Let our cities be our swamps and our buildings our jungles
May 27, 2004 4:36 PM Subscribe
Let our cities be our swamps and our buildings our jungles After witnessing the Pentagon's inconclusive retreat from both Fallujah and Najaf without achieving the "success" of pacification or elimination of the local resistance, it seems that apart from incidentally killing several thousand Iraqis, causing lots of property damage, uniting Shias and Sunnis, and promoting minor clerics into major resistance leaders, today's Pentagon forces are quite ineffectual within dense urban areas. I am reminded of the words of the ex-Deputy PM of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq: People say to me, 'You are not the Vietnamese. You have no jungles and swamps' ... I reply, 'Let our cities be our swamps and our buildings our jungles.'.
speaking of Fallujah, this was good: Resembling an Islamic mini-state, Fallujah may be a glimpse of Iraq's future
posted by amberglow at 5:14 PM on May 27, 2004
posted by amberglow at 5:14 PM on May 27, 2004
"today's Pentagon forces are quite ineffectual within dense urban areas"
I don't think any country is particularly great at this kind of thing, but you are wrong to suggest that somehow the Marines lost at Fallujah. They didn't. Nor did the US military "lose" at Najaf or Kerbala. In all three cases, American forces retook considerable territory and the balance of casualties - even disregarding civilian deaths - favoured Americans overwhelmingly. In comparison to historical precedents for such fighting (Grozny and Berlin to name two), I'd say the US military compares favourably.
One of your articles mentions the recapture of Hue during the Tet Offensive; it's a good analogy because then as now, in pure military terms the US won the contest. In political terms of course, the victories of '68 and the offensives of the last months were a real failure. The latter even more so because the confrontation wasn't entirely forced upon the US but actively sought out. Whose dumbfuck idea was that, eh? But I digress. Moaning about the US military being weak* is just wrong and sneering at the withdrawals is just stupid, seeing as going in in the first place was a really bad idea. Despite the admittedly ingnominous nature of the withdrawals from Fallujah, Kerbala and now Najaf, we should celebrated them as evidence (I pray) of a new found recognition that politics and dialogue can be a continuation of war by other means.
*On the subject of tactics, I would accept that there are some definite doctrinal problems but these pertain more to attitude than to bad weaponry or tactics per se. In a highly political conflict such as this, where perception is everything there's little advantage in choosing to use the maximum force instead of maximum restraint. The US forces have repeatedly ignored this fairly obvious truth.
posted by pots at 5:33 PM on May 27, 2004
I don't think any country is particularly great at this kind of thing, but you are wrong to suggest that somehow the Marines lost at Fallujah. They didn't. Nor did the US military "lose" at Najaf or Kerbala. In all three cases, American forces retook considerable territory and the balance of casualties - even disregarding civilian deaths - favoured Americans overwhelmingly. In comparison to historical precedents for such fighting (Grozny and Berlin to name two), I'd say the US military compares favourably.
One of your articles mentions the recapture of Hue during the Tet Offensive; it's a good analogy because then as now, in pure military terms the US won the contest. In political terms of course, the victories of '68 and the offensives of the last months were a real failure. The latter even more so because the confrontation wasn't entirely forced upon the US but actively sought out. Whose dumbfuck idea was that, eh? But I digress. Moaning about the US military being weak* is just wrong and sneering at the withdrawals is just stupid, seeing as going in in the first place was a really bad idea. Despite the admittedly ingnominous nature of the withdrawals from Fallujah, Kerbala and now Najaf, we should celebrated them as evidence (I pray) of a new found recognition that politics and dialogue can be a continuation of war by other means.
*On the subject of tactics, I would accept that there are some definite doctrinal problems but these pertain more to attitude than to bad weaponry or tactics per se. In a highly political conflict such as this, where perception is everything there's little advantage in choosing to use the maximum force instead of maximum restraint. The US forces have repeatedly ignored this fairly obvious truth.
posted by pots at 5:33 PM on May 27, 2004
Great link.
posted by meehawl at 5:34 PM on May 27, 2004
About 80 masked, armed men, accompanied by local police, forced hundreds of street hawkers at gun point to clear out from the streets and confine their businesses to designated areas.Was it just me thinking "Oh wouldn't Rudy Guiliani have just loved this kind of muscle when he was going after NYC's on-street pretzel vendors, or what?"
posted by meehawl at 5:34 PM on May 27, 2004
You cannot win a war of aggression in the long term - when will people ever learn?
The long term does not matter.
With Saddam in power, and US no-fly zones in effect, the middle east was fairly stable. But very little oil made it out of Iraq, and no infrastructure upgrades were possible.
With Saddam out of power, US companies can focus on pulling all the oil out of the ground. Once that task is completed, the entire country can be returned to the Iraquis. Because they don't have any wealth-creating oil left, they don't run the risk of becoming uppity and powerful like the Saudis.
In the long term, maybe Iran overruns Iraq. By that time, we will have all the oil.
posted by Kwantsar at 5:37 PM on May 27, 2004
The long term does not matter.
With Saddam in power, and US no-fly zones in effect, the middle east was fairly stable. But very little oil made it out of Iraq, and no infrastructure upgrades were possible.
With Saddam out of power, US companies can focus on pulling all the oil out of the ground. Once that task is completed, the entire country can be returned to the Iraquis. Because they don't have any wealth-creating oil left, they don't run the risk of becoming uppity and powerful like the Saudis.
In the long term, maybe Iran overruns Iraq. By that time, we will have all the oil.
posted by Kwantsar at 5:37 PM on May 27, 2004
the balance of casualties - even disregarding civilian deaths - favoured Americans overwhelmingly
Using the "balance of casualties" to assess the effectiveness of a military campaign is pretty much useless. Using your example, I am reminded of the continual monthly bodycount statistics in Vietnam that were used to demonstrate that the US was, in fact, "winning". Or to extend an analogy further, by inflicting extraordarily high 3:1 military casualties on the Allied forces the Axis Powers "won" World War 2. I don't think so. I note further that the Central Powers also inflicted a 2:1 casualty rate on the Allied Powers during World War 1.
Military tactics are a means to an end. If the end is not achieved, either through military or political means, then I for one do not count that as a meaningful victory within the moral calculus of this discussion.
posted by meehawl at 5:44 PM on May 27, 2004
Using the "balance of casualties" to assess the effectiveness of a military campaign is pretty much useless. Using your example, I am reminded of the continual monthly bodycount statistics in Vietnam that were used to demonstrate that the US was, in fact, "winning". Or to extend an analogy further, by inflicting extraordarily high 3:1 military casualties on the Allied forces the Axis Powers "won" World War 2. I don't think so. I note further that the Central Powers also inflicted a 2:1 casualty rate on the Allied Powers during World War 1.
Military tactics are a means to an end. If the end is not achieved, either through military or political means, then I for one do not count that as a meaningful victory within the moral calculus of this discussion.
posted by meehawl at 5:44 PM on May 27, 2004
Kwantsar That is poorly argued tosh. How do you reconcile the statement "The long term does not matter" and "...US companies can focus on pulling all the oil out of the ground. Once that task is completed, the entire country can be returned to the Iraquis"? It will take many, many years to entirely extract all of Iraq's supplies and even if it was possible to get it all out sharpish, US consumption and storage capacity is way too low.
Iraq has 115 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.
There are 600 million barrels in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Daily US consumption is19 million barrels per day.
In any case, "It's all about the OIL!!!!" conspiracy theories are unsubstantiated crap which entirely ignore the publicly admitted (and far more sinister) neocon ideology outlined by the Project for the New American Century If you wish to bleet about Bush do so on those grounds, not over immature, mono-dimensional nonsense.
posted by pots at 6:05 PM on May 27, 2004
Iraq has 115 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.
There are 600 million barrels in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Daily US consumption is19 million barrels per day.
In any case, "It's all about the OIL!!!!" conspiracy theories are unsubstantiated crap which entirely ignore the publicly admitted (and far more sinister) neocon ideology outlined by the Project for the New American Century If you wish to bleet about Bush do so on those grounds, not over immature, mono-dimensional nonsense.
posted by pots at 6:05 PM on May 27, 2004
meehawl: My highlighting of pure military terms was intended to avoid the impression I find such tactics morally acceptable. My subsequent comments amply demonstrate my belief in military action only as a means to a political end and not an end in itself. So we are in agreement over that.
Further, I concur that favourable casualty ratios are no indicator for victory. Your stats perfectly demonstrate this. But, when such ratios are paralleled by control of territory - a tangible political advantage - then the casualty ratio is a valid means of indicating the cost of that advantage. A favourable ratio + territory taken = military success. I don't think you've said anything to disprove this proposition, but I appreciate I wasn't so clear initially.
One other point: you mention the "monthly bodycount statistics in Vietnam... used to demonstrate the US was, in fact, "winning"". My Vietnam reference was to the Tet Offensive and in that particular instance I think you are wrong; the figures in that period did reflect a real military success. For perhaps the only time in the Vietnam war, the US military faced an enemy in conventional war fighting - it was a straight-up struggle for territory, for tangible political control and the US was exceptionally successful at it. The failure was in the image of chaos and destruction it suggested back home, and the impact it had on the legitimacy and stability of the South Vietnamese government. If the US had been attempting to subjugate Vietnam - rather than democratize it - her military would have been victorious. This historical precedent is directly applicable to Fallujah/Najaf/Kerbala with one difference, in the latter cases the US military stopped short of, "destroying the town in order to save it". There's progress for you.
posted by pots at 12:53 AM on May 28, 2004
Further, I concur that favourable casualty ratios are no indicator for victory. Your stats perfectly demonstrate this. But, when such ratios are paralleled by control of territory - a tangible political advantage - then the casualty ratio is a valid means of indicating the cost of that advantage. A favourable ratio + territory taken = military success. I don't think you've said anything to disprove this proposition, but I appreciate I wasn't so clear initially.
One other point: you mention the "monthly bodycount statistics in Vietnam... used to demonstrate the US was, in fact, "winning"". My Vietnam reference was to the Tet Offensive and in that particular instance I think you are wrong; the figures in that period did reflect a real military success. For perhaps the only time in the Vietnam war, the US military faced an enemy in conventional war fighting - it was a straight-up struggle for territory, for tangible political control and the US was exceptionally successful at it. The failure was in the image of chaos and destruction it suggested back home, and the impact it had on the legitimacy and stability of the South Vietnamese government. If the US had been attempting to subjugate Vietnam - rather than democratize it - her military would have been victorious. This historical precedent is directly applicable to Fallujah/Najaf/Kerbala with one difference, in the latter cases the US military stopped short of, "destroying the town in order to save it". There's progress for you.
posted by pots at 12:53 AM on May 28, 2004
In any case, "It's all about the OIL!!!!" conspiracy theories are unsubstantiated crap...
Um... So we fly in a bunch of neo-con friendly business men (see the old 'brat pack' link), make sure they get top jobs in the Iraqi oil industry during reconstruction, and then (since they own the rights in free-market Iraq) we use them to get cheaper oil for the States than we would get through, say, Saddam. PNAC aside, this seems like a pretty clear subplot to this whole mess, already rolling. Maybe it's not ALL about the oil, but saying there isn't any oil involved (and the associated billions of dollars...) is just kinda naive.
I mean, the evil conspiracy has to get their money somewhere, right?
posted by kaibutsu at 1:33 AM on May 28, 2004
Um... So we fly in a bunch of neo-con friendly business men (see the old 'brat pack' link), make sure they get top jobs in the Iraqi oil industry during reconstruction, and then (since they own the rights in free-market Iraq) we use them to get cheaper oil for the States than we would get through, say, Saddam. PNAC aside, this seems like a pretty clear subplot to this whole mess, already rolling. Maybe it's not ALL about the oil, but saying there isn't any oil involved (and the associated billions of dollars...) is just kinda naive.
I mean, the evil conspiracy has to get their money somewhere, right?
posted by kaibutsu at 1:33 AM on May 28, 2004
pots: I went to an interesting debate between Peter Singer and John Gray at the National Portrait Gallery in London last week. It was not so much a debate as a minor disagreement about what the real influence on George W. Bush's ethics and motivations (with some nice insight into the differences between GWB and Tony Blair's motivations).
The consensus that Singer and Gray were able to reach was that oil, the Project for a New American Century and Washington's political hawks with a sense of unfinished business were the major factors and that it would be difficult to ever untangle a single major motivation.
I think it has been said on here before that it is not necessarily the revenue from the oil, but the power that comes with controlling the oil that other people use. What has been the reaction in the US to the record high price for a barrell of oil?
posted by xpermanentx at 2:14 AM on May 28, 2004
The consensus that Singer and Gray were able to reach was that oil, the Project for a New American Century and Washington's political hawks with a sense of unfinished business were the major factors and that it would be difficult to ever untangle a single major motivation.
I think it has been said on here before that it is not necessarily the revenue from the oil, but the power that comes with controlling the oil that other people use. What has been the reaction in the US to the record high price for a barrell of oil?
posted by xpermanentx at 2:14 AM on May 28, 2004
It's not a question of the U.S. being bad at urban fighting, or jungle fighting or whatever.
It's a question of can tactical success redeem strategic failure.
In the short term it seems to be able to, but not over the long term, and that's what we're seeing now. The point at which the strategic failures start to overwhelm the tactical successes.
posted by Grimgrin at 2:34 AM on May 28, 2004
It's a question of can tactical success redeem strategic failure.
In the short term it seems to be able to, but not over the long term, and that's what we're seeing now. The point at which the strategic failures start to overwhelm the tactical successes.
posted by Grimgrin at 2:34 AM on May 28, 2004
"today's Pentagon forces are quite ineffectual within dense urban areas"
"I don't think any country is particularly great at this kind of thing"
The only country I know of that's any "good" at this is Israel. They have a simple solution. Go in with armour-plated bulldozers and tear everything down.
posted by derbs at 4:05 AM on May 28, 2004
"I don't think any country is particularly great at this kind of thing"
The only country I know of that's any "good" at this is Israel. They have a simple solution. Go in with armour-plated bulldozers and tear everything down.
posted by derbs at 4:05 AM on May 28, 2004
I think this discussion needs some basic clarifications.
The US military has the power to reduce any or all of the cities in Iraq to rubble.
What it cannot do is to root out opposition from urban areas. This is less about the (admittedly) real difficulties of urban warfare and more about cultural factors.
The fact that few American troops speak the native languages of Iraq, and - further - were unfamiliar with Islamic culture going into the occupation, constitute the main problem here.
Given that, how could they possibly be effect at making civilian/combatant distinctions amidst the chaos of urban combat? - A difficult enough challenge even within one's native culture (think of the French resistance in occupied France during WW2) or when one's forces are fairly intimate with the native culture, as in French Algeria.
I'd be willing top bet that the 82nd Airborne would be fairly successful at rooting out insurgents in urban combat in LA.
posted by troutfishing at 4:08 AM on May 28, 2004
The US military has the power to reduce any or all of the cities in Iraq to rubble.
What it cannot do is to root out opposition from urban areas. This is less about the (admittedly) real difficulties of urban warfare and more about cultural factors.
The fact that few American troops speak the native languages of Iraq, and - further - were unfamiliar with Islamic culture going into the occupation, constitute the main problem here.
Given that, how could they possibly be effect at making civilian/combatant distinctions amidst the chaos of urban combat? - A difficult enough challenge even within one's native culture (think of the French resistance in occupied France during WW2) or when one's forces are fairly intimate with the native culture, as in French Algeria.
I'd be willing top bet that the 82nd Airborne would be fairly successful at rooting out insurgents in urban combat in LA.
posted by troutfishing at 4:08 AM on May 28, 2004
"....to bet"
posted by troutfishing at 4:09 AM on May 28, 2004
posted by troutfishing at 4:09 AM on May 28, 2004
It's a question of can tactical success redeem strategic failure.
Well, that's the rub: War is politics by other means.
Those other means are highly specialized. Which is why it behooves the politicians who would use those means to not only engage specialists, but then also listen to them when they give the advice they're asked for.
It could be argued that political leaders who fail to at least listen ought to be regarded as incompetent...
posted by lodurr at 4:45 AM on May 28, 2004
Well, that's the rub: War is politics by other means.
Those other means are highly specialized. Which is why it behooves the politicians who would use those means to not only engage specialists, but then also listen to them when they give the advice they're asked for.
It could be argued that political leaders who fail to at least listen ought to be regarded as incompetent...
posted by lodurr at 4:45 AM on May 28, 2004
My highlighting of pure military terms was intended to avoid the impression I find such tactics morally acceptable.
There are no such thing as pure military terms. As someone noted above, war is means to an end. If you do not reach your stated goals, your have not won the war, no matter how few/many casualties you.
What was the stated goal again?
posted by Eirixon at 5:21 AM on May 28, 2004
There are no such thing as pure military terms. As someone noted above, war is means to an end. If you do not reach your stated goals, your have not won the war, no matter how few/many casualties you.
What was the stated goal again?
posted by Eirixon at 5:21 AM on May 28, 2004
Why has the US not trained more soldiers to speak Arabic?
posted by xpermanentx at 6:44 AM on May 28, 2004
posted by xpermanentx at 6:44 AM on May 28, 2004
I'd be willing top bet that the 82nd Airborne would be fairly successful at rooting out insurgents in urban combat in LA.
I think the issue is that US cities tend to feature lots of regular grids, wide-open avenues, and distinct zones. Very easy to control. Very late-19th century. Very much a product of modern urban and police planning.
Dense urban slums are much more difficult control.
To take a European example, before the 19th century Paris was a nightmare of recurrent urban uprisings and tenuous central control. Then the central government began a policy of deliberate destruction and reconstruction along more open lines, removing obstacles and urban features they considered difficult to surveil, police, or assault. Paris today is an eminently more controllable city.
The dense urban slums of developing nations are in character and population density similar to ancien regime Paris. THey are similarly difficult to control.
Some posters have pointed out that were the US to use some of the strategies it used in the 1960s - carpet bombing and napalm, it might find it easier to control urban territory. That's possibly true,but the example of Monte Cassino also shows that tenacious defenders can hang on in a complete rubble zone for a surprising amount of time.
Finally, the Israeli tactics of urban assault work on a small scale in terms of "pacifying" territory, but they do entail a high degree of casualties (for both civilians and the Israeli troops) when practiced on a larger scale or for a prolonged period. One characteristic of the IDF is how quickly now it retreats from engagements instead of permanently occupying the Gaza slums. I think their reluctance stems from their experience of occupation and retreat in Lebanon.
posted by meehawl at 8:15 AM on May 28, 2004
I think the issue is that US cities tend to feature lots of regular grids, wide-open avenues, and distinct zones. Very easy to control. Very late-19th century. Very much a product of modern urban and police planning.
Dense urban slums are much more difficult control.
To take a European example, before the 19th century Paris was a nightmare of recurrent urban uprisings and tenuous central control. Then the central government began a policy of deliberate destruction and reconstruction along more open lines, removing obstacles and urban features they considered difficult to surveil, police, or assault. Paris today is an eminently more controllable city.
The dense urban slums of developing nations are in character and population density similar to ancien regime Paris. THey are similarly difficult to control.
Some posters have pointed out that were the US to use some of the strategies it used in the 1960s - carpet bombing and napalm, it might find it easier to control urban territory. That's possibly true,but the example of Monte Cassino also shows that tenacious defenders can hang on in a complete rubble zone for a surprising amount of time.
Finally, the Israeli tactics of urban assault work on a small scale in terms of "pacifying" territory, but they do entail a high degree of casualties (for both civilians and the Israeli troops) when practiced on a larger scale or for a prolonged period. One characteristic of the IDF is how quickly now it retreats from engagements instead of permanently occupying the Gaza slums. I think their reluctance stems from their experience of occupation and retreat in Lebanon.
posted by meehawl at 8:15 AM on May 28, 2004
I am amazed at the naiivete of this thread. I utterly reject most of your axioms as false.
First of all, everything about Fallujah was a resounding success for the Marines and the US. A hostile city that we used as a lure to draw in and kill troublemakers in an industrial district. We minimized our own and civilian casualties, killed hundreds of bad boys, and are now punishing that anti-American, but secular Baathist town by letting it be lorded over by Taliban fanatics.
How THE HELL is that a loss? By NOT killing civilians and leveling the town? We got EVERYTHING we wanted, and they are getting punished BY THEIR OWN KIND for being arrogant, anti-American Baathist bastards.
Second of all, al-Sadr is OVER. He has surrendered to the other Imams and the tribal leaders, and will either stand trial before Iraqis or be exiled to Iran. His followers that are still attacking the US are so disconnected they don't even know there is a truce on. The Mehdi Army is disintigrating. al-Sadr is a humiliation to his people.
How is THAT a LOSS? That we DIDN'T kill lots of civilians and wipe out their treasured mosques? What the heck are you thinking? The US is going great guns over there, and not just militarily. It is rebuilding the country, setting up a new government, with the help of the UN, and getting ready for elections next January.
My bet still stands. If you're interested to show me how wrong you think I am:
HERE'S THE BET: (1)The turnover of power will happen on schedule, (2)as will the January elections. (3)The US will send home the two divisions scheduled to be sent on on time, this time. (4)al-Sadr will be exiled to Iran, killed, or turned over to Iraqi authorities to be prosecuted. (5)Bush will be re-elected. (6)The US will leave a large force in Iraq as part of a regional command. (7) There will be continuing incidental violence peaking with one last blow off for the elections.
I want everyone who disagrees with me to not do so now, but to wait until I am proven wrong, on ANY of these points, the feel free to rub it in and I will admit being wrong. That is, IF I am wrong. If I am not, eat crow.
Note: A "quagmire" doesn't mean we are still in Iraq. I contend we plan to stay in force until at least 2010, using it as a base to dominate the whole region.
posted by kablam at 10:51 AM on May 28, 2004
First of all, everything about Fallujah was a resounding success for the Marines and the US. A hostile city that we used as a lure to draw in and kill troublemakers in an industrial district. We minimized our own and civilian casualties, killed hundreds of bad boys, and are now punishing that anti-American, but secular Baathist town by letting it be lorded over by Taliban fanatics.
How THE HELL is that a loss? By NOT killing civilians and leveling the town? We got EVERYTHING we wanted, and they are getting punished BY THEIR OWN KIND for being arrogant, anti-American Baathist bastards.
Second of all, al-Sadr is OVER. He has surrendered to the other Imams and the tribal leaders, and will either stand trial before Iraqis or be exiled to Iran. His followers that are still attacking the US are so disconnected they don't even know there is a truce on. The Mehdi Army is disintigrating. al-Sadr is a humiliation to his people.
How is THAT a LOSS? That we DIDN'T kill lots of civilians and wipe out their treasured mosques? What the heck are you thinking? The US is going great guns over there, and not just militarily. It is rebuilding the country, setting up a new government, with the help of the UN, and getting ready for elections next January.
My bet still stands. If you're interested to show me how wrong you think I am:
HERE'S THE BET: (1)The turnover of power will happen on schedule, (2)as will the January elections. (3)The US will send home the two divisions scheduled to be sent on on time, this time. (4)al-Sadr will be exiled to Iran, killed, or turned over to Iraqi authorities to be prosecuted. (5)Bush will be re-elected. (6)The US will leave a large force in Iraq as part of a regional command. (7) There will be continuing incidental violence peaking with one last blow off for the elections.
I want everyone who disagrees with me to not do so now, but to wait until I am proven wrong, on ANY of these points, the feel free to rub it in and I will admit being wrong. That is, IF I am wrong. If I am not, eat crow.
Note: A "quagmire" doesn't mean we are still in Iraq. I contend we plan to stay in force until at least 2010, using it as a base to dominate the whole region.
posted by kablam at 10:51 AM on May 28, 2004
We minimized our own and civilian casualties, killed hundreds of bad boys, and are now punishing that anti-American, but secular Baathist town by letting it be lorded over by Taliban fanatics....We got EVERYTHING we wanted, and they are getting punished BY THEIR OWN KIND for being arrogant, anti-American Baathist bastards.
Speaking of naivete...
This whole "Baathist" thing is really quite an oversimplification. I think if you look into it more deeply, you'll find widespread opinion that the insurgents in the so-called Baathist areas are more motivated by tribal affiliations and inter-tribal power struggles than by any political ideology.
posted by mr_roboto at 11:43 AM on May 28, 2004
Speaking of naivete...
This whole "Baathist" thing is really quite an oversimplification. I think if you look into it more deeply, you'll find widespread opinion that the insurgents in the so-called Baathist areas are more motivated by tribal affiliations and inter-tribal power struggles than by any political ideology.
posted by mr_roboto at 11:43 AM on May 28, 2004
Kablam: I think that's a fairly accurate set of predictions. I'm not sure we shouldn't, however, assasinated this punk Sadir.
It's incredible how the pathological Hate America crowd could somehow construe Our liberation of Iraq as a failure. Iraq is probably one of the most noble moments in US history.
Don't let a bunch of cynical assholes get you down, Kablam.
posted by ParisParamus at 11:43 AM on May 28, 2004
It's incredible how the pathological Hate America crowd could somehow construe Our liberation of Iraq as a failure. Iraq is probably one of the most noble moments in US history.
Don't let a bunch of cynical assholes get you down, Kablam.
posted by ParisParamus at 11:43 AM on May 28, 2004
We got EVERYTHING we wanted, and they are getting punished BY THEIR OWN KIND for being arrogant, anti-American Baathist bastards.
Fallujah was a centre of *resistance* to Baathism during Saddam's regime and its resistance was and is characterised by Sunni-based religious tribalism, not pan-Arabist secular Baathism.
If you aren't aware of that simple fact then I regard everything else that you blather on about with about as much credibitlity.
posted by meehawl at 11:51 AM on May 28, 2004
Fallujah was a centre of *resistance* to Baathism during Saddam's regime and its resistance was and is characterised by Sunni-based religious tribalism, not pan-Arabist secular Baathism.
If you aren't aware of that simple fact then I regard everything else that you blather on about with about as much credibitlity.
posted by meehawl at 11:51 AM on May 28, 2004
Note: if your going to indict some one's credibility, at least learn to spell the word.
What makes you think that pre-war political distributions in Iraq have remained exactly as they were, post-war? Wouldn't you "get out of Dodge," so to speak, if you were a Saddam loyalist?
posted by ParisParamus at 11:58 AM on May 28, 2004
What makes you think that pre-war political distributions in Iraq have remained exactly as they were, post-war? Wouldn't you "get out of Dodge," so to speak, if you were a Saddam loyalist?
posted by ParisParamus at 11:58 AM on May 28, 2004
Note: if your going to indict some one's credibility, at least learn to spell the word.
Likewise if you're going to advocate for someone to be "assasinated."
posted by Ty Webb at 12:14 PM on May 28, 2004
Likewise if you're going to advocate for someone to be "assasinated."
posted by Ty Webb at 12:14 PM on May 28, 2004
if your going to indict some one's credibility, at least learn to spell the word.
I know how to spell credibility, that was a mis-typing not a mis-spelling. But thanks for your concern and sterling refutation of the substantive issues.
Tomorrow I will still know how to spell credibility, yet I suspect you and your friend will remain significantly clueless about Iraq.
Finally, if you're going to attempt to be anally retentive concerning net postings, I suggest you learn the difference between your and you're.
posted by meehawl at 12:17 PM on May 28, 2004
I know how to spell credibility, that was a mis-typing not a mis-spelling. But thanks for your concern and sterling refutation of the substantive issues.
Tomorrow I will still know how to spell credibility, yet I suspect you and your friend will remain significantly clueless about Iraq.
Finally, if you're going to attempt to be anally retentive concerning net postings, I suggest you learn the difference between your and you're.
posted by meehawl at 12:17 PM on May 28, 2004
I'm with kablam on every point, except for #3--I think the two divisions will be delayed again, or else others may be--and #7--the violence will be more than merely incidental, it's going to ramp-up as the handover approaches and becomes real. And it will continue to be funded by/given logistical support by/carried out by Syria and Iran.
Other than that, right on.
posted by Asparagirl at 12:26 PM on May 28, 2004
Other than that, right on.
posted by Asparagirl at 12:26 PM on May 28, 2004
Hope you're even more miserable than you are now on November 3, 2004: Most Americans will have a better future due to your "misery."
posted by ParisParamus at 12:26 PM on May 28, 2004
posted by ParisParamus at 12:26 PM on May 28, 2004
Oh god, it's Likudman and Likudgirl, come to triumph over the forces of intelligent discussion.
posted by riviera at 12:31 PM on May 28, 2004
posted by riviera at 12:31 PM on May 28, 2004
(Anyone interested in escaping before the pee-pee stream really gets going, there's an interesting discussion here about the problems that arise when democracies fight 'small wars', which ties in with Tariq Aziz's comments...)
posted by riviera at 12:35 PM on May 28, 2004
posted by riviera at 12:35 PM on May 28, 2004
Ah Asparagirl-Brooke, how delightful it is indeed that you continue to condescend to slum it with the terror apologists at Metafilter. Thanks for the FAQ, that cleared up some things for me.
posted by meehawl at 12:39 PM on May 28, 2004
posted by meehawl at 12:39 PM on May 28, 2004
Hope you're even more miserable
I think the lyrics of Holidays In The Sun are quite appropriate here, written as they were as a reaction against the lunacy of twin totalizing Statist ideologies presenting a "choice" for human progress.
A cheap holiday in other people's misery
I don't wanna holiday in the sun
I wanna go to the new Belsen
I wanna see some history
'cause now I got a reasonable economy
posted by meehawl at 12:43 PM on May 28, 2004
I think the lyrics of Holidays In The Sun are quite appropriate here, written as they were as a reaction against the lunacy of twin totalizing Statist ideologies presenting a "choice" for human progress.
A cheap holiday in other people's misery
I don't wanna holiday in the sun
I wanna go to the new Belsen
I wanna see some history
'cause now I got a reasonable economy
posted by meehawl at 12:43 PM on May 28, 2004
I want everyone who disagrees with me to not do so now, but to wait until I am proven wrong, on ANY of these points, the feel free to rub it in and I will admit being wrong.
Well, here's one past due prediction:
Sadr is coming to the end of his string. A coalition of 25 Shia tribal leaders and the four top clerics of Najaf gave him a deadline of May 15 to surrender to them, as a face-saving gesture, to face trial for murder without ever being in the custody of the US....
I'm still betting one of his bodyguard offs him, hoping to curry favor or get a cash reward.
I think we can all agree that, once again, here kablam is WRONG!
Now consider this paragraph from here:
Iraq has lots of things going for it.
#1 is money. Not only are they getting boucoup oil revenues with more to come; but their currency is really strong and stable; the actually have a flat tax(!), which is the lowest and projected to be the most efficient (as in fair) tax in the region, making them a magnet for investment. Bremer is setting them up for economic boom like MacArthur did Japan. Nothing succeeds like success.
kablam is always talking about how the oils flowing out and the money's flowing in for Iraq, so let's consider the potential for oil revenues...
Iraq Pipeline Watch
50. May 8 - bomb 35 miles (56 km) south of Basra damaged an 18-foot section of one of two pipelines running from Basra to the Faw peninsula on the Gulf. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Spokesman Steve Wright said oil exports from the Basra and Khor al-Amaya offshore southern terminals, through which about 90% of Iraq's oil exports flow, were stopped as a result: "Pumping has stopped. They attacked in the vicinity where the manifold goes into the sea." According to Iraqi officials exports were still flowing from Basra albeit at a reduced rate of 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) compared with 1.6 million bpd prior to the attack as oil from the damaged pipeline is flowing through the parallel pipeline. Ali Nasr al-Rubaie, director of the main port terminal said exports had been halved following the attack: "We have dropped from an average of 80,000 barrels per hour to 40,000 barrels per hour."
51. May 8 - attack on oil pipeline taking crude northwards from the country’s southern oilfields at point 25 miles (40 km) south of Baghdad, oil ministry spokesman Assem Jihad said on Saturday, noting it would take several days to start pumping oil again.
52. May 9 - blast near a strategic oil pipeline network linking north and south Iraq, by the town of Musayyib, about 56 miles (90 km) south of Baghdad. Unclear what caused the explosion or whether the pipeline itself was damaged.
53. May 13 - rocket landed in a gas plant at the Daura oil refinery in Baghdad, injured a worker and caused a fire.
54. May 24 - explosion badly damaged the Northern pipeline at around 7pm local time on a section between the Kirkuk oilfields and the Dibis pumping installations. A security official of Iraq's Northern Oil Company, Juma Ahmad, said pumping had to be stopped to fight the fire. Another security official for Northern Oil, Issam Muhammad, said while the fire had been put out it would take 12 days to repair the damage.
Targeting weak points: Iraq's oil pipelines
Some Iraqi oil, perhaps as much as 200,000 to 300,000 barrels per day (bpd), is being reinjected into oil reservoirs in the north due to constraints on both domestic processing ability as well as export outlets. As of August 2003, roughly 40 percent of northern Iraqi production was being transferred to the Baiji refinery, with the balance reinjected into the fields, ostensibly to maintain pressure. This means, however, that crude oil production is overstated by a level equivalent to the volume of oil reinjected (as it is not available for refining or export, but is still counted as production).
As of December 2003, total oil production in Iraq recovered to a daily average of almost 2 million barrels per day (mbd), excluding the crude oil that is being reinjected, with exports reaching almost 1.5 million mbd. But the vast majority of that output is from the southern fields, with the targeting of the northern sector seriously hindering production in the northern fields. This north-south divide also has important implications for domestic politics and stability, and exacerbates the complexities of power between the self-sufficient Kurds in the north, the emboldened Shi'ites in the south and the disgruntled Sunnis in between.
Pipeline bombing cuts Iraq oil exports 25 percent
Insurgents bombed an oil pipeline in southern Iraq, setting off a huge blaze and slashing daily Iraqi oil exports by about 25 percent, or 450,000 barrels per day, an official said today.
Insurgents have often attacked the much smaller northern pipeline to Turkey but attacks against Iraq's southern oil facilities, which account for almost 90 percent of the country's exports, have been rare.
Militants set off the bomb Saturday under the Faw oil pipeline, some 35 miles south of the main southern city of Basra, said an engineer at Iraq's Southern Oil Company, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Iraq Oil Exports Suffer New Blow With World Prices Near 13-year Highs
Tanker loadings from Basra, Iraq’s main southern port, have been halved by the sabotage of one of the terminal’s two feeder pipelines in a fresh blow to an industry already reeling from prolonged disruption of exports from its main northern oilfields. The setback for the key foreign exchange earner, which the occupying coalition had been counting on to fund the reconstruction and recovery of Iraq following its spring 2003 invasion, came with world oil prices still hovering near 13-year highs.
“We have dropped from an average of 80,000 barrels per hour [BPH] to 40,000d”, said Ali Nasr Rubaie, manager of Basra’s offshore terminal, one of just two serving Iraq’s southern oilfields. The terminal’s executive director, Hamad Assadi, confirmed the fall in loadings following an attack on the feeder pipeline 40 kilometers south of the city.
Site engineers acknowledged that the 80,000 BPH figure had not always been met because of production constraints at the wells. Loadings sometimes ran as low as 50,000 BPH, said Moayyed Hashem. And officials at the other terminal serving Iraq’s southern oilfields -- Khor al-Amaya -- said they had some surplus capacity. “Currently, we have no tanker in dock”, admitted chief engineer Khairallah Abdelkader.
Economy's booming? Certainly in scrap metal:
In the Scrapyards of Jordan, Signs of a Looted Iraq
As the United States spends billions of dollars to rebuild Iraq's civil and military infrastructure, there is increasing evidence that parts of sensitive military equipment, seemingly brand-new components for oil rigs and water plants and whole complexes of older buildings are leaving the country on the backs of flatbed trucks.
By some estimates, at least 100 semitrailers loaded with what is billed as Iraqi scrap metal are streaming each day into Jordan, just one of six countries that share a border with Iraq.
American officials say sensitive equipment is, in fact, closely monitored and much of the rest that is leaving is legitimate removal and sale from a shattered country. But many experts say that much of what is going on amounts to a vast looting operation.
And about that currency--what's in the debit column?
Another enemy looms -- Iraq debt
$120 billion owed; 9 times nation's economic output
Iraq is thus burdened with an estimated $120 billion it owes. The enormous load, 900 percent the size of the national economy, dwarfs the approximately $33 billion the international community has so far committed to Iraq's reconstruction. The infrastructure is in ruins and the country is almost completely dependent on one industry, oil, according to the International Monetary Fund, which is leading the effort to analyze Iraq's economic prospects.
"People realize that although Iraq has very large oil resources, its capacity to produce oil just isn't sufficient to pay for both reconstruction and debt servicing," Lorenzo Perez, the head of the IMF's Iraq team, said in a recent IMF publication.
And the debt is separate from an additional $125 billion or so of reparation claims -- mainly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia -- from the Gulf War.
About this boom...
From the Economist- Without peace, reconstruction stalls
If the Americans left Iraq today, their most obvious physical legacy, in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis, would be concrete blocks. The big slabs protecting administrators, soldiers and contractors from the 30-odd countries in the ruling coalition, which is due to be dissolved at the end of June in favour of an interim government run by Iraqis, jut into Baghdad's main roads and often reduce traffic in the capital to a standstill. Meanwhile, as the violence sputters on, the country's reconstruction—witness, for example, its communications system—is a shambles.
The insurgency, aimed at America's foreign and Iraqi contractors as much as the soldiers of occupation, is largely to blame. Last month 90 foreigners were kidnapped, prompting Russia, Portugal, Poland and France to urge their nationals to go home. Another bomb this week targeted a Baghdad hotel full of contractors. Kellogg Brown & Root, which has won the biggest building contracts in the new Iraq, has seen 34 of its staff killed, a higher toll than has been sustained by the military forces of any of America's allies bar Britain's.
Security squads and the protection of buildings, along with insurance and the soaring costs of transport on dangerous roads, account for as much as 30% of the costs of some of the companies trying to set up in business. The Californian building and engineering giant, Bechtel, which is handling contracts with the Agency for International Development (USAID) worth around $2 billion, has pulled half of its staff out to neighbouring Jordan and Kuwait and has assigned two Gurkha bodyguards to each of its 33 expatriates left in Baghdad. After last month's insurrections in Fallujah, to the west, and in Shia towns to the south, many of its key people have, for the time being, gone.
An official at the planning ministry, which oversees Iraq's reconstruction effort, says that productivity has slumped virtually to nil. When the militia of a rebel Shia firebrand, Muqtada al-Sadr, swooped through towns to the south of Baghdad, water, sewage-treatment and other projects were abandoned to scavengers, who stripped plants of machinery. Other than looters, the beneficiaries have been the 20,000-odd men working for security companies. They have blurred the lines between civilian and military contractors. Both are targets of the insurgents.
As the summer heat rises, many essentials are getting scarcer. The schools are still open and exams held on time. But after months of regular electricity at night, long power cuts have become frequent again, plunging the capital into darkness and increasing crime. Promises that by next month the country's output would have risen from 4,500 to 6,000 megawatts (the amount a biggish American town consumes) look unlikely to be kept, especially since all of Siemens's specialists and most of General Electric's have left. This week another Russian engineer was killed and two more kidnapped at a power plant, prompting a further flight of foreigners.
Tell it to the hand, Pollyannas.
posted by y2karl at 1:06 PM on May 28, 2004
Well, here's one past due prediction:
Sadr is coming to the end of his string. A coalition of 25 Shia tribal leaders and the four top clerics of Najaf gave him a deadline of May 15 to surrender to them, as a face-saving gesture, to face trial for murder without ever being in the custody of the US....
I'm still betting one of his bodyguard offs him, hoping to curry favor or get a cash reward.
I think we can all agree that, once again, here kablam is WRONG!
Now consider this paragraph from here:
Iraq has lots of things going for it.
#1 is money. Not only are they getting boucoup oil revenues with more to come; but their currency is really strong and stable; the actually have a flat tax(!), which is the lowest and projected to be the most efficient (as in fair) tax in the region, making them a magnet for investment. Bremer is setting them up for economic boom like MacArthur did Japan. Nothing succeeds like success.
kablam is always talking about how the oils flowing out and the money's flowing in for Iraq, so let's consider the potential for oil revenues...
Iraq Pipeline Watch
50. May 8 - bomb 35 miles (56 km) south of Basra damaged an 18-foot section of one of two pipelines running from Basra to the Faw peninsula on the Gulf. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Spokesman Steve Wright said oil exports from the Basra and Khor al-Amaya offshore southern terminals, through which about 90% of Iraq's oil exports flow, were stopped as a result: "Pumping has stopped. They attacked in the vicinity where the manifold goes into the sea." According to Iraqi officials exports were still flowing from Basra albeit at a reduced rate of 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) compared with 1.6 million bpd prior to the attack as oil from the damaged pipeline is flowing through the parallel pipeline. Ali Nasr al-Rubaie, director of the main port terminal said exports had been halved following the attack: "We have dropped from an average of 80,000 barrels per hour to 40,000 barrels per hour."
51. May 8 - attack on oil pipeline taking crude northwards from the country’s southern oilfields at point 25 miles (40 km) south of Baghdad, oil ministry spokesman Assem Jihad said on Saturday, noting it would take several days to start pumping oil again.
52. May 9 - blast near a strategic oil pipeline network linking north and south Iraq, by the town of Musayyib, about 56 miles (90 km) south of Baghdad. Unclear what caused the explosion or whether the pipeline itself was damaged.
53. May 13 - rocket landed in a gas plant at the Daura oil refinery in Baghdad, injured a worker and caused a fire.
54. May 24 - explosion badly damaged the Northern pipeline at around 7pm local time on a section between the Kirkuk oilfields and the Dibis pumping installations. A security official of Iraq's Northern Oil Company, Juma Ahmad, said pumping had to be stopped to fight the fire. Another security official for Northern Oil, Issam Muhammad, said while the fire had been put out it would take 12 days to repair the damage.
Targeting weak points: Iraq's oil pipelines
Some Iraqi oil, perhaps as much as 200,000 to 300,000 barrels per day (bpd), is being reinjected into oil reservoirs in the north due to constraints on both domestic processing ability as well as export outlets. As of August 2003, roughly 40 percent of northern Iraqi production was being transferred to the Baiji refinery, with the balance reinjected into the fields, ostensibly to maintain pressure. This means, however, that crude oil production is overstated by a level equivalent to the volume of oil reinjected (as it is not available for refining or export, but is still counted as production).
As of December 2003, total oil production in Iraq recovered to a daily average of almost 2 million barrels per day (mbd), excluding the crude oil that is being reinjected, with exports reaching almost 1.5 million mbd. But the vast majority of that output is from the southern fields, with the targeting of the northern sector seriously hindering production in the northern fields. This north-south divide also has important implications for domestic politics and stability, and exacerbates the complexities of power between the self-sufficient Kurds in the north, the emboldened Shi'ites in the south and the disgruntled Sunnis in between.
Pipeline bombing cuts Iraq oil exports 25 percent
Insurgents bombed an oil pipeline in southern Iraq, setting off a huge blaze and slashing daily Iraqi oil exports by about 25 percent, or 450,000 barrels per day, an official said today.
Insurgents have often attacked the much smaller northern pipeline to Turkey but attacks against Iraq's southern oil facilities, which account for almost 90 percent of the country's exports, have been rare.
Militants set off the bomb Saturday under the Faw oil pipeline, some 35 miles south of the main southern city of Basra, said an engineer at Iraq's Southern Oil Company, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Iraq Oil Exports Suffer New Blow With World Prices Near 13-year Highs
Tanker loadings from Basra, Iraq’s main southern port, have been halved by the sabotage of one of the terminal’s two feeder pipelines in a fresh blow to an industry already reeling from prolonged disruption of exports from its main northern oilfields. The setback for the key foreign exchange earner, which the occupying coalition had been counting on to fund the reconstruction and recovery of Iraq following its spring 2003 invasion, came with world oil prices still hovering near 13-year highs.
“We have dropped from an average of 80,000 barrels per hour [BPH] to 40,000d”, said Ali Nasr Rubaie, manager of Basra’s offshore terminal, one of just two serving Iraq’s southern oilfields. The terminal’s executive director, Hamad Assadi, confirmed the fall in loadings following an attack on the feeder pipeline 40 kilometers south of the city.
Site engineers acknowledged that the 80,000 BPH figure had not always been met because of production constraints at the wells. Loadings sometimes ran as low as 50,000 BPH, said Moayyed Hashem. And officials at the other terminal serving Iraq’s southern oilfields -- Khor al-Amaya -- said they had some surplus capacity. “Currently, we have no tanker in dock”, admitted chief engineer Khairallah Abdelkader.
Economy's booming? Certainly in scrap metal:
In the Scrapyards of Jordan, Signs of a Looted Iraq
As the United States spends billions of dollars to rebuild Iraq's civil and military infrastructure, there is increasing evidence that parts of sensitive military equipment, seemingly brand-new components for oil rigs and water plants and whole complexes of older buildings are leaving the country on the backs of flatbed trucks.
By some estimates, at least 100 semitrailers loaded with what is billed as Iraqi scrap metal are streaming each day into Jordan, just one of six countries that share a border with Iraq.
American officials say sensitive equipment is, in fact, closely monitored and much of the rest that is leaving is legitimate removal and sale from a shattered country. But many experts say that much of what is going on amounts to a vast looting operation.
And about that currency--what's in the debit column?
Another enemy looms -- Iraq debt
$120 billion owed; 9 times nation's economic output
Iraq is thus burdened with an estimated $120 billion it owes. The enormous load, 900 percent the size of the national economy, dwarfs the approximately $33 billion the international community has so far committed to Iraq's reconstruction. The infrastructure is in ruins and the country is almost completely dependent on one industry, oil, according to the International Monetary Fund, which is leading the effort to analyze Iraq's economic prospects.
"People realize that although Iraq has very large oil resources, its capacity to produce oil just isn't sufficient to pay for both reconstruction and debt servicing," Lorenzo Perez, the head of the IMF's Iraq team, said in a recent IMF publication.
And the debt is separate from an additional $125 billion or so of reparation claims -- mainly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia -- from the Gulf War.
About this boom...
From the Economist- Without peace, reconstruction stalls
If the Americans left Iraq today, their most obvious physical legacy, in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis, would be concrete blocks. The big slabs protecting administrators, soldiers and contractors from the 30-odd countries in the ruling coalition, which is due to be dissolved at the end of June in favour of an interim government run by Iraqis, jut into Baghdad's main roads and often reduce traffic in the capital to a standstill. Meanwhile, as the violence sputters on, the country's reconstruction—witness, for example, its communications system—is a shambles.
The insurgency, aimed at America's foreign and Iraqi contractors as much as the soldiers of occupation, is largely to blame. Last month 90 foreigners were kidnapped, prompting Russia, Portugal, Poland and France to urge their nationals to go home. Another bomb this week targeted a Baghdad hotel full of contractors. Kellogg Brown & Root, which has won the biggest building contracts in the new Iraq, has seen 34 of its staff killed, a higher toll than has been sustained by the military forces of any of America's allies bar Britain's.
Security squads and the protection of buildings, along with insurance and the soaring costs of transport on dangerous roads, account for as much as 30% of the costs of some of the companies trying to set up in business. The Californian building and engineering giant, Bechtel, which is handling contracts with the Agency for International Development (USAID) worth around $2 billion, has pulled half of its staff out to neighbouring Jordan and Kuwait and has assigned two Gurkha bodyguards to each of its 33 expatriates left in Baghdad. After last month's insurrections in Fallujah, to the west, and in Shia towns to the south, many of its key people have, for the time being, gone.
An official at the planning ministry, which oversees Iraq's reconstruction effort, says that productivity has slumped virtually to nil. When the militia of a rebel Shia firebrand, Muqtada al-Sadr, swooped through towns to the south of Baghdad, water, sewage-treatment and other projects were abandoned to scavengers, who stripped plants of machinery. Other than looters, the beneficiaries have been the 20,000-odd men working for security companies. They have blurred the lines between civilian and military contractors. Both are targets of the insurgents.
As the summer heat rises, many essentials are getting scarcer. The schools are still open and exams held on time. But after months of regular electricity at night, long power cuts have become frequent again, plunging the capital into darkness and increasing crime. Promises that by next month the country's output would have risen from 4,500 to 6,000 megawatts (the amount a biggish American town consumes) look unlikely to be kept, especially since all of Siemens's specialists and most of General Electric's have left. This week another Russian engineer was killed and two more kidnapped at a power plant, prompting a further flight of foreigners.
Tell it to the hand, Pollyannas.
posted by y2karl at 1:06 PM on May 28, 2004
Note: A "quagmire" doesn't mean we are still in Iraq. I contend we plan to stay in force until at least 2010
That sounds like a quagmire to me.
using it as a base to dominate the whole region.
That sounds like "losing" to me.
posted by Mars Saxman at 1:11 PM on May 28, 2004
That sounds like a quagmire to me.
using it as a base to dominate the whole region.
That sounds like "losing" to me.
posted by Mars Saxman at 1:11 PM on May 28, 2004
Second of all, al-Sadr is OVER. He has surrendered to the other Imams and the tribal leaders, and will either stand trial before Iraqis or be exiled to Iran. His followers that are still attacking the US are so disconnected they don't even know there is a truce on. The Mehdi Army is disintigrating. al-Sadr is a humiliation to his people.
To quote John McLaughlin: WRONG!
Getting Away With Murder?
Still, no one seemed to know if or when Sadr would disband his militia, or surrender to face charges which accuse him, among other things, of involvement in the April 2003 murder of moderate Shiite cleric Abdel Majid al-Khoei. Both were unshakeable demands of U.S. authorities in early April. But subsequent weeks of debilitating violence—and the looming June 30 transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis—may have reshaped priorities for the Coalition. Now, it seems, Sadr himself will negotiate the future status of his militia and his arrest warrants with Shiite political and religious figures.
Will Sadr get off the hook? One of several Shiite figures striving to mediate in the conflict, Mohammed al-Musawi, said the deal involves transforming the Mahdi Army into a “political organization” and delaying Sadr’s prosecution until an elected government takes office after elections early next year.
Even if Sadr gives himself up to Iraqi authorities after June 30, as some sources say he is willing to do, many Iraqis now question whether he will—or should—be brought to trial. In an opinion poll last month, 31 percent of Iraqi respondents said they supported the pudgy-faced militant cleric, making him the third-most popular leader in the country. Today one Iraqi Governing Council member, Abdul-Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi, warned that Sadr’s arrest would simply trigger ''an unending revolution.''
posted by y2karl at 1:21 PM on May 28, 2004
To quote John McLaughlin: WRONG!
Getting Away With Murder?
Still, no one seemed to know if or when Sadr would disband his militia, or surrender to face charges which accuse him, among other things, of involvement in the April 2003 murder of moderate Shiite cleric Abdel Majid al-Khoei. Both were unshakeable demands of U.S. authorities in early April. But subsequent weeks of debilitating violence—and the looming June 30 transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis—may have reshaped priorities for the Coalition. Now, it seems, Sadr himself will negotiate the future status of his militia and his arrest warrants with Shiite political and religious figures.
Will Sadr get off the hook? One of several Shiite figures striving to mediate in the conflict, Mohammed al-Musawi, said the deal involves transforming the Mahdi Army into a “political organization” and delaying Sadr’s prosecution until an elected government takes office after elections early next year.
Even if Sadr gives himself up to Iraqi authorities after June 30, as some sources say he is willing to do, many Iraqis now question whether he will—or should—be brought to trial. In an opinion poll last month, 31 percent of Iraqi respondents said they supported the pudgy-faced militant cleric, making him the third-most popular leader in the country. Today one Iraqi Governing Council member, Abdul-Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi, warned that Sadr’s arrest would simply trigger ''an unending revolution.''
posted by y2karl at 1:21 PM on May 28, 2004
In one of y2karl's links there was this excellent little snippet that shows someone obviously got an MBA in the 1990s:
This dovetails nicely with John Brady Kiesling's excellent explanation of a classic Machievellian colonial exit strategy: appear to lose steadily to a minor native resistance figure and during that conflict big him up to dictator-in-waiting. Then after a few years of strife and surreptitious aid, establish semi-cordial relations with Iraq's new Strong Man and it's back to business as usual.
In Shia towns, including the holiest, Najaf, General Martin Dempsey has offered to turn Mr Sadr's lieutenants into “stakeholders” in seven battalions being set up within a new Iraqi army and to let Mr Sadr's foot-soldiers join it as recruits.Yes, turn your fiercest foes into "stakeholders", after they have proved themselves quite resilient in battle. It's cooperation with the competition, or "co-opition" as it was lamely termed in the Bubble Economy, in the best sense of the word.
This dovetails nicely with John Brady Kiesling's excellent explanation of a classic Machievellian colonial exit strategy: appear to lose steadily to a minor native resistance figure and during that conflict big him up to dictator-in-waiting. Then after a few years of strife and surreptitious aid, establish semi-cordial relations with Iraq's new Strong Man and it's back to business as usual.
To achieve its vital war aims, in other words, America must abandon its dream of victory and accept the appearance of defeat ... Success breeds success. Iraqis will quickly rally to any leader associated with our retreat. We should strive to become invisible, while our foe takes on responsibility for the security Iraqis have learned to value more than freedom. When the time comes, we will pull out completely, and an Iraqi leader will enter Baghdad in triumph.posted by meehawl at 1:45 PM on May 28, 2004
The thing is, it seems that people are arguing too much about what the Americans will/are do/doing. What really matters is what the Iraqis do. In the end even the world's largest army has nothing on a united and determined people.
From what I've seen, if Iraq does become a success (and I think it will) it will be in spite of, and not because of the US post-war management. Getting rid of Saddam was a blessing, but since it SEEMS (I am not there so I can't say for sure) that things have been horribly bungled. But I still have hope.
posted by chaz at 1:59 PM on May 28, 2004
From what I've seen, if Iraq does become a success (and I think it will) it will be in spite of, and not because of the US post-war management. Getting rid of Saddam was a blessing, but since it SEEMS (I am not there so I can't say for sure) that things have been horribly bungled. But I still have hope.
posted by chaz at 1:59 PM on May 28, 2004
What really matters is what the Iraqis do
That's true. It's become increasingly evident over the past century or so that an increase in the lethality of personal weaponry and the effectiveness of decentralised operations has made it increasingly difficult for any central power to rule or occupy a country without the consent of the population. It's a democratisation of dissent, a commoditisation of revolt. We are moving from one historical pattern to another, from an era of grossly effective Centralised Empires to an era of constrained Great Powers. I was only quoting something like this a few days ago:
That's true. It's become increasingly evident over the past century or so that an increase in the lethality of personal weaponry and the effectiveness of decentralised operations has made it increasingly difficult for any central power to rule or occupy a country without the consent of the population. It's a democratisation of dissent, a commoditisation of revolt. We are moving from one historical pattern to another, from an era of grossly effective Centralised Empires to an era of constrained Great Powers. I was only quoting something like this a few days ago:
Great powers are fickle, and only care about themselves, not their small allies of opportunity, the Generals Thieu and Thé of the present and future. Then again, there is no such thing as a trustworthy surrogate: they have wills of their own, aims that may coincide with their protectors' only in the short term, and an alarming ability to drag great powers into their quarrels and to change sides when the dollars dry up.posted by meehawl at 3:17 PM on May 28, 2004
From what I've seen, if Iraq does become a success (and I think it will) it will be in spite of, and not because of the US post-war management. Getting rid of Saddam was a blessing, but since it SEEMS (I am not there so I can't say for sure) that things have been horribly bungled.
The most likely outcome of all this, I think, is that Iraq will hold together and achieve an equilibrium of low-grade, former-Soviet-republic-esque chaos, such that it becomes useless for proving anybody's points about foreign policy. Big joke on us!
posted by furiousthought at 4:03 PM on May 28, 2004
The most likely outcome of all this, I think, is that Iraq will hold together and achieve an equilibrium of low-grade, former-Soviet-republic-esque chaos, such that it becomes useless for proving anybody's points about foreign policy. Big joke on us!
posted by furiousthought at 4:03 PM on May 28, 2004
The Fake Peace
An Orwellian "peace" has descended upon Najaf. On Friday afternoon, the day after a peace agreement with the U.S. forces was announced, armed Mahdi army fighters were occupying all their usual posts. The men had retrieved their rifles and grenade launchers, which they had hidden away when the peace deal was announced, and were carefully watching people move through the city, asking visiting foreigners for their documents. Failure to produce the correct document can lead to immediate arrest.
According to the surprise peace agreement, worked out between the tribal authorities and the opposing sides, the Mahdi army was to permanently put down its weapons and withdraw from the city. In return, the United States promised to honor the cease-fire and suspend operations, pulling back to bases near Najaf. Iraqi police, not U.S. forces or militiamen, were supposed to return and guarantee order.
But as of Friday afternoon, the Mahdi army had made no move to withdraw or lay down its weapons, leaving the most important part of the peace plan in ruins. U.S. tanks usually parked near the police station at the Revolution of 1920 Square could not be seen. Despite much hopeful talk, Najaf has not been returned to civilian authorities: It is still under the aegis of the militants and the secretive Sharia court they use to deliver sentences...
On Friday morning, the number of armed men on the streets of Najaf did not seem to have diminished, and in places it seemed to have increased. And as of late Friday afternoon, Mahdi army volunteers were still streaming into Najaf, responding to Muqtada's call for assistance, some coming from other countries. The numbers of militiamen were growing significantly. Pickup trucks full of men with heavy weapons were parked on the street leading to the medina, or old town. Many of the fighters were from out of town. The trucks had been quickly painted over, and the faint image of the blue Iraqi police lettering was still visible.
With the pressure from the United States abated, the Mahdi fighters spent Friday acting as if they had just won a great victory.
It has been a lighting-fast turnaround. Earlier in the week, the religious militia had suffered high casualties in fierce battles with U.S. forces and seemed on the verge of collapse. Two charred vehicles in Kufa bore testament to an Apache helicopter attack on Sunday, the occupants burned beyond recognition. At least eight other Mahdi dead lay in a makeshift morgue outside Najaf's main hospital in a refrigerator truck. Tuesday also saw some of the fiercest battles since the beginning of the conflict: The U.S. military used tanks to attack Mahdi army checkpoints in Kufa as well as positions near the vast Najaf graveyard. Light poles in the small suburb of Kufa have been cut down by machine-gun fire, and concrete barriers pierced by artillery shells. The main street between the bridge over the Euphrates and the American base is in ruins.
But despite the heavy fighting and the high casualties of the last week, the movement seems to be going through a strange rebirth with the arrival of fresh volunteers.
posted by y2karl at 8:12 PM on May 28, 2004
An Orwellian "peace" has descended upon Najaf. On Friday afternoon, the day after a peace agreement with the U.S. forces was announced, armed Mahdi army fighters were occupying all their usual posts. The men had retrieved their rifles and grenade launchers, which they had hidden away when the peace deal was announced, and were carefully watching people move through the city, asking visiting foreigners for their documents. Failure to produce the correct document can lead to immediate arrest.
According to the surprise peace agreement, worked out between the tribal authorities and the opposing sides, the Mahdi army was to permanently put down its weapons and withdraw from the city. In return, the United States promised to honor the cease-fire and suspend operations, pulling back to bases near Najaf. Iraqi police, not U.S. forces or militiamen, were supposed to return and guarantee order.
But as of Friday afternoon, the Mahdi army had made no move to withdraw or lay down its weapons, leaving the most important part of the peace plan in ruins. U.S. tanks usually parked near the police station at the Revolution of 1920 Square could not be seen. Despite much hopeful talk, Najaf has not been returned to civilian authorities: It is still under the aegis of the militants and the secretive Sharia court they use to deliver sentences...
On Friday morning, the number of armed men on the streets of Najaf did not seem to have diminished, and in places it seemed to have increased. And as of late Friday afternoon, Mahdi army volunteers were still streaming into Najaf, responding to Muqtada's call for assistance, some coming from other countries. The numbers of militiamen were growing significantly. Pickup trucks full of men with heavy weapons were parked on the street leading to the medina, or old town. Many of the fighters were from out of town. The trucks had been quickly painted over, and the faint image of the blue Iraqi police lettering was still visible.
With the pressure from the United States abated, the Mahdi fighters spent Friday acting as if they had just won a great victory.
It has been a lighting-fast turnaround. Earlier in the week, the religious militia had suffered high casualties in fierce battles with U.S. forces and seemed on the verge of collapse. Two charred vehicles in Kufa bore testament to an Apache helicopter attack on Sunday, the occupants burned beyond recognition. At least eight other Mahdi dead lay in a makeshift morgue outside Najaf's main hospital in a refrigerator truck. Tuesday also saw some of the fiercest battles since the beginning of the conflict: The U.S. military used tanks to attack Mahdi army checkpoints in Kufa as well as positions near the vast Najaf graveyard. Light poles in the small suburb of Kufa have been cut down by machine-gun fire, and concrete barriers pierced by artillery shells. The main street between the bridge over the Euphrates and the American base is in ruins.
But despite the heavy fighting and the high casualties of the last week, the movement seems to be going through a strange rebirth with the arrival of fresh volunteers.
posted by y2karl at 8:12 PM on May 28, 2004
[o/t] I appreciate the comments regarding my use of the expression "pure military terms". War is politics by other means, so arguments that Tet lacked practical benefit are correct. I can't deny this. However, the fact America lost in Vietnam in no way labels every incident of military combat a US failure. Here's an illustration. During the war, there were instances when ambushes were uncovered and annihilated without American casualties. Can these be labelled defeats, simply because the war was lost? For the soldiers involved and their commanders (and me), such an assertion is ridiculous.
Don't be put off by the introduction's emotive tone; this article has some thoughtful analysis and neatly summarises my argument regarding the Tet offensive:
Don't be put off by the introduction's emotive tone; this article has some thoughtful analysis and neatly summarises my argument regarding the Tet offensive:
Competing myths about Tet claim that it was a defeat for the United States, countered by equally strident claims that it was a military victory. Those opposing views can be reconciled through the use of a military template, for military analysis looks at battlefield events on three distinct but interlocking levels.posted by pots at 2:59 AM on May 29, 2004
First is the tactical or battlefield level. Second is the operational or theater-of-war level. Third is the strategic or political-military level. Victory at one level does not necessarily guarantee victory at a higher level. You may indeed win the battle but lose the war. This was brought home to me in Hanoi a week before the fall of Saigon. "You know you never beat us on the battlefield!" I said to my NVA counterpart. He thought about that a moment, then replied, "That may be so. But it's also irrelevant."
Aw shucks, meehawl, maybe if you'd deigned to read any of those links you'd dug up (I'm flattered, really), you'd notice a few things:
1) Charles called a few members of Metafilter "terror apologists", not me. As an active member here, more active than you are, I would think that would show no concern on my part for hanging out in parts of the web where I don't always agree with every comment.
2) Speaking of parts of the web where I don't always agree with every comment, I haven't commented at LGF for what, a year, year and a half? And I stand anythig I said there--and again, if you'd read my comments, you'd notice some of them were taking other commentors to task for their harsh views. But your point was not to actually debate or discuss anything at all, just to tar with a broad brush.
3) And why stop at the FAQ on my site, when I have over three years of blog posts to sort through? Or two years of Metafilter comments? What was the point of that exactly? Unless you're so dense that you thought you were outing me in some way. Newsflash, dude: my identity has never been a secret.
Additionally, perhaps you are unaware that Matt has long had a clear no-linking-to-LGF no-sniping-at-LGF policy on Metafilter. Or perhaps you simply don't care. In any case, you've said nothing to repond to kablam's or my comments in this thread, just mined some of my very long Google history. Like I said, it's flattering, but what's your point?
posted by Asparagirl at 1:22 PM on May 29, 2004
1) Charles called a few members of Metafilter "terror apologists", not me. As an active member here, more active than you are, I would think that would show no concern on my part for hanging out in parts of the web where I don't always agree with every comment.
2) Speaking of parts of the web where I don't always agree with every comment, I haven't commented at LGF for what, a year, year and a half? And I stand anythig I said there--and again, if you'd read my comments, you'd notice some of them were taking other commentors to task for their harsh views. But your point was not to actually debate or discuss anything at all, just to tar with a broad brush.
3) And why stop at the FAQ on my site, when I have over three years of blog posts to sort through? Or two years of Metafilter comments? What was the point of that exactly? Unless you're so dense that you thought you were outing me in some way. Newsflash, dude: my identity has never been a secret.
Additionally, perhaps you are unaware that Matt has long had a clear no-linking-to-LGF no-sniping-at-LGF policy on Metafilter. Or perhaps you simply don't care. In any case, you've said nothing to repond to kablam's or my comments in this thread, just mined some of my very long Google history. Like I said, it's flattering, but what's your point?
posted by Asparagirl at 1:22 PM on May 29, 2004
kablam: Note: A "quagmire" doesn't mean we are still in Iraq. I contend we plan to stay in force until at least 2010
Mars Saxman: That sounds like a quagmire to me.
Would you consider the war in Europe to have been a quagmire, then? We still have tens of thousands of troops stationed there, 55+ years after the end of WWII. Insurgent attacks were continuing against our troops there until at least the late 1940's. How about our troops in Okinawa, or South Korea?
kablam: using it as a base to dominate the whole region.
Mars Saxman: That sounds like "losing" to me.
Same questions as before. And having a base of operations in a volatile region is a plus, not a minus.
posted by Asparagirl at 1:33 PM on May 29, 2004
Mars Saxman: That sounds like a quagmire to me.
Would you consider the war in Europe to have been a quagmire, then? We still have tens of thousands of troops stationed there, 55+ years after the end of WWII. Insurgent attacks were continuing against our troops there until at least the late 1940's. How about our troops in Okinawa, or South Korea?
kablam: using it as a base to dominate the whole region.
Mars Saxman: That sounds like "losing" to me.
Same questions as before. And having a base of operations in a volatile region is a plus, not a minus.
posted by Asparagirl at 1:33 PM on May 29, 2004
Would you consider the war in Europe to have been a quagmire, then? We still have tens of thousands of troops stationed there, 55+ years after the end of WWII. Insurgent attacks were continuing against our troops there until at least the late 1940's. How about our troops in Okinawa, or South Korea?
I would. I would love to see those troops recalled, and those bases closed.
posted by thirteen at 1:57 PM on May 29, 2004
"You know you never beat us on the battlefield!" I said to my NVA counterpart. He thought about that a moment, then replied, "That may be so. But it's also irrelevant."
I think in Vietnam the US always put the cart before the horse, so to speak. A pattern of tactical victories proved to be, as the source says, irrelevant to the inevitability of the final victory. The Vietnamese nationalists had basically known they were going to win since 1945, when Bao Dai abdicated in favour of Ho Chi Minh. Of course with the benefit of hindsight it's easy to see that creating a stable and sufficiently strong South Vietnam vassal state was always a social, political and military impossibility. What, then, will people in 20 years say about the US invasion of Iraq? Will it be viewed in the same negative light as the similar British invasion after WW1? Or the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan?
I think in Vietnam the US always put the cart before the horse, so to speak. A pattern of tactical victories proved to be, as the source says, irrelevant to the inevitability of the final victory. The Vietnamese nationalists had basically known they were going to win since 1945, when Bao Dai abdicated in favour of Ho Chi Minh. Of course with the benefit of hindsight it's easy to see that creating a stable and sufficiently strong South Vietnam vassal state was always a social, political and military impossibility. What, then, will people in 20 years say about the US invasion of Iraq? Will it be viewed in the same negative light as the similar British invasion after WW1? Or the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan?
In war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.posted by meehawl at 4:36 PM on May 29, 2004
Charles called a few members of Metafilter "terror apologists", not me.
Did I attribute these words to you? ANd if this "Charles" picked out "a few members", then who are they? I'd love to see a list of un-Americans.
more active than you are
Quality over quantity baby.
you've said nothing to repond to kablam's or my comments in this thread
I responded to some of the directed attacks. The actual "substance" of the dualistic thesis presented was problematized quite succinctly by "mr roboto" so I felt I had little to add there. In terms of structure the thesis presented was old six months ago and hardly bears examination. Your contribution consisted of hardly anything but "Hell yeah!". Are you then part of this vast right-wing echo chamber I hear so much about?
I have over three years of blog posts to sort through?
I have nearly 20 years of online postings to sort through - I am no stranger to online identity politics. Not everyone who reads this thread is aware or would be aware of contributors' backgrounds. Context is always good - especially when someone's contribution in question is so... sparse. I admire the moral expediancy of a person who is prepared to put out a FAQ about themselves and their partner. Why shouldn't I link to it?
Matt has long had a clear no-linking-to-LGF no-sniping-at-LGF policy on Metafilter.
That I wasn't aware of. There should be a FAQ! Not linking makes sense. When some of the brownshirt goons from LGF decided to DOS my website and spambomb my email with hate speech and quite honestly repeititious moronicisms it was quite aggravating until I IP-blocked them. But not sniping? Is this then the principle of mutual assured destruction in action?
posted by meehawl at 4:53 PM on May 29, 2004
Did I attribute these words to you? ANd if this "Charles" picked out "a few members", then who are they? I'd love to see a list of un-Americans.
more active than you are
Quality over quantity baby.
you've said nothing to repond to kablam's or my comments in this thread
I responded to some of the directed attacks. The actual "substance" of the dualistic thesis presented was problematized quite succinctly by "mr roboto" so I felt I had little to add there. In terms of structure the thesis presented was old six months ago and hardly bears examination. Your contribution consisted of hardly anything but "Hell yeah!". Are you then part of this vast right-wing echo chamber I hear so much about?
I have over three years of blog posts to sort through?
I have nearly 20 years of online postings to sort through - I am no stranger to online identity politics. Not everyone who reads this thread is aware or would be aware of contributors' backgrounds. Context is always good - especially when someone's contribution in question is so... sparse. I admire the moral expediancy of a person who is prepared to put out a FAQ about themselves and their partner. Why shouldn't I link to it?
Matt has long had a clear no-linking-to-LGF no-sniping-at-LGF policy on Metafilter.
That I wasn't aware of. There should be a FAQ! Not linking makes sense. When some of the brownshirt goons from LGF decided to DOS my website and spambomb my email with hate speech and quite honestly repeititious moronicisms it was quite aggravating until I IP-blocked them. But not sniping? Is this then the principle of mutual assured destruction in action?
posted by meehawl at 4:53 PM on May 29, 2004
pots, to what purpose are you gilding this daffodil? A military force can win a battle within a less-than-successful larger context - so what? Your enthusiasm for this banal point seems out of all proportion to its significance. Am I missing something?
Asparagirl, I'm not sure that I agree with meehawl's "context is always good" pronouncement, but whether context is "always good" or not, it is pretty hard to ignore. Personally, I wish members' greater online identities were left chained to a bicycle rack outside of the building, preferably in a magical spot where it is always raining and angry dogs are always circling. When they follow you in here, they do influence my appreciation of your remarks, especially when those remarks sometimes seem artfully adjusted to mollify the MetaFilter audience. It's part of the price you pay for importing ego. Just sayin'.
meehawl--Is this then the principle of mutual assured destruction in action?
Pretty much, yeah. Prolly substitute "diaper rash" for "destruction".
posted by Opus Dark at 9:17 PM on May 29, 2004
Asparagirl, I'm not sure that I agree with meehawl's "context is always good" pronouncement, but whether context is "always good" or not, it is pretty hard to ignore. Personally, I wish members' greater online identities were left chained to a bicycle rack outside of the building, preferably in a magical spot where it is always raining and angry dogs are always circling. When they follow you in here, they do influence my appreciation of your remarks, especially when those remarks sometimes seem artfully adjusted to mollify the MetaFilter audience. It's part of the price you pay for importing ego. Just sayin'.
meehawl--Is this then the principle of mutual assured destruction in action?
Pretty much, yeah. Prolly substitute "diaper rash" for "destruction".
posted by Opus Dark at 9:17 PM on May 29, 2004
Insurgents and Islam Now Rulers of Fallouja
In the wake of a truce last month that averted an all-out assault by U.S. Marines, the conservative Sunni Muslim city west of Baghdad has taken on the trappings of a mini-republic that lives largely according to its own rules ... The principal U.S. aims under the truce, which was reached in the wake of three weeks of fierce fighting between Marines and insurgents, do not appear even close to being achieved ... U.S. military spokesman Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt told reporters in Baghdad on Saturday that "we are not satisfied we are making active progress" in the case or toward other truce objectives.posted by meehawl at 1:19 PM on June 14, 2004
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*sits back and waits for someone to point out counterexample*
posted by spazzm at 5:05 PM on May 27, 2004