly wouldn't argue that all of our choices are not constrained in numerous ways. I just don't see that they are constrained in ALL ways.
posted by rushmc at 10:02 AM on December 10, 2002
it seems to me that the burden of proof is on you, since that's a rather remarkable and counterintuitive claim to make.
Universal causation is a remarkable claim? I think its pretty unremarkable. Lets start with this rushmc, do you think thought is entirely produced by a material brain? Do you think the brain is an organic machine?
Right now you are arguing for a Cartesian Duality, whereby people are able to generate their own thoughts ex-nihilo (or to try and seem more reasonable you argue semi-ex-nihilo, which is trying to have your cake and eat it too.).
That's all good and nice if your the religious type, but that brand of thinking hasn't been scientifically tenable since Phineas Gage.
As far as we can tell, thought is a brain-based biological phenomenon and the brain is a physical system of chemical impulse. Thought is not self-created (which is a paradox), but is produced by the mechanical actions of the brain. To illustrate the flaw of free-will here is an example:
Johnny wakes up and walks over to his chair where he sees two sweaters: red and blue. Johnny picks up the red sweater and puts it on. Now if we rewind history and look inside Johnny's head at the moment leading up to the decision what do we see? A system of impulses that are reacting to the environment in mechanical ways. In a purely mechanical universe Johnny will necessarily pick the red sweater, no matter how many times we rewind history, because the variables will always remain constant leading to the same outcome. In a probabilistic universe Johnny will most likely pick the red sweater, due to the variables , but a theoretical disturbance could tweak some of the necessary variables ever-so-slightly causing Johnny to pick the blue sweater. I disbelieve in such a universe, but even granting you its hypothetical existence for this scenario, Johnny still isn't responsible for his choice of picking the blue sweater, any more so than he was for picking the red sweater in my mechanistic universe. Either way his actions were determined by nothing that could be called free-will. His actions are entirely determined, in both scenarios, by the operations of the universe. Its not a remarkable claim at all, its just a coherent summary of the way things work.
posted by dgaicun at 1:33 PM on December 10, 2002
Universal causation is a remarkable claim? I think its pretty unremarkable. Lets start with this rushmc, do you think thought is entirely produced by a material brain? Do you think the brain is an organic machine?
Right now you are arguing for a Cartesian Duality, whereby people are able to generate their own thoughts ex-nihilo (or to try and seem more reasonable you argue semi-ex-nihilo, which is trying to have your cake and eat it too.).
That's all good and nice if your the religious type, but that brand of thinking hasn't been scientifically tenable since Phineas Gage.
As far as we can tell, thought is a brain-based biological phenomenon and the brain is a physical system of chemical impulse. Thought is not self-created (which is a paradox), but is produced by the mechanical actions of the brain. To illustrate the flaw of free-will here is an example:
Johnny wakes up and walks over to his chair where he sees two sweaters: red and blue. Johnny picks up the red sweater and puts it on. Now if we rewind history and look inside Johnny's head at the moment leading up to the decision what do we see? A system of impulses that are reacting to the environment in mechanical ways. In a purely mechanical universe Johnny will necessarily pick the red sweater, no matter how many times we rewind history, because the variables will always remain constant leading to the same outcome. In a probabilistic universe Johnny will most likely pick the red sweater, due to the variables , but a theoretical disturbance could tweak some of the necessary variables ever-so-slightly causing Johnny to pick the blue sweater. I disbelieve in such a universe, but even granting you its hypothetical existence for this scenario, Johnny still isn't responsible for his choice of picking the blue sweater, any more so than he was for picking the red sweater in my mechanistic universe. Either way his actions were determined by nothing that could be called free-will. His actions are entirely determined, in both scenarios, by the operations of the universe. Its not a remarkable claim at all, its just a coherent summary of the way things work.
posted by dgaicun at 1:33 PM on December 10, 2002
Lets start with this rushmc, do you think thought is entirely produced by a material brain?
Expand "brain" to "nervous system" to accommodate some recent findings and I will agree with you. But how the brain et al produces thought has not even begun to be understood, so I think it's premature to conclude that it is according to a strictly mechanistic process (though it may be). To me, the model that makes the most sense at this point is to think of the brain as simply another environment in which evolutionary processes, including competition and "fitness testing," occur. Would you argue that evolutionary outcomes are predictable? I am unconvinced.
Johnny still isn't responsible for his choice of picking the blue sweater, any more so than he was for picking the red sweater in my mechanistic universe.
So you claim, and so I understand that you believe, but you still have not offered any proof of this contention--or even an argument of why it might be so. People sometimes choose blue sweaters and sometimes red ones--if you cannot hypothesize this chain of inevitability that you are postulating which leads to a predetermined choice, then it seems to me that Occam's Razor would lead one to prefer a model of selection that involves some degree of free (or at least less-constrained) choice.
posted by rushmc at 3:33 PM on December 10, 2002
Expand "brain" to "nervous system" to accommodate some recent findings and I will agree with you. But how the brain et al produces thought has not even begun to be understood, so I think it's premature to conclude that it is according to a strictly mechanistic process (though it may be). To me, the model that makes the most sense at this point is to think of the brain as simply another environment in which evolutionary processes, including competition and "fitness testing," occur. Would you argue that evolutionary outcomes are predictable? I am unconvinced.
Johnny still isn't responsible for his choice of picking the blue sweater, any more so than he was for picking the red sweater in my mechanistic universe.
So you claim, and so I understand that you believe, but you still have not offered any proof of this contention--or even an argument of why it might be so. People sometimes choose blue sweaters and sometimes red ones--if you cannot hypothesize this chain of inevitability that you are postulating which leads to a predetermined choice, then it seems to me that Occam's Razor would lead one to prefer a model of selection that involves some degree of free (or at least less-constrained) choice.
posted by rushmc at 3:33 PM on December 10, 2002
But how the brain et al produces thought has not even begun to be understood, so I think it's premature to conclude that it is according to a strictly mechanistic process
Premature? Everything works by a strictly mechanistic process! Does something happen that doesn't have a cause? Can you explain how the brain operates outside the constraints of cause and effect? Is the brain supernatural?
Would you argue that evolutionary outcomes are predictable?
I've already been over this rushmc. In a hypothetically probabilistic universe neither human decisions nor evolutionary outcomes would be predictable, even with full knowledge of all universal variables. Your analogy does no great service to your idea of free-will, because evolution, like human thought, is wholly contingent on the operating method of the universe. Evolution, like human thought, doesn't make its own decisions, rather, they are both externally determined.
ME:Johnny still isn't responsible for his choice of picking the blue sweater, any more so than he was for picking the red sweater in my mechanistic universe.
YOU:So you claim, and so I understand that you believe, but you still have not offered any proof of this contention--or even an argument of why it might be so.
This is false. You cut-and-pasted the conclusion while conveniently ignoring all my supporting arguments. The proof was deductive. I'll try one more time:
Johnny picks the red sweater. Why did Johnny pick the red sweater? Because he wanted to, his will directed him to the red sweater. But what shaped that will? Ahhh. And thus we are presented with two choices rushmc, Johnny's will was either: A) shaped by external variables, aka the brain and the environment, and their complex intertwined relationship (a process that you can't say is attributable to 'him' (i.e. Johnny shaped his will), because the 'him' is precisely what we are trying to explain. 'He' is the will.) or B) nothing shaped his will, his will was determined in a vacuum called free-will. In other words, the will is determined in an intagible (or super-tangible) vacuum called self-hood, otherwise and more popularly known as a soul.
This is what we call religion, rushmc. Of course you want to eat your cake and have it to, so to avoid the religion part, you argue that we live in a probabilistic universe and then somehow believe that that will lead to a level of free human choice that closely resembles that of world 'B'. What I have been trying to communicate to you, is that you are wrong in this assumption- A probabilistic universe does not result in Free-will. If johnny picks the red sweater because all the variables were set to mechanistically create that conclusion, he obviously didn't have free will. But, if Johnny lives in a probabilistic universe and he comes to the sweater decision where he will 'probably' pick the red one, but a tiny (unmechanistic/uncaused) fluctuation of variables results in him picking the blue one instead, how does that resemble free-will anymore so than the decision he made in the entirely mechanistic world? It doesn't. What is my proof? Follow the deduction, feel free to disagree with individually specified premises: If the variables weren't acted upon by uncaused disturbances, they wouldn't have resulted in Johnny picking the blue sweater. Johnny didn't freely-choose, he was subject, like everything else, to the laws of causation. Johnny's will was caused externally. There's no where this will can hide, it must be shaped rushmc, otherwise it is exempt from the natural universe, and it becomes a soul.
posted by dgaicun at 6:12 PM on December 10, 2002
Premature? Everything works by a strictly mechanistic process! Does something happen that doesn't have a cause? Can you explain how the brain operates outside the constraints of cause and effect? Is the brain supernatural?
Would you argue that evolutionary outcomes are predictable?
I've already been over this rushmc. In a hypothetically probabilistic universe neither human decisions nor evolutionary outcomes would be predictable, even with full knowledge of all universal variables. Your analogy does no great service to your idea of free-will, because evolution, like human thought, is wholly contingent on the operating method of the universe. Evolution, like human thought, doesn't make its own decisions, rather, they are both externally determined.
ME:Johnny still isn't responsible for his choice of picking the blue sweater, any more so than he was for picking the red sweater in my mechanistic universe.
YOU:So you claim, and so I understand that you believe, but you still have not offered any proof of this contention--or even an argument of why it might be so.
This is false. You cut-and-pasted the conclusion while conveniently ignoring all my supporting arguments. The proof was deductive. I'll try one more time:
Johnny picks the red sweater. Why did Johnny pick the red sweater? Because he wanted to, his will directed him to the red sweater. But what shaped that will? Ahhh. And thus we are presented with two choices rushmc, Johnny's will was either: A) shaped by external variables, aka the brain and the environment, and their complex intertwined relationship (a process that you can't say is attributable to 'him' (i.e. Johnny shaped his will), because the 'him' is precisely what we are trying to explain. 'He' is the will.) or B) nothing shaped his will, his will was determined in a vacuum called free-will. In other words, the will is determined in an intagible (or super-tangible) vacuum called self-hood, otherwise and more popularly known as a soul.
This is what we call religion, rushmc. Of course you want to eat your cake and have it to, so to avoid the religion part, you argue that we live in a probabilistic universe and then somehow believe that that will lead to a level of free human choice that closely resembles that of world 'B'. What I have been trying to communicate to you, is that you are wrong in this assumption- A probabilistic universe does not result in Free-will. If johnny picks the red sweater because all the variables were set to mechanistically create that conclusion, he obviously didn't have free will. But, if Johnny lives in a probabilistic universe and he comes to the sweater decision where he will 'probably' pick the red one, but a tiny (unmechanistic/uncaused) fluctuation of variables results in him picking the blue one instead, how does that resemble free-will anymore so than the decision he made in the entirely mechanistic world? It doesn't. What is my proof? Follow the deduction, feel free to disagree with individually specified premises: If the variables weren't acted upon by uncaused disturbances, they wouldn't have resulted in Johnny picking the blue sweater. Johnny didn't freely-choose, he was subject, like everything else, to the laws of causation. Johnny's will was caused externally. There's no where this will can hide, it must be shaped rushmc, otherwise it is exempt from the natural universe, and it becomes a soul.
posted by dgaicun at 6:12 PM on December 10, 2002
Everything works by a strictly mechanistic process! Does something happen that doesn't have a cause? Can you explain how the brain operates outside the constraints of cause and effect? Is the brain supernatural?
Why is matter drawn toward matter? Why are particles attracted and repelled by one another? There is no underlying cause that can be determined about basic rules of nature. It need not be supernatural for things to exist which are not mechanically determined.
Anyway, how do you explain consciousness within this system? what causes the awareness of the composite matter that makes up the self? And if a thing is capable of going right or left, and also capable of being aware of these options and understanding the consequences of each, what would obstruct it from making a decision?
The part that is somewhat less explicable is the fact that we're conscious to start with. If you don't deny that we are matter that has somehow become aware of itself through complex organization, then why is this awareness not capable of directing certain actions, within limits of its capability?
posted by mdn at 8:26 PM on December 10, 2002
Why is matter drawn toward matter? Why are particles attracted and repelled by one another? There is no underlying cause that can be determined about basic rules of nature. It need not be supernatural for things to exist which are not mechanically determined.
Anyway, how do you explain consciousness within this system? what causes the awareness of the composite matter that makes up the self? And if a thing is capable of going right or left, and also capable of being aware of these options and understanding the consequences of each, what would obstruct it from making a decision?
The part that is somewhat less explicable is the fact that we're conscious to start with. If you don't deny that we are matter that has somehow become aware of itself through complex organization, then why is this awareness not capable of directing certain actions, within limits of its capability?
posted by mdn at 8:26 PM on December 10, 2002
I suspect we have more common ground than is at first apparent (though certainly some significant differences, as well), dgaicun, but your intransigence and hectoring tone make it unlikely we will ever discover it. /shrug
posted by rushmc at 9:15 PM on December 10, 2002
posted by rushmc at 9:15 PM on December 10, 2002
rushmc: Sorry, didn't mean to bully. Its just very frustrating when you spend a half an hour to forty-five minutes on a response, and then you are told 'you haven't even provided an argument'.
mdn: Anyway, how do you explain consciousness within this system? what causes the awareness of the composite matter that makes up the self? And if a thing is capable of going right or left, and also capable of being aware of these options and understanding the consequences of each, what would obstruct it from making a decision?
I can't totally explain consciousness, but we know it is produced by a material process in the brain. It can be altered, manipulated, modified, and destroyed. It is an example of emergent behavior, where patterns at smaller levels of operation create their own macro-patterns. (sort of how 1s and 0s are responsible for all the images and sounds on your computer, and how deep blue can beat Gary Kasparov at chess). As for decision-making, nothing obstructs you from making a decision. This is obvious, as we 'decide' things all the time. What a lot of people don't understand is that that decision wasn't perfectly formed in a vacuum called 'you', it was a product of the material state of the brain. The, 'you' isn't something platonic with pre-born ideas (i.e. likes ice cream, likes the color red, hectors people during debates), but all these things are programmed by your genetics and shaped by your environment, or, more accurately, are a product of their complex mutual interaction. In other words 'you' are nothing but an empty consciousness. A person's will (the final drive to make a decision) has been fully determined by what happened in the material universe. It would only make sense that if you chose to eat an apple pie instead of a cherry one, even though you tend to eat both equally on average, that the final choice to eat the apple one, had some sort of set of causes that tipped the balance, instead of some sort of little ruler in your brain who issued an arbitrary dictum that 'it must be apple'. To throw out a couple of lame, but demonstrative examples of why you might have chosen apple over cherry that day: maybe you had had cherry twice before, so you figured it was apple time; maybe the ingredients of apple pie are a little different in composition, less acidy, for instance, so that your body physically compelled you toward it; maybe your train of thought was randomly centered around apples that day (i.e. I'm bored- I should call a friend- I wonder if Jim is home today- yeah, but i shouldn't call, he's probably still tired from our trip last week- it was fun last week when we drove to Montana- we stayed at his grandmother's house- I remember that delicious pie she baked us- it was apple- mmmm. . . apple pie- *eats apple pie*). In any case, there was a logical causal chain that led to the pie decision, as there is necessarily a mechanical chain of events that leads to any decision. The will is shaped externally (from itself), not platonically materialized. See, it's not that we are anyhow, obstructed from making a decision, it's just that who we are, and the decisions we make, are inevitable outcomes. 'You' could have been anybody- Hitler or Jesus- if you were born into Hitler or Jesus's Mother's womb, with their exact genetics. If you were you would have made all the same decisions as those men did, because nothing would have been different, but which car it felt like you were driving. You might dispute this by saying that Hitler or Jesus made their decisions not because they were shaped to inevitably take those paths, but because Hitler had some sort of 'evil essence', that was attached to his consciousness, that provoked him to make the wrong decision at each fork in the path. But if this was the case I ask you, how does that resemble free-will in anyway more genuinely than the mechanical processes I have described? If Hitler wasn't shaped as evil, but had a decision making will, that was separate form material causation, or was only 'informed' by material causation, but still made these terrible decisions, where is the free-will in that? It sounds like Hitler was born evil in that scenario. As described above we can't say Hitler made himself evil. Because that is paradoxical. Hitler's will is the very thing we are trying to describe. We would end up this: Why did Hitler 'make himself' evil? Because Hitler made himself made himself evil (ad infinitum)? In my view Hitler was an empty consciousness at birth, like we all are, given the exact genetics, and the exact environment that could only lead to one outcome when they interacted with eachother- the one that actually happened.
posted by dgaicun at 9:58 AM on December 11, 2002
mdn: Anyway, how do you explain consciousness within this system? what causes the awareness of the composite matter that makes up the self? And if a thing is capable of going right or left, and also capable of being aware of these options and understanding the consequences of each, what would obstruct it from making a decision?
I can't totally explain consciousness, but we know it is produced by a material process in the brain. It can be altered, manipulated, modified, and destroyed. It is an example of emergent behavior, where patterns at smaller levels of operation create their own macro-patterns. (sort of how 1s and 0s are responsible for all the images and sounds on your computer, and how deep blue can beat Gary Kasparov at chess). As for decision-making, nothing obstructs you from making a decision. This is obvious, as we 'decide' things all the time. What a lot of people don't understand is that that decision wasn't perfectly formed in a vacuum called 'you', it was a product of the material state of the brain. The, 'you' isn't something platonic with pre-born ideas (i.e. likes ice cream, likes the color red, hectors people during debates), but all these things are programmed by your genetics and shaped by your environment, or, more accurately, are a product of their complex mutual interaction. In other words 'you' are nothing but an empty consciousness. A person's will (the final drive to make a decision) has been fully determined by what happened in the material universe. It would only make sense that if you chose to eat an apple pie instead of a cherry one, even though you tend to eat both equally on average, that the final choice to eat the apple one, had some sort of set of causes that tipped the balance, instead of some sort of little ruler in your brain who issued an arbitrary dictum that 'it must be apple'. To throw out a couple of lame, but demonstrative examples of why you might have chosen apple over cherry that day: maybe you had had cherry twice before, so you figured it was apple time; maybe the ingredients of apple pie are a little different in composition, less acidy, for instance, so that your body physically compelled you toward it; maybe your train of thought was randomly centered around apples that day (i.e. I'm bored- I should call a friend- I wonder if Jim is home today- yeah, but i shouldn't call, he's probably still tired from our trip last week- it was fun last week when we drove to Montana- we stayed at his grandmother's house- I remember that delicious pie she baked us- it was apple- mmmm. . . apple pie- *eats apple pie*). In any case, there was a logical causal chain that led to the pie decision, as there is necessarily a mechanical chain of events that leads to any decision. The will is shaped externally (from itself), not platonically materialized. See, it's not that we are anyhow, obstructed from making a decision, it's just that who we are, and the decisions we make, are inevitable outcomes. 'You' could have been anybody- Hitler or Jesus- if you were born into Hitler or Jesus's Mother's womb, with their exact genetics. If you were you would have made all the same decisions as those men did, because nothing would have been different, but which car it felt like you were driving. You might dispute this by saying that Hitler or Jesus made their decisions not because they were shaped to inevitably take those paths, but because Hitler had some sort of 'evil essence', that was attached to his consciousness, that provoked him to make the wrong decision at each fork in the path. But if this was the case I ask you, how does that resemble free-will in anyway more genuinely than the mechanical processes I have described? If Hitler wasn't shaped as evil, but had a decision making will, that was separate form material causation, or was only 'informed' by material causation, but still made these terrible decisions, where is the free-will in that? It sounds like Hitler was born evil in that scenario. As described above we can't say Hitler made himself evil. Because that is paradoxical. Hitler's will is the very thing we are trying to describe. We would end up this: Why did Hitler 'make himself' evil? Because Hitler made himself made himself evil (ad infinitum)? In my view Hitler was an empty consciousness at birth, like we all are, given the exact genetics, and the exact environment that could only lead to one outcome when they interacted with eachother- the one that actually happened.
posted by dgaicun at 9:58 AM on December 11, 2002
What a lot of people don't understand is that that decision wasn't perfectly formed in a vacuum called 'you', it was a product of the material state of the brain.
From my perspective, what you don't seem to understand is that you ARE the material state of your brain. I think I also essentially agree with what you're saying, but you don't need to try to separate the organized material and the person.
You might dispute this by saying that Hitler or Jesus made their decisions not because they were shaped to inevitably take those paths, but because Hitler had some sort of 'evil essence', that was attached to his consciousness, that provoked him to make the wrong decision at each fork in the path.
I don't think you need to simplify it into an "evil essence" - but hatred, intolerance, self-righteousness, bigotry, lack of empathy, etc etc, are various traits that are undesirable in people and which lead them toward "evil" actions. Traits like these may be genetic; they may be influenced by environmental factors; they may be learned.
In my view Hitler was an empty consciousness at birth, like we all are, given the exact genetics, and the exact environment that could only lead to one outcome when they interacted with eachother- the one that actually happened.
why was hitler not the actual material brain and body that was born? the specific animal that became hitler was one entity. You're the one falling into dualism here, I think.
REgarding the predetermination thing, I think the problem there is imagining that we can experience time more than once - it's determined in the sense that whatever happens, happens. But the consciousness that emerges through the organization of matter is capable of understanding possible consequences of actions. In important decisions perhaps most people lean far enough in one direction or the other that they would be influenced by genetic and environmental factors to always make the same decisions, but in small decisions like what to make for dinner that night, something that would have been random to a non-conscious animal becomes a choice for a conscious animal.
Randomly, the non-conscious entity could go right or left. The conscious being is aware that she can go right or left. She is aware that the options stand before her and both are possible. Instead of randomly going in one direction, she makes a decision to go in one direction or the other (sometimes based on nothing more than randomly choosing / flipping a coin - but she's aware of this, while the non-conscious entities are not).
posted by mdn at 11:50 AM on December 11, 2002
From my perspective, what you don't seem to understand is that you ARE the material state of your brain. I think I also essentially agree with what you're saying, but you don't need to try to separate the organized material and the person.
You might dispute this by saying that Hitler or Jesus made their decisions not because they were shaped to inevitably take those paths, but because Hitler had some sort of 'evil essence', that was attached to his consciousness, that provoked him to make the wrong decision at each fork in the path.
I don't think you need to simplify it into an "evil essence" - but hatred, intolerance, self-righteousness, bigotry, lack of empathy, etc etc, are various traits that are undesirable in people and which lead them toward "evil" actions. Traits like these may be genetic; they may be influenced by environmental factors; they may be learned.
In my view Hitler was an empty consciousness at birth, like we all are, given the exact genetics, and the exact environment that could only lead to one outcome when they interacted with eachother- the one that actually happened.
why was hitler not the actual material brain and body that was born? the specific animal that became hitler was one entity. You're the one falling into dualism here, I think.
REgarding the predetermination thing, I think the problem there is imagining that we can experience time more than once - it's determined in the sense that whatever happens, happens. But the consciousness that emerges through the organization of matter is capable of understanding possible consequences of actions. In important decisions perhaps most people lean far enough in one direction or the other that they would be influenced by genetic and environmental factors to always make the same decisions, but in small decisions like what to make for dinner that night, something that would have been random to a non-conscious animal becomes a choice for a conscious animal.
Randomly, the non-conscious entity could go right or left. The conscious being is aware that she can go right or left. She is aware that the options stand before her and both are possible. Instead of randomly going in one direction, she makes a decision to go in one direction or the other (sometimes based on nothing more than randomly choosing / flipping a coin - but she's aware of this, while the non-conscious entities are not).
posted by mdn at 11:50 AM on December 11, 2002
Me:What a lot of people don't understand is that that decision wasn't perfectly formed in a vacuum called 'you', it was a product of the material state of the brain.
You:From my perspective, what you don't seem to understand is that you ARE the material state of your brain.
Me:In my view Hitler was an empty consciousness at birth, like we all are, given the exact genetics, and the exact environment that could only lead to one outcome when they interacted with eachother- the one that actually happened.
You:why was hitler not the actual material brain and body that was born? the specific animal that became hitler was one entity. You're the one falling into dualism here, I think.
It's not dualism, but I am slicing up the concept of 'you' into more parts than one. But I understand that they are all coming from the brain. The Hitler I was referring to was the most fundamental 'you' there is, the you that only emergently rises from specific matter. This is the same 'me' that is looking out through these eyes. The me of wholly subjective conscious experience. I assume that you are aware right now too, looking out through your eyes, instead of mine, like I am. I assume that there is nothing unique about my brain, that makes that part of me any different. If there were a brain that was genetically identical to mine (like identical twins have), and environmentally identical to mine (like twins don't have), I assume that all thoughts inside both minds would be identical. (For I can't come up with any other variables that would affect either brain. If you think that there is a probabilistic universe right now with tiny quantum level variations, I'm going to ask you to pretend it affects both of these brains in an identical manner too, for the sake of this hypothetical example, please). All thoughts would be identical, yet both brains still wouldn't experience what the other brain was. Each brain is experiencing unique internal reality, even though the realities are identical.*
By this, I'm singling out subjective experience as the most essential part of 'you', but I'm also seeing it as something that's entirely a neutral phenomenon of local matter. (I hope that made sense because it's central to the thesis) Because of this, I assume that you and I could, hypothetically, switch consciousness right now, and nothing would change except who was experiencing what. Neither of us would have different personalities, or memories, or be different in any way, because experience itself is neutral. I would be the one feeling the pain when 'you' got hurt, I would be the one tasting the bread when 'you' ate dinner, I would be the one who felt like I was freely making every decision (even though I would be making all the decisions you would have made, because I have 'your' brain now), and vice versa. It wouldn't be like Being John Malkovich where another brain was looking out through another brain (i.e. Hey, I'm John Malkovich, now. This is cool!); because, I'm not saying we switched brains, only the neutral, matter specific phenomenon of subjective self.
but in small decisions like what to make for dinner that night, something that would have been random to a non-conscious animal becomes a choice for a conscious animal.
I see no convincing reason to believe in either randomness or choice, only linear chains of cause and effect. The choices made by both man and animals and insects and weather patterns all stem from direct chains of mechanical causation. Those things just all have different and/or better hard-ware and soft-ware. Animals don't decide things randomly, they act in specific ways according to specific conditions according to specific variables both external and internal. None of that is random. Just like when you flip a coin- the side it comes up on was not random, but was completely determined by many real-world variables (strength with which it was flipped, wind-speed, humidity...and on, and on). If those variables could all be accounted for, which side the coin landed on would be predictable with %100 certainty, making the outcome seem a whole lot less random. Just like if all variables could be accounted for, we would know what the coyote decides to chase, or, in fact every decision that coyote makes with %100 certainty, making those outcomes seem a whole lot less random. And finally, if you could account for all the variables, you would know exactly what the human will decide to eat for dinner with %100 certainty, making that decision seem a whole lot less "chosen".
*Really think about this its crucial. To try to understand this, think if both brains were pinched in an identical fashion- both brains would feel an identical kind of pain (as in its location on self, intensity, even emotional. . etc.), but they wouldn't be the feeling the same pain. Because each pain is felt individually only in the specific matter that was pinched.
posted by dgaicun at 6:26 PM on December 11, 2002
You:From my perspective, what you don't seem to understand is that you ARE the material state of your brain.
Me:In my view Hitler was an empty consciousness at birth, like we all are, given the exact genetics, and the exact environment that could only lead to one outcome when they interacted with eachother- the one that actually happened.
You:why was hitler not the actual material brain and body that was born? the specific animal that became hitler was one entity. You're the one falling into dualism here, I think.
It's not dualism, but I am slicing up the concept of 'you' into more parts than one. But I understand that they are all coming from the brain. The Hitler I was referring to was the most fundamental 'you' there is, the you that only emergently rises from specific matter. This is the same 'me' that is looking out through these eyes. The me of wholly subjective conscious experience. I assume that you are aware right now too, looking out through your eyes, instead of mine, like I am. I assume that there is nothing unique about my brain, that makes that part of me any different. If there were a brain that was genetically identical to mine (like identical twins have), and environmentally identical to mine (like twins don't have), I assume that all thoughts inside both minds would be identical. (For I can't come up with any other variables that would affect either brain. If you think that there is a probabilistic universe right now with tiny quantum level variations, I'm going to ask you to pretend it affects both of these brains in an identical manner too, for the sake of this hypothetical example, please). All thoughts would be identical, yet both brains still wouldn't experience what the other brain was. Each brain is experiencing unique internal reality, even though the realities are identical.*
By this, I'm singling out subjective experience as the most essential part of 'you', but I'm also seeing it as something that's entirely a neutral phenomenon of local matter. (I hope that made sense because it's central to the thesis) Because of this, I assume that you and I could, hypothetically, switch consciousness right now, and nothing would change except who was experiencing what. Neither of us would have different personalities, or memories, or be different in any way, because experience itself is neutral. I would be the one feeling the pain when 'you' got hurt, I would be the one tasting the bread when 'you' ate dinner, I would be the one who felt like I was freely making every decision (even though I would be making all the decisions you would have made, because I have 'your' brain now), and vice versa. It wouldn't be like Being John Malkovich where another brain was looking out through another brain (i.e. Hey, I'm John Malkovich, now. This is cool!); because, I'm not saying we switched brains, only the neutral, matter specific phenomenon of subjective self.
but in small decisions like what to make for dinner that night, something that would have been random to a non-conscious animal becomes a choice for a conscious animal.
I see no convincing reason to believe in either randomness or choice, only linear chains of cause and effect. The choices made by both man and animals and insects and weather patterns all stem from direct chains of mechanical causation. Those things just all have different and/or better hard-ware and soft-ware. Animals don't decide things randomly, they act in specific ways according to specific conditions according to specific variables both external and internal. None of that is random. Just like when you flip a coin- the side it comes up on was not random, but was completely determined by many real-world variables (strength with which it was flipped, wind-speed, humidity...and on, and on). If those variables could all be accounted for, which side the coin landed on would be predictable with %100 certainty, making the outcome seem a whole lot less random. Just like if all variables could be accounted for, we would know what the coyote decides to chase, or, in fact every decision that coyote makes with %100 certainty, making those outcomes seem a whole lot less random. And finally, if you could account for all the variables, you would know exactly what the human will decide to eat for dinner with %100 certainty, making that decision seem a whole lot less "chosen".
*Really think about this its crucial. To try to understand this, think if both brains were pinched in an identical fashion- both brains would feel an identical kind of pain (as in its location on self, intensity, even emotional. . etc.), but they wouldn't be the feeling the same pain. Because each pain is felt individually only in the specific matter that was pinched.
posted by dgaicun at 6:26 PM on December 11, 2002
if you could account for all the variables
I guess one of the keys for me is that given the nature and limitations of the universe, you cannot ever account for all of the variables...not even close. THAT is reality--it's not a limitation of your ability to know, it's the hard-wired structure of things. Therefore, the experience of living in the universe does have wiggle room, whereas the idealized place of omniscience that you postulate might not, but it does not exist, so why should I care about it except as an interesting intellectual thought-experiment? If it is impossible to know enough to fully predict all of the actions (including decisions, choices, etc.) of a conscious mind, even in theory, then it seems to me that a certain amount of freedom exists in that blind spot, because you are forced to hypothesize constraints that can't be tested to support your notion of absolute determinism.
posted by rushmc at 8:49 PM on December 11, 2002
I guess one of the keys for me is that given the nature and limitations of the universe, you cannot ever account for all of the variables...not even close. THAT is reality--it's not a limitation of your ability to know, it's the hard-wired structure of things. Therefore, the experience of living in the universe does have wiggle room, whereas the idealized place of omniscience that you postulate might not, but it does not exist, so why should I care about it except as an interesting intellectual thought-experiment? If it is impossible to know enough to fully predict all of the actions (including decisions, choices, etc.) of a conscious mind, even in theory, then it seems to me that a certain amount of freedom exists in that blind spot, because you are forced to hypothesize constraints that can't be tested to support your notion of absolute determinism.
posted by rushmc at 8:49 PM on December 11, 2002
rushmc,
I guess one of the keys for me is that given the nature and limitations of the universe, you cannot ever account for all of the variables...not even close.
Therefore, the experience of living in the universe does have wiggle room
First and foremost- You keep going at the problem from this angle, but I have already addressed it. Every reply I've written to you, I have argued from both the mechanistic and the probabilistic models of the universe. I am fully willing to concede that the universe operates probabilistically for the purposes of hypothetical argumentation. But the flaw in your argument remains: I have yet to understand how you think randomness, if it might exist, would be the same thing as wiggle room. Its like I argued above, if Johnny picks the red sweater, because it was mechanically certain, that isn't free-will. But if Johnny picks the blue sweater because of quantum randomness that upset or diverted the mechanical order, how would that resemble free-will anymore so than the mechanically activated red-sweater choice? If the uncaused disturbance hadn't tweaked the causal bridge, Johnny would have chosen the red sweater. Is an unpredictable uncaused quantum disturbance free-will? It had nothing to do with Johnny's will. Johnny's will was the thing being manipulated.
If it is impossible to know enough to fully predict all of the actions (including decisions, choices, etc.) of a conscious mind, even in theory, then it seems to me that a certain amount of freedom exists in that blind spot, because you are forced to hypothesize constraints that can't be tested to support your notion of absolute determinism.
My argument has always been basically deductive (i.e. argued from premises). Which isn't to say it's weak at all, just that it could be remarkably untrue if the right evidence were uncovered. Of course if the right evidence was uncovered, we could also discover that the earth was made eight minutes ago, memorys' intact, evidence of antiquity simulated. My point in saying this, is that hypothesis usually have to be made on the most reliable theories regarding nature and the universe. You seem to be saying I am in error, because I am applying the rules of what are known about the universe into the gaps:
it seems to me that a certain amount of freedom exists in that blind spot, because you are forced to hypothesize constraints that can't be tested to support your notion of absolute determinism.
But the most reliable model for interpreting the universe is mechanical- cause and effect. To me this would indicate we don't have a better model to interpret, or better explain, the universe by, so it should be assumed unless another model starts showing some equal or better explanatory power. Unfortunately that model doesn't exist, and you don't seem to be proposing a more effective explanatory model to interpret these blind spots with. All I know is that I am assuming the tried-and-true method (c&e) applies equally to said blind spots by default, and this is somehow bad because I'm not omniscient. Which would seem to be an example of the infallibilist fallacy mentioned above. Of course my model can be tested, if mechanical explanations less successfully predict human behavior in increasingly sophisticated tests, to another competing explanatory method. But what can't be tested is that wiggle room may exist somewhere in those blind spots, because as you say:
you cannot ever account for all of the variables
Therefore, there will always be blind-spots for your theory to hide in, by your own words it is unfalsifiable, while the theory I defend, universal causation, is falsifiable if a better explanatory model comes along (which is possible). Of course what I have yet to understand is, is what exactly 'wiggle room' is, or how a will separate from c&a would be any more free, as you seem to think it would. And how the idea of free-will keeps from imploding: Why did Hitler 'make himself' evil? Because Hitler made himself made himself evil (ad infinitum)
posted by dgaicun at 10:37 PM on December 11, 2002
I guess one of the keys for me is that given the nature and limitations of the universe, you cannot ever account for all of the variables...not even close.
Therefore, the experience of living in the universe does have wiggle room
First and foremost- You keep going at the problem from this angle, but I have already addressed it. Every reply I've written to you, I have argued from both the mechanistic and the probabilistic models of the universe. I am fully willing to concede that the universe operates probabilistically for the purposes of hypothetical argumentation. But the flaw in your argument remains: I have yet to understand how you think randomness, if it might exist, would be the same thing as wiggle room. Its like I argued above, if Johnny picks the red sweater, because it was mechanically certain, that isn't free-will. But if Johnny picks the blue sweater because of quantum randomness that upset or diverted the mechanical order, how would that resemble free-will anymore so than the mechanically activated red-sweater choice? If the uncaused disturbance hadn't tweaked the causal bridge, Johnny would have chosen the red sweater. Is an unpredictable uncaused quantum disturbance free-will? It had nothing to do with Johnny's will. Johnny's will was the thing being manipulated.
If it is impossible to know enough to fully predict all of the actions (including decisions, choices, etc.) of a conscious mind, even in theory, then it seems to me that a certain amount of freedom exists in that blind spot, because you are forced to hypothesize constraints that can't be tested to support your notion of absolute determinism.
My argument has always been basically deductive (i.e. argued from premises). Which isn't to say it's weak at all, just that it could be remarkably untrue if the right evidence were uncovered. Of course if the right evidence was uncovered, we could also discover that the earth was made eight minutes ago, memorys' intact, evidence of antiquity simulated. My point in saying this, is that hypothesis usually have to be made on the most reliable theories regarding nature and the universe. You seem to be saying I am in error, because I am applying the rules of what are known about the universe into the gaps:
it seems to me that a certain amount of freedom exists in that blind spot, because you are forced to hypothesize constraints that can't be tested to support your notion of absolute determinism.
But the most reliable model for interpreting the universe is mechanical- cause and effect. To me this would indicate we don't have a better model to interpret, or better explain, the universe by, so it should be assumed unless another model starts showing some equal or better explanatory power. Unfortunately that model doesn't exist, and you don't seem to be proposing a more effective explanatory model to interpret these blind spots with. All I know is that I am assuming the tried-and-true method (c&e) applies equally to said blind spots by default, and this is somehow bad because I'm not omniscient. Which would seem to be an example of the infallibilist fallacy mentioned above. Of course my model can be tested, if mechanical explanations less successfully predict human behavior in increasingly sophisticated tests, to another competing explanatory method. But what can't be tested is that wiggle room may exist somewhere in those blind spots, because as you say:
you cannot ever account for all of the variables
Therefore, there will always be blind-spots for your theory to hide in, by your own words it is unfalsifiable, while the theory I defend, universal causation, is falsifiable if a better explanatory model comes along (which is possible). Of course what I have yet to understand is, is what exactly 'wiggle room' is, or how a will separate from c&a would be any more free, as you seem to think it would. And how the idea of free-will keeps from imploding: Why did Hitler 'make himself' evil? Because Hitler made himself made himself evil (ad infinitum)
posted by dgaicun at 10:37 PM on December 11, 2002
What's interesting to me is that I agree 100% with dgaicun (I don't quite follow rushmc's argument, which seems to me 'I can't see it so it's not there'), but when I came to this conclusion (pre-determined history) myself a few years ago it actually led me to a pretty firm faith in a non-specific God; I can't conceive of such a complex and specifically-purposed* universe occurring spontaneously. It surprises me to see someone with the same viewpoint but the opposite conclusion.
(*I don't mean one ending in the kingdom of heaven, or anything like that - surely when the universe has run its course the end result will be completely inconceivable to anyone not omniscient - but if every event along the chain is inevitable, there is a specific bit of performance art being played across all time)
posted by zzero at 12:20 PM on December 12, 2002
(*I don't mean one ending in the kingdom of heaven, or anything like that - surely when the universe has run its course the end result will be completely inconceivable to anyone not omniscient - but if every event along the chain is inevitable, there is a specific bit of performance art being played across all time)
posted by zzero at 12:20 PM on December 12, 2002
zzero,
it actually led me to a pretty firm faith in a non-specific God. . .It surprises me to see someone with the same viewpoint but the opposite conclusion.
This thread has no where touched the topic of Theism/non-Theism, and I have no where expressed my opinion on the matter. What I have expressed is my support for both materialism and causality. Though I understand how that might suggest a non-Theism. Yet, as in your case, it has been used to support, Thiesm as well (See First Cause).
Another person who supported materialism and causality who was assumed to be a non-theist, was American revolutionary, Thomas Paine. Theodore Roosevelt, even denounced him as '. . .a filthy little atheist.' In reality, Thomas Paine wrote an infamous little book called Age of Reason (whole book online here), about how those beliefs (reason) logically falsified Christianity, yet drew him towards, what he regarded as, a sort of scientific Deism (probably not too dissimilar from what you believe).
posted by dgaicun at 1:15 PM on December 12, 2002
it actually led me to a pretty firm faith in a non-specific God. . .It surprises me to see someone with the same viewpoint but the opposite conclusion.
This thread has no where touched the topic of Theism/non-Theism, and I have no where expressed my opinion on the matter. What I have expressed is my support for both materialism and causality. Though I understand how that might suggest a non-Theism. Yet, as in your case, it has been used to support, Thiesm as well (See First Cause).
Another person who supported materialism and causality who was assumed to be a non-theist, was American revolutionary, Thomas Paine. Theodore Roosevelt, even denounced him as '. . .a filthy little atheist.' In reality, Thomas Paine wrote an infamous little book called Age of Reason (whole book online here), about how those beliefs (reason) logically falsified Christianity, yet drew him towards, what he regarded as, a sort of scientific Deism (probably not too dissimilar from what you believe).
posted by dgaicun at 1:15 PM on December 12, 2002
if every event along the chain is inevitable, there is a specific bit of performance art being played across all time
That's a faith-based conclusion, certainly. Another conclusion would be that a non-specific accident is being played across all time. Without knowing the end-game, it's difficult to be certain, unless one has some sort of faith. But then Pascal's wager always struck me as a justification, rather than a cause ... I'm playing the agnostic card myself, but I don't rule out any possibilities.
posted by walrus at 5:37 AM on December 13, 2002
That's a faith-based conclusion, certainly. Another conclusion would be that a non-specific accident is being played across all time. Without knowing the end-game, it's difficult to be certain, unless one has some sort of faith. But then Pascal's wager always struck me as a justification, rather than a cause ... I'm playing the agnostic card myself, but I don't rule out any possibilities.
posted by walrus at 5:37 AM on December 13, 2002
Sorry dgaicun, I misread your tone re: religion and soul to rushmc above.
posted by zzero at 6:24 AM on December 13, 2002
posted by zzero at 6:24 AM on December 13, 2002
P.S. Thanks for the links - not sure I buy into the First cause one though:
Many quantum-processes seem to happen without cause... (emphasis mine)
Sounds to me like the 'I don't see it, it doesn't exist' again
posted by zzero at 6:31 AM on December 13, 2002
Many quantum-processes seem to happen without cause... (emphasis mine)
Sounds to me like the 'I don't see it, it doesn't exist' again
posted by zzero at 6:31 AM on December 13, 2002
dgaicun, you never responded to my question of where the initial 'givens' come from. Certain elements of the universe cannot be said to be specifically caused at this stage - gravity is a description of how matter relates to matter, but it's not caused by anything beyond itself. It is a cause itself though. These kinds of first causes are like independent causes, in that we start with them; the chain cannot extend infinitely back. So why can't we think of consciousness as its own sort of independent cause, for the actions of a person? Once a consciousness has emerged within the organism, it can be the future cause of action. The emergence of consciousness isn't just a side effect of a causal chain - if I choose the red sweater because it reminds me of a sweater my father used to wear and I've been thinking recently that I need to try to get along better with my father, then my consciousness plays an active role in the choice I make.
Determinism is just a philosophical problem, as rushmc said, since in the real world we still have to make choices, even if we have faith that they were pre-ordained. If you just stand there staring at the two sweaters waiting for life to choose one for you, you'll be waiting a while.
If you can conceive of making a different choice about something, maybe in another version of the universe you would have made the other choice. Sometimes decisions are made because you've been standing there staring for long enough now, and it's time to move on. maybe three out of four times you would have chosen the red sweater but you might have chosen the blue sweater, too. It's not exactly randomness in the sense that some quantum speck makes the choice and imposes itself on your will; it's that your will is a cause in itself. Determinism is interesting, but it extends a very simple mechanical law over all of existence for no reason other than that it makes everything simpler. The more we learn about consciousness, the less I find simplistic readings convincing. Check out modern AI technology & complex adaptive systems: you never know what you're gonna get.
posted by mdn at 1:33 PM on December 14, 2002
Determinism is just a philosophical problem, as rushmc said, since in the real world we still have to make choices, even if we have faith that they were pre-ordained. If you just stand there staring at the two sweaters waiting for life to choose one for you, you'll be waiting a while.
If you can conceive of making a different choice about something, maybe in another version of the universe you would have made the other choice. Sometimes decisions are made because you've been standing there staring for long enough now, and it's time to move on. maybe three out of four times you would have chosen the red sweater but you might have chosen the blue sweater, too. It's not exactly randomness in the sense that some quantum speck makes the choice and imposes itself on your will; it's that your will is a cause in itself. Determinism is interesting, but it extends a very simple mechanical law over all of existence for no reason other than that it makes everything simpler. The more we learn about consciousness, the less I find simplistic readings convincing. Check out modern AI technology & complex adaptive systems: you never know what you're gonna get.
posted by mdn at 1:33 PM on December 14, 2002
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posted by dgaicun at 6:35 AM on December 9, 2002